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SUl tARY
This report of the findings of an interdisciplinary group of research
workers at Syracuse University deals with project management in NASA's
Apollo program in four interrelated sections following the introductory
ii chapter.
.'4
Chapter II examines the Apollo program in tilecontext of the total
NASA organization. Because of its importance, Apollo tended to be the
dominant agency consideration for several years, and as a resultD the
continued existence of NASA as a large agency WaS threatenedas that
program began to phase out. The Apollo program wa_ a unique undertaking.
As such, organizational arrangements worked out during the course of the
program's existence must be treated as suggestive of techniques that might
apply inother organizational settings.
/
i Within the Apollo program, the initial organization and its consequent
changes proved to be influenced by various factors including the past history
of the constituent parts of the effort, the national climate at the time
_ theorlginal decision to activate Apollo was made, the life-cycle nature of
,, projects, the personalities a_d experience of people Who were running the
: program, and the trade-offs effeCted which _re partleuiarly constrained by ii
a tight schedule. Three significant Organlzational technlques that developed i
in Apollo are discussed° Th_se are: the purpOsefUl use of conflict to Insure .
I
control by the top of the orsinlzatlo_, the use Of the change control panels _
to facilltate problem solving and cooralnatlon_ and the use of mattlx organl-
zatlo_s cmlpled with a single authority n_xus to insure continued functioning _
,il
:i of the matrix. " )ii
r
: '7%
.... : 'ii .... '(15
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Chapter III of thls report deals with the nature of project management
13 and the manner in which project managers functioned in the Apollo p_ogr_n.
There were a number of important managerial characteristics associated
with Apollo project management methods. First, the form of project manage-
ment used in Apolle was a problem-oriented approach. As such, its unique
contribution to its larger "host" organization was to solve the complex
organizational problems undertaken in _,ccomvllshing AFollo objectives. Second,
the project management system used in Apollo was characterized by a multi-
disciplinary management approach bec:_use complex task resolution required tile
integrated efforts of many disciplinary specialists. In other words, in
Apollo, project management provided the vehicle for the integration of organi-
zational specialists with the complex problems undertaken. Third, the project
management systems employed in Apollo were designed to provide the all-
important responsibility point-of-commitment since one manager was ultimately
_i charged with the success or failure of a task. Fourth, the project approach -
Ji, used employed a systems perspective in problem-solving. Not only did the
pro_ect manager have to be _ware of the internal workings of the project_
_.. he also had to be cognizant of the project's larger environmental context.
:iii', Fifth, project management allowed flexibillty and innovation i_ organlza-
i
_. tlonal design. This was often accomplished Without a complete revamplng
_, of the entire structUre of theNASA organization. This was evident in the
_: majer NASA centerswhose functional organizations could Be kept intact
_:_:_ despite the size of the Apollo program.
_'-,i Conflict was often a fundamental characteristic of Apollo project
ii_.' management. The value of the conflict produced depended upon how the
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project team members perceived _he conflict and how the project manager i
was able to manage the emergent conflict _ituatlons. Several examples
are given In Chapter III of how conflict situations were handled by
project participants in the Apollo. program.
: An examination of the influence styles by which project managers in
: 7
Apollo were able to get compliance from interfaces focused on four primary
i
sources of influence: reward power, punishment power, expert power, and
referent power. It appeared that the most effective "management style"
_v
employed was one based on the project manager's expert and referent power.
Moreover, the expert/referent style would seem to be less disruptive to
,, the total organization.
Finally_ four areas which produced problems for project managers in
their day-to-day management activities were revealed. These were: managing
human interrelationships in the project organizations maintaining a balance
o.
between technlcal and managerial project functlons_ coping with various
_ types of project risks, and surviving institutional restraints and
.-i: rigidities placed on the project organization.
The existence of a very extensive technical competence within NASA7_
'i
at the beginning of the A_oilo program played a large role In shaping the
_ management schemes used at the three ma_or centers involved. Chapter IV
of this report discusses the utilizatlon Of the in-house technical competence
In the support of the Apollo program. Organlzatl.on81 diagrams for MSFC,
MSC, and KSC are pre6ented in such a way as to illustrate the relatlonships
.... at each of the three centers between the Apollo prog_mofflces and the _:
functlonal directorates, ....
00000001-TSAO8
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A significant difference between MSFC and MSC i_ found in the location
of sub-system managers in the Program Management side of the house at the
former and within the functional directorates at the latter. This foste_ed
resentmengs between the Research and Development Laboratories and the project
managers at MSFC, though it did give the ma_.agers more direct control over
details. The sub-system managers at MSC maintained better relationships
with their technical bases and were exposed to less professional risk in
assuming a management position, but project managers felt a lack of direct
communicatlo_ as a result.
Responsibility for Apollo was purposely diffused at MSFC so that center
management was necessarily involved, whereas it was possible at M_C to ignore
the center organization to the detriment of the program unless the ASPO
manager specifically _ade an effort to involve the center. At KSC, Launch
Operations had prime responsibility for launch and the Apollo offices served
essentially as llason to the other two centers. The styles of operation of
* those two centers were reflected in their response to problems at KSC where
MSC displayed a greater trust than did MSFC in its resident managers and
_' contractors.
"_ The problem of communlcatlon and co-trol over changes in this tremendous
program involving Headquarters and the three centers was very effectively met i
through the use of Change ContrOl Boards and Configuration Control Panels at :
i
all.management levels, These may represent the greatest contribution to ,,
:_ compi_x project management made by NASA and the Apollo program°
It is doubtful whether any internal management schemep no matter how i,
well conceived or carefully executed, could have achieved the ambltlous goals :
i
*:-, of the Apollo program without the tremendous personal dedication of essentially
! ,
, 'i ,i
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every team m_mber to the clearly defined goals of the program. It Is also
doubtful whether succesa could have been achieved if NASA had not mai_talned
_,_ its own tremendous in-house teclmlcal eapabJlJty o Nowhere else could a
program manager depend on such support in dealing with contractors or in
searching for the best in alternative proposals.
i_!'_ Chapter V of this report discusses the formal and informal relation-iJ
_I__ ships between Apollo managers and the conuractors. The project managers
_'_iI dealt with their prime contractors formally through the project or contract
officer and the resident NASA office. Informally, a great deal of communica-
tion took place between various pairs of people in NASA and in the contractor
organizations. A compromise was necessary between the need for rapid com-
munication and the more time consuming documentation for configuration and
cost control. But this palnstakln8 documentation is the only known method
:' to ins_,re control of a complex engineering system.
The MSFC type of project/contractor interface was somewhat more cumber-
4
some, but mere thorough, than that of MSC. The Huntsville projects, to the
discomfort of the contractor, seemed to benefit more from in-house expertise
partly because of the weaker authority of the project manager. Schedule
", pressures, however, Justified the easier decision making of the MSC style.
Resident offices played a very important facilitating role for both prlncl-
pals. The tendency of MSFC to by-pass the resident offices, however,
llmlted the u_efulness of these orsanlzatlons. Contract negotiation through
MSC was considered by contractors to be _ore dlrect and efficient than through
i
MSFC where there was dual responsibility of contracts personnel to both :"
instltutlon and project.
i
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Contractor program organ]za1:iona _hanged constantly in terms of
resource competlt!on w:[thin the Company. The authority of the program
naturally depended on its relative magnitude Matrl_ mac_agemezltwas
really practiced by the contractors only at a particular stage in the
program's hi_tOryo For many reasons, the probability of a contractor
;! effectlvely integrating the a¢._Ivitles of other prlme contractors i_
:i
rather small° These functions were executed bes_ by NASA itself.
The forced intimacy of a publ_c agency w_th orivate corporatlons
i_evitably produced certain points of disagreement and irritation.
There were valid grounds for some of the contrac=ors' grievances per-
talni_g to NASA procedures. Nevertheless, all concerned.admitted (some-
times grudgingly) that these procedures have helped more than hindered '
the achievement of program objectives while fully protecting the public
interest.
\
-!
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INTRODUCTION
As a part o_ a relatively modest NASA program aC Syracus_ University,
an interdisciplinary team o£ faculty members and graduate students under-
took a study of the characteristics of project management in _he Apollo
Program. The research was conceived paztlally in response to NASA's desire
to make itself available as a learning laboratory in the area of large
scale technological enterprise by a government agency. But it was also
anticipated that an unbiased, objective investigation of project manage-
ment practices by a group not affiliated with NASA or the federal government
might result in some insights that very well could have evaded the eyes of
those deeply imbedded in the NASA organization. The presumption that a
University based research team could penetrate the NASA Manned Space Flight
organization turned out to be quite correct. The t¢,am enjoyed from almost
all NASA personnel contacted, an openness, a degree of cooperation, under-
__: standing, and confidence that exceeded the most optunJst_c hopes ever
--_ entertained by the tea_. For this ready exchange of ideas, the research
team is deeply indebted to NASA, and to those of its prime Apollo contractors
who were vls_ted, and who responded in a similar way.
The complexity of the task originally defined required the team to
constrain itself to the study of something less than the entire NASA operation,
or even of the entire Apollo program. By virtue of the mutual interest of
NASA and Syracuse University, the research team concentrated on the role of
the project manager in the Apollo program. Since the term "project manager"
O0000001-TSAI3
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has many different interpretations in NASA and contractor usage, it
should be noted that the type of project used as a model in the study
is that exemplified by the LM, CSM_ S-IC, S-II, and S-IVB effort_.
Since project management is not isolated from the larger organiza-
tional elements in NASA, nor from the prime contractors in industry, it
was necessary to take cognizance of these considerations. Chapters _I
and V contalu commentary on these facets of project management.
The make-up of the research team was guided by the req_irements
of the task, and an interest on the part of temu members in inter-
disciplinary research. There have been some changes in the membership
of the team, but the core of the team stiJl consists of the following
faculty members: Professor Eugene E. Drucker of Mechanical Engineering;
Professor William S. Pooler of the Department of Sociology; Professor
David Lo Wilemon of the School of Management; and Professor Bernard D.
Wood of Mechanical Engineering. As a by-product of the investigation,
a good deal was learned about the interdisciplinary mode of research,
and fed back into the operation. As a result the research group has
become a close-knit, smoothl_ operating unit, contrary to the large
number of groups which have attempted to function in an interdisciplinary
mode but have succumbed to the many pitfalls which are known to exist,
The information on which this report is based was gathered by well
over 200 intensive field Interviews, almost always attended by more than
one person from the team and usually from different disciplines. The
In_erviews were usually tape recorded, transcribed, and submitted to
interviewers for corzectlons. Above sll_ the interviews have re_ained ._
iI ,,
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confidential, as guaranteed by the interviewe_s ....NASA personnel at
_ several level6 at the three major field cent,_rs and headquarters were 'il
interviewed, as well as engineers and managers at the plants of five _!
I
prime contractors, NASA resident: peop!e, Congressmen and Congressional ;:
committee staff members. A comprehensive list of interviewees appears
as Appendix A.
During the course of the research, a three day conference was held
with team members and various NASA interviewees in attendance. The
purpose was to informally discuss and offer criticism of some of the
preliminary hypotheses and conclusions. The remarks of the NASA repre-
sentatives were extremely helpful in this regard, and many are to be
found incorporated in this final report.
From the various sources, and additional documentation of many
types, the research team formed a comprehensive picture of the various _
interactions of a project manager with the elements of his working environ-
menC0 In a somewhat arbitrary manner, the presentation of this picture is
arranged in four chapters. Although each was written by one team member,
all chapters have undergone a detailed and critical examination by the
other three team members.
i_ In addition to contributions by _he project manager group to the
Semi-Annual Reports of the Syracuse/NASA Program_ various papers, reports,
theses, and articles have been written in Conjunction with the research.
• Thes_ are llsted in Appendix B.
• - , --
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CHAPTER II
NASA AND THE APOLLO PROGRAM:
A MACRO-ORGANIZATIONAL VIEW
by
William So Pooler
A. Introduction
B. Apollo as a National Goal
C. The Apollo Organization
D. A Comparison of Apollo Field Center Organizations
E. General Organizational Considerations
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CHAPTER II
A. INTRODUCTION ......
The common theme underlying all o£ the work of the group has been
the "project manager." Initial research quickly indicated that what he
: does can best be understood in th_ context of a series of overlapping
organizational environments of in,:reasingly larger scope within which
his actions take place. It will be the purpose of this chapter of the
report to describe and analyze the background and larger organizational
factors which we have found to be related to the modes of project manage-
ment adopted in the Apollo project. As well, some attention will be paid
, to the nature of the relationship between the form of project management
, and the environmental context. One onifylng thread which ties together
r
the points made in the discussion is the tentative idea that the organiza-
tional change processes exhibited by NASA and the Apollo program were a
coflSequenceof two salient dilemmas. First, NASA had to cope with a con-
stantiy shifting envizovment, changing through time from supportive to
neutral to mildly hostile. Second, NASA also had to cope with the problem
of combining a permanent bureau organization characterized by semi- ,',
• autonomous technical research laboratories with a large, non-permanent !
- program organization characterized by hlghly coordinated "contract mo_tor-
_:=, inE" activitieS.
!
_. Before eXm_inlng.ln greater detail the nature of these .411e_m&qand
_._.. the resultant adaptive organlzatlonal fom, a few introductory remarks about
_.", the nature of modern organizatlone and an appropzlate model one might ,,
:2!
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utilize to explaln their patter_ of development [_eems app_',prJate.
_ Basically_ all organizations have two problems to cope with If they
are to survive. First, to do something, that Is, goal-oriented activity
- tO provide the raison d'etre for the organization; and second, to estab-
j_ fish a context which facilitates the goal-orlented actlvity_ that is,
_ maintenance activity. It is necessary, of course, for these two sets of
:_ activities to be coordinated.
Typically in advanced socleEies, the form organization takes is one
where increasingly the goal-orlented or task activities are more clearly
separated from the maintenance or administrative activities. This is
partly a consequence of the complex technology generated irL urban-
industrial societies. Complex tasks that require skill levels and pat-
terns of coordinated activities which are highly variable in magnitude-
and duration can be conceived of and acted on in organized contexts° In
a sense_ org_-_Izational forms in advanced societies have been developing
in such a manner as to 7.cad to the creation of organizations within
1
existing organizations. Accompanying this pattern of development has
been the attempt to exercise control by parallel forms of management to
provide adequate direction and Integrate.on in the increasingly differentia-
ted organizations.
A general as_,_,__,_ptionu derlying most attempts to analyze large scale
organlzatlon is that the character of the patternln_ of relationships is
at least quasl-determlnate. That is, g_.ven a set of conditions involving
iThe Mission Control organization withlu the Apollo .....• ozga_Izaticn is a_ :_
ex_m_ple of this. ','.i
..,_.
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among other things, the nature of the task activities, the state of the
arts, the nature of the environment, the nature of the people involved,
Lttepast "history" of the organization, and current structure of the
organization, one can predict the probable future states of the organi-
zation. This I repeat is an assumption, but it provides the basis for
a strategy in attempting to discover the particular pattern of develop-
ment of the organizat!onunder investigation and What is generalizable
about that pattern, that is, what might apply to organizations in general.
An implication of what has been said thus far is that one must proceed
from the particular to the general, inductively, but at the same time one
_4
must continually build approximate models of what the general appears to
be to give direction to one's investigation of the particular.
_ Matrix organizations have been developed in modern organizations which :
do not seem to fit the more traditional models of organization. In essence,
the conception of a matrix organization is one where the work activities -i, ..
are organized around tasks or projects. These, in turn, cut across tha ...
existing functional-admlnlstratlve activities in the organi_ation. From '_
the task or.project perspective, the larger immediate organizational set-
tir_ constitutes the maintenance-resource base. From the perspective of ili
i
• the organization, projects represent temporary sets Of arrangements created _
to accomplish specific tasks. Often these arrangements are highly variable ii
in scope, Complexity_ andduratlon.
The interdependence between the task or projec_ and the larger orsaniza- _i
i
1 _
tion is strong. The pro_ect represents a way in whlch the organization is ,_
.... IThi8 diSCUSSlo_ does not refer to the speclal ca_e where the project :il
!!
._ and the organi_ation are one and the e_ne. ,i
!'
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able to get something done. The larger org_mization is dependent on.
project success since the project constitutes the productive activityI
sector for the total organization. Thus_ wh%le authority is delegated
to the project, it is not given complete autonomy. The larger organiza-
tion provides the needed resources for the project, including the process
of legi_imizing the project, and thus the project is also dependent on
the larger organization.
The conception of a large organization and one large project imbedded
within it, is a special case of generic matrix organization. The general
model supposes that there are numerous projects_ with highly variable scope,
in all different phases of maturatiort.
: There are apparent tensions in the matrix form of organization° If
one assumes that there is a finite and limited amount of organizational
resources (men, money, skllls, etc.) and organizational authority to be
allocated, then obviously the projects are competitive. Clearly, the
. parent organization is superordiuate to the project organizations. One
of its major fut_ctions is to allocate the resources and authority in the
orga_Izatlon to the projects, such that the demands of the projects are
satisfied and the competitive tensions are minimized. As well, it is
incumbent upon the parent organization not to allocate resources and
authority in such a manner as to allow the projects to become super _
:.L 'i
-_: : ordinate to the parent organization. Projects are tran$itory..entlt_es, i
:: created for specific tasks. Their functioning must be contrM1ed _uch
_; that when they phase out, the parent organization is able to survive. :::
!i ,
j ;1
:"2:'_V'
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_ Specific to tileApollo progrmn, this introductory discussion suggests
[_'
-"
!_ that one should be able to locate a set of background factors which combined
to produce the Apollo organization within NASA. Further, the changing con-
flgura_ton of background factors, the inherent strains in the resulting
_iI organization, the tensions produced by tllelarge and dominant Apollo program
organizatlonj and the life-cycle character of the program, resulted in a
i series of organizational changes in NASA and the Apollo program organization.
i Both of these considerations are relevant for understanding the nature of tee
Apollo program organization and the varieties of project organization exhibited
therein. As well, an examination of the NASA-Apollo complex from this per-
spective should provide insights into the general nature of project organlza-
tions.
r_
B. APOLLO AS A NATIONAL COAL
The Apollo program represented a national goaJ. It publicly com-
mitted tlleUnited States, within J0 years, to safely land a m,_n on the
moon and return him to earth. This commitment had both favorable and
unfavorable consequences for NASA.
The task assigned to NASA, while complex and requiring new tech-
nologies, was well defined, in a broad sense, whlc'h is a prime requisite
for a successful projec=. The performance criterion specified landing a
man on the moon and returning him safely to earth. The schedule criterion
specified that the task be performed before the end of the decade, 1960-1970.
The cost, while somewhat open-ended, was estimated to be between 20 and 40
billion dollars. The fact that the performance, schedule, and cost criteria
were met is testimony to the exemplary nature of the organization and
management scheme that was created for Apollo° .,
Yet another favorable consequence of the na=ional co_nitment wa:_ the=
fact that the effort was relatively free from politlca! considerations.
This, in effect, meant that NASA was not defined as a supporter of, or a
base of support for, either of the major pollCical parties, and at least
in the early years of the effort enjoyed bl-pertlsan support. Also, because
the prestige of the United States, in terms of clalm_ng tedmolog[cal _uper-
iority over the world com_unlty was being tested, great imperial.co was
i
attached to the effo_t. As a result, NASA had littl.e trouble recru_ti_.g
extremely competent personnel who were stt'ongly committed to the m_nned ._:,
space proJect_ and who were able to view the totality of tb,e l_rog_am on_l '_
• i.ill
._
i'
j :'
"__,:L" " ;'7'..........',,',_":" -......."'
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thus maintain perspective about their individual contributions. And
finally, again particularly in the early stages of the program, financial
resources were not eonstra:lned.
As noted, there were some unfavorable consequences of the natlonal
commitment as well. NASA was not equipped to manage such a large and
complex undertaking. One result was that NASA had to undergo a process
of quick growth prhnarlly in those areas dlrectly related to tlleApollo
program. Thus the agency was in effect subordinate to the project, and
was severely handicapped in terms of legitimating itself as a long-term,
enduring agency guided by a set of general goals. Related to this is
the fact that NASA was viewed primarily as a sophisticated, technologically
equipped organization which would primarily be the instrumental means by
_i which the national goal would be achieved. That is, NASA, through time,
became less often regarded as a general research and development agency
(:,. concerned with aeronautics and astronautics. Rather Apollo and NASA were
__I:_:i thought of as one and the same. Because of the funding mechanism, itlfact,
_' the Apollo program supported most of NASA's activities and as a result the
il cutbacks in budgets greatly affected not only the Apollo effort b!Jt theto al capability of th Agency.J
The specificity o_ the goal, particularly the time constralnt of a
decade and the commitment to public scrutiny of the project, proved to
be troublesome. The problem was due to the necessity of "£¢eczlug-_in''
the total concept and the design o_ hardware as quickly as possible.
Thus, the early research work revolved around design decisions involving
'the t)oo_ter and sp_jcecraft and these, in _.urn,were Influenced by the mode
chi_sen #:.oImmch men to the moon. By 1,962--1963 lunar orbit had been decided
O0000001-TSCIO
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"_ upon, the _:oL_cc:pt of _he Sat.urn V clu_ter of engrams hnd b_on selected and
was in prel_nlnary _ab_/ at_on and test, and the spacecraf_ and lunar land-
ing vehlcle had been t_mtatively dlmen_ione_d and desig_ied and ]n:tt:talfabric-
ation work was comr_encing. On.co these decisions were made there was ever
decreasing latl_ude to change the design of any of the parts. The lead times
• were quite long, approximately five years_.and lu the interim, new techno-
t
logical breakO_roughs or advanced new features often had to be ignored. It
has been noted, for_ example, that the Gemini spacecraft involved a much more
sophisticated design than the Apollo spacecraft. Problems of integrating
the major pieces of hardware with the men and the ground checkout and monitor-
ing equipment, precluded fundamental changes in the basic design, Cost was
not a large factor. Schedule, because of the time frame specified in the
1951 decision, was the prime consideration. Pure and simple, Apollo was
orig_nally conceived of as a space spectacular to gain back the previously
held technological world leadership the U.S. enjoyed and other considerations
such as scientific experlmen=ation received low priority.
1_is severe time constraint is a key to understanding the organization
and management of Apollo. First, the designs to achieve the objective were
blocked out. Then the rest of the effort was devoted to building up, within
NASa, an organizatlo_ and management scheme which could manage the building
and configuring of the hardware out-of-house, which could train men, and which
could brlng it all together so that the goal was achieved before the decade
of the "]O's, Through time the degrees of freedom, in Lenus of' improvlng
perfomance of each of the parts, were i:urther coustra.i._:mdand manag_ent:
wa_ more and more concerned with f.itti_g all of the pier:e:_together. As a
i
::_:._.. ..... ._--_:,_.::=v.-:_: ,::,--:_, =7--=: " :: , ........ _ ..... " " ..... ' ' ' ' _i..;._i.,,,:i ........ :.,,_.-,,,_,,_,_-,_.': _-';'.:_4_'_._'_'_
:7- ""-
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result, more men and resources were _evoted to coordination and control,
c_:_ and new organizational structures were appended to the extant organization
to Insure s_fety and to meet the scheduIe.
The severe time constraint also contributed to the tendency of the
Apollo program to dominate the host organization, NASA, which housed it.
That is, there was a tendency for Apollo considerations to be paramount
in NASA, and as a result it cannot be considered a typical project. While
part of NASA, Manned Space Flight (really bpollo) formed a separate sub-
unit of the overall organization. It was physically separated from the
rest of NASA and yet still integrated, particularly in the sense that men
and dollars flowed to NASA primarily through ;_olIo. As fervor for the
_'moonmission" dzmmed, the binding of Manned Space Flight closer to the
rest of NASA was attempted. This effort to make the manned @rogram sub-
ordinate to the Agency was at least partly due to the fact _hat the con-
_inued survival of the Agency rested with the success of this large program.
O0000001-TSC]4
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C_ THE APOLLO ORGANIZATION :_
i._ The Apollo organization consisted of a headquarters unit, three ma_or
operating field centers, a group of contractors, and anclllary personnel
and resources as needed. Headquarters was given overall administrative
and resource control over the total project, and final technical authority
i'
was also vested there. After some preliminary organizational attempts,
responsibility was given to the head of the Office of Manned Space Flight
who delegated the routine running of the organization-to the Program Director
for Apollo within the Office of Manned Space Flight.
By 1963 a general organizational pattern for stabilizing relationships
between the field centers and headquarters had been worked out. The Head-
. quarters P_ogram O_fi_e_. OART, OSSA, OTDA, and OMSF were given both the
'i
responsibility for managing programs in their respective offices and the •
responsibility of controlling resources, primarily men and dollars, that
the running of the programs necessitated. In effect the Program Office :
Directors Lhen had institutional as well as program authority. To furtber
strengthen their position, they were given the title Associate Administrator _!
and expected to play the role of general manager for NASA in their respec- _'_i
tire program offices, and as well, manage the particular programs. For '_
OMSF this meant that the Associate Administrator both headed up the Apollo =_
.:;_
program and was responsible for maintaining some balance between the Apollo '__:i_,.
progral,tand the rest of NASA. As was noted above, the day to day runnlug '#
of the Apollo program was left to the Apollo Program Managero Thus decisions _
....:_%
made at the top of the Apollo organization could be backed up and coordinated "_'!:
with resources. _,_,:
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The three operating field centers primarily concerned with Apollo
were tied into Headquarters in at )east three different ways. Fizst,
I
the director= of the field cen_ers were directly under the head of the
Office of Manned Space Flight in terms of maintaining the field centers°
• [
Second, the Apollo Program Manager at Headquarters was linked to the
Apollo program managers at each of the centers and used five functional
offices: Test, Reliability and Quality Assurance, Systems Engineering,
Program Control, and Flight Operations, to constantly monitor the progress
l
of the progrmm. From the Office of Manned Space Flight then, institu-
tional control flowed through the Center Directors to the rest of the
center and program direction flowed through the Apollo organization at
each of the centers.
The third li_k tended to tie both of these orga,_iza.]ons together,
both i_ terms of horizontal and vertical reiatlonShips_ This llnk _Tas
p
the Management Council. It was made up of the head of the Office of
A,
Marmed Space Flight, the three center directors, and their deputies.
O_ce a month the Apollo program manager was charged with gathering his
Apollo orgsnlzation together and forging a presentatlon which would point
out three aspects of the program to the Management Council) the match
between _chedule and progresS) the natUre of any problems chaC arose an4
what was needed tO Solve them, aud the projected costs and resources
Decessary. _'
2
:,•f_
]'The utilization of the functlonal Offices by program people at the
centers varied, and their effecgiveness was also questionable. _:
.'t ,-. ° ._ 2"t'
..... . . . : , " _. _,. .w,_=.:, .= =_r_r _r<.-,.=_'....:.._-,=-._=.,._._,_'='_.'.;_.. ._-'_. .=:r=;-_==_ =- '_ _'.-, _ _. _:._-:i_'-'. _'. :_. _- ".--'._-r_.... ';_._. ---- _. :=- -'_
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With the Management Council mechanism all of the hierarchical levels
of the Apollo organization were collapsed into two, the Council and the
Program organizationj and the three centers were brought together such
that problems specific to centers and those that ratlged across centers
could be discussed and solutions arrlved at. The head of the Offize of
._ Manned Space Flight, who both controlled institutional resources and had
the ultimate Apollo program authority, by using the Management Council,
was in a position to evaluate ?he "fit" between program and institutional
activities. As well_ he was made aware of any problems either specific
tO institution or program that arose as a consequence of lack of coordina-
tion between these two elements.
This organizational arrangement worked out for the Management Council,
was instrumental for the success of the Apollo program and in effect pro-
) "i
vided the necessary authority to make the matrix concept work, That is _
_i the person responsible for both dimensions of the matrlx_ the program _:
r
activities and .the institutional support, was In a position ._f necessary,
to "force" cooperation between the dimensions of the matrix at any level,,
If one could generalize frown this single instance, it might be hypothesized
', that matrix organizations, to fu_ctlon p_operly, must be structured such i,_
that a single authority nexus controls all of the dimensions which comprise
.!' the _atrix and tha_ feedback mechanisms must be established to insure that
the proper information is availabie to that authority nexuS. This is not
to imply that cooperation must be "forced", As a rule, within the A?ollo
p_ogram there was a good deal of cooperatlono But when things did not
,t
_" proceed smoothly there was a back-Up device that insured that problems _i
.... "i
,l
...........•" .........................' ...._'_- -'_.i:,_=". "......_.......'_::.,.'"......... ........................................i_i'
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could be alleviated and a smooth working organization achieved.
To go one step further, it also might be hypothesized that olleof
the dimensions of the matrix has to be glv_n somewhat greater authority
than tileother dimensions. With Apollo, for example, the program people
were given final authority in terms of the schedule, cost, and performance
criteria. This was most clear at Huntsville and Houston where the respec-
tive program managers were given this authority. But, the system really
worked because both of these program managers finally established very
close working relationships with the head of each center. Thuss the head
of each center, who formally had authority over both the technical and
program sides of the house_ could be brought in to settle disputes or help
i
solve problems arising out of the matrix organizational set-up of each.
center. Interestingly, the Apollo program managers at the centers each
\
had had long workln_ relationships with the center directors. They also
had had long working celatlonships with the people who were the technical .
experts at the centers. These latter factors appear to be quite important
in accounting for the success that the Apollo program organization enjoyed,
using the matrix organizatlontechnlque.
One would suspect J_here an agency o_ a program office is Involved in
running many prosrams, the institutional agency-wide or program offlce-wide :_
concerns would tend to dominate. Thusj size of program or project and its _i
importance vis-a-vis the total organization are important variables to :_
consider when decisions concerning the aUocatlon of authority are made
" iil
It would still appear necessary to have a s_ngle authorlty point to brlng i i_
about cooperation. But whether there should be equal allocatio_ of _:i
;T'$_
,%
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authority to both the functional and project dlmenalons, or whether
grants of authority should vary with different sized projects and wlth
different stages of the llfe cycle of the project is still pretty much
!_ an open question, UnfOrtunately, the uniqueness of Apollo does not
_ provide much insight as to how these organizational problems can be
! solved in other organizations or at another t.ime in NASA.
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D. A COMPARISON OF APOLLO FIELD CE_ER ORGANIZATIONS
_ Each of the three operating, centers of the Apollo program were
organlzed dlfferently. Hunt_ville wa_ given the responsibl]ity for
building the booster assembly. Houston was given the responsibility
for building the "manned" segments, the Spacecraft and the Lunar Module,
for tralnin_ the astronauts and for operatlnE the mission. Kennedy was
given launch responsibilities and associated final check-out and test for
launch. Perhaps the first question might be; Why was the Apollo project
broken o,t in _ust that configuration?
The scope of the Apollo _rogram was vastly larger than any previous
astronautical venture. Therefore, much that had to be designed and built
was new. But there was the conscious attempt to keep a_d utilize what
was already known and tested or at the very least what had an ex_ramely
high probability of working° Under these conditions It _s reasonable to
conclude tha_ HUntsville, already par_ of NASA and functioning as the
booster expe_ts for the Agency, would be given respo_sibillty for design- "
}
i_ and building what came to be known as the Saturn V. It is even more
• . predictable when it is recosn_.sed that the director of .the Huntsville
_. _r Center was one of the technic_al experts primarily relied on when the nature
_. of the Space effort and the nee4ed booster capabilities were exam/ned.
-D
The decision to use Cape Kennedy, and build up a pad compleX capable :
_ of laun_hin_ the Apollo confisuratlon was _.Iso quite understandable.
<
i The selection of the director Of _hat cemter also f_.ts tha general pattern, _
11_e _ite wa_ alzeady In _s_ by I_ASA and skllled persomael were :;
avsllable. •_
r
,'_
i_%-
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for he had a great deal of launch experience and was d_oroughly [ami]_ar
_ wlth the requlre_ents for a test and launch center to insure the succes_
' ful firing of the.,Saturn V rocket. When the organization and management
of A_ollo at Cape Kennedy is compared to the other two centers, it appears
.. to be quite unique. This Is a function of the responsibilities it h_d
_: and only ingofar as necessary for the discussion of the organization of+
f,,
_ the Apollo program will its character be commented on. Ceographically_
Cape Kennedy was an obvious choice for the launching site of Apollo°
Houston is somewhat 'different from the other two centers in that it
_-+_,, ,r_o_a Cnr Apollo While the choice of the site is prob-_" WaS -o_----..--j ...........
lematlcal in terms of the analysis being presented, the personnel who
manned the Center are not. There has been a great deal of controversy
i and dialogue concernin 8 the choice of Houston as a center site, but not
ii
i,? about the responsibilities assigned to the Center, nor about the indivSduals
selected for key posltions within the Center organization. Th_ men chosen
_ to operate the Houston center were those in NASA who had the most experlence ,,
._, planning and des._gnlng hardware for manned aircraft fllght. Since before
Apollo no one had manned spaceflight experience, thls_s_ed to be the
_ logical group tO be given thls responsibility. Further, the group was
,i
) given responsibility not only for the "manned" s?a_craft hardware but
?: also for the men and their flight as well. Thus, given the range of i
::: eXperlbnce ..tBatexisted, the Houston complex except for the site selec-
t: tl.on,also _ppears to represent a conservative d_clsion in terms of
respons'/bil_tle_ for a porf.lon of the Apollo effort°
ITb_s 8a_u_ group wa_ also Involved wi_:h the Mercury at_dGemin$ progr_ms+ @
, +
,_i _
0000000]-TSD07
27 -
Thus, Co answer our _rst questlon_ the original hzeak-out of
responslb_llt!es Co Citethree c_ntec_ was understa,dable in t|Le context
of the past h_story of U. S. space efforts. _ w_:_a]dhave.been possible
to organize the.effort in another way, with a lead center perhaps, or
with only two centers--l{untsville and Cape Kennedy, for e:_ample_ It is
reasonable to argue that Cape Kenn.edy could have been expanded and housed
I
the Houston center. Why this was not done is not clear. But in any
event, aS a function of the high speed communication and transportation
technology available in the 1960's, locatin 8 the center at Housto_ does
not seem to have been a problem for the success of the proSram_ In terms
of the past history of space efforts, and in terms of manpower and exper-
ience available, it certainly seems reasonable to assume that the three
operating centers of Apollo were given their responsibilities because of
the orlglnal inputs to the decision to "go to the moon" by the various
.*
groups who eventually ran the three centers.
t
As with the 1961 Apollo decision, there are both favorable and
unfavorable aspects a_soclated with the use of three field centers and
headquarters. All of the units were spatially separated and all, with
the except$on of headquarters, were concerned with tasks that could ,_
proceed in parallel and be integrated at a later clme.
The fact that Hu'ntsville and RoOSton were separated and that the '_:_
division of labor was so clear i_peded co_munlcatlon between the two /
!ii
centers. _Us, i_ was not _nusual du_in8 _ost of the Apollo p._ogra._, ._
,;-,q
, !_[!
lone , _,;i,reason g_ven _or uoC c_blni,%_ Kennedy a_d _o_ot_ acti_Itle_ ":'
was the lack of a "local" z_so_c_ base to s_apport euch a ma@Siv_ '._ii_iil
00000001-TSD08
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|_ ,_for people at the middle at_,d lower level_ of the re_pective _.entcr
org_nization_ to have little or _o t_ea about how the or.her center
was organlzed, and how work was p_oeeeding,. [n_e_actlon between the
centers did.occur through the Management Council, through the prograln
organlzation, and through the change control panels. But these Inter-
actions were quite specific to a problem or some narrow coordination
difficulty, and thus the expertise relevant to tasks beyond a particular
center's zesponslbility, by that center's own personnel, was not utilized,
Also, because o£ the lack of a generalized set of interaction techniques,
the work at Houston and Huntsville did not exactly fit and many integration
problems rose to the surface at Kennedy. Because of little communication
between Houston and Huntsville, for example, Kennedy had particularly
difficult configuzation and test problems to resolve. Also, because of
the separation of Huntsville and Houston, the spirit of cooperation and
high des_ee o£ integration of the total organization working on this
monumental undertaking was thwarted° It is fair to say that some anlmus
existe_ between these two centers, and it was exacerbated by their separa-
t.ion both functlonally alld spatially.
" The separation of the three centers and headquarters certainly con-
tr.ibL_tedto all of the coordination problems which were continually trouble- ,.
some for the program, The separation also was related _o a general tvndency ._
i,
to "projecClze" tasks associated with Apollo, That is, at _.eadquarters_
OMSF was =patl_lly se_ra_ed _rom the re_t of NASA headquarters. At each
o£ the center_, _here _s an effort _o ge_, the tout=actors to separate
ou_ _r_m the rest o_ t_eir work, the portion concerne_t _ith Apollo, and ii
j,, 'L_
- 59
to create an organlzat_ion to r,n their piece of _pol]o within, but
i-_;_ from tile r_st o_ theirclearly separate organlzaEions.
i:_:
_: Whilo it ifl true that chls tendent_y to "proJectize" parts of the
!i.
_.
!% Apollo program had unfortunate consequences there w_re al,qo beneflts
i_I: to be derived from this procedure. The brcakdo_m and isolation of
i-If separable piece,_ focused responslbillty for the different part_ On
highly visible units within industry and facilitated the monltori_g
of the contract. From the perspective of the contractors, it tended
to enhance interaction between the center and the contractor. It also
allowed more concerted effort to be focused on producing a reliable,
high performance piece of hardware. This separation was also beneficial
for the centers in that it gave a unity of ta:_k to the total center and
tended to enhance relatlonshlps within each of the centers. This was
particularly Important because of the "built-in" conflict mechanism
associated with the matrix organlzatio8 that existed at each center.
The coordination problems at Kennedy were certainly aggravated by
the separation of task a_d separation iu space of the other two centers.
For the group at Cape Kennedy to do its job properlyD there should have
been constant Interaction between it.and the other two centers. To design
adequate configuration_ test, and !am_ch fecllitles, Kennedy shou.ld have
had a view into the "innards o£ the. bird" at Huntsviile and have been
_pprlsed of all of the design and _ub_equent changes associated witl_ the
Spacecraft e_d Ltular Module. This _:as n_L th_ case _s the two field
ce.ter_ developed a somewhat insular pc_spe_t_v,_ d_e to their _._epo_,-att.on
o_ function and the:_r dli!ferent ._pa_l_1 s_:_n_.
O0000001-TSDIO
The organizat£ot_ of the. lhmU_v:illo _,J Houototl Cenl:e_a were quite
rit_ --different, n_s was partly due to tttci_n[_uloi'persp,,_:ctiveof each center,
noted above, coupled w.lt:hthe _asks they had to perform, List.itpaflt history,
the e_£sting state of the art, and to a degree the k%nd_ of Lndlviduals
! involved in _unnlng the program and running _he center_. One dlffcrence
between the centers i¢ captured by noting that Hun_sville had a strong
project organization and Houston a strot_g program organization. At Huntsville,
the stages were relatively clean pieces of the Saturn V complex and hence
even though there was ,_program manager, his coordinative function was sim-
pler compared to Houston. The project or stage managers were mostly from
the R&DO side of the Huntsville house and were well aware of the e;_pert£se
that existed in the lab,_ of R&DO and the "performance" commitment of the
laboratory directors. Also, the stage managers were mostly highly tech-
nicaily qualified and as a consequence were in a position to decide issues
involving a schedule-performance tradeoff. Each of the stages was such that
they could be built relatively independently of each other, as was the case
wxth the engines which were parts of the stages. Therefore, at Huntsville
ther_ was a series of projects, related b_t quasi-independent, managed by
strong project or stage managers. Except _or the S-If stage_ the major
tasks Imvolved enlarging already existing boosters and for the first time
manufacturing them out of house. To insure the meeting of Schedule check
points, the project or stage managers had the ma,_or problem of relating
!: to _he strong technJ.cal In-house expertise that existed in the labs at
_ Hunt_v111e, and the new_y developed exp_tlse that existed at the contractors.
The. resultant "trolcm" of schedule, per£orm0nCd, and cost decisions made
'%
. L
. : ', : ,,, , ..",, . . ,, ...... :. .... . .... :" _..'.., ,_.
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by _te stage manager w_th cost emphasized by the contractors and
,_ perforn_ance by the RbDO people resulted In a strong project orienta-
tlon. The program manager was a back-up for the stage managers, and
since ae had also been with the Huntsville group for a long period of
2
time, he could help ameliorate problems that arose between the project
manager and the labs over in-house or contractor issues. Furthers the
program manager had the confidence of the Center Director who took a
strong hand in the running of the Apollo program at the Center, and as
a result could get the assistance of the Center Director in helping
maintain program and project perspective° There is little doubt that
Huntsville R&DO people had a great deal of technical expertise, both in
terms of design and planning and in terms of fabrication, and as a result
tended to dominate the Center. Further, the past experience of the
_ Huntsville people derived from _le Arsenal concept of doing the complete
job with the same people, In-house. Thus, it is a great credit to the
selection process that it allowed quite strong project managers to be
chosen, who for the most part had the skills necessary to allow program
and project considerations to surfac_in such an environmento
Unlike Huntsville, Houston was characterized by a strong program
organization. At Houston_ there Were not clearly separable pieces, except
for the Spacecraft and the Lunar Module. In these two instances there
were project managers similar to Huntsville but they were located in the
Program Office. There Ware also functional directorates at HouSton _hlch
had direct inputs into the Apollo program but in a manner far dlfferen_
_- from that which was obtalned at Huntsville. Hission Control needed constant
00000001-TSD13
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interaction with the design and fabrication of _he Spacecraft and Lunar
Module, as did the astronaut directorate. The resulting man, cosmmnica-
tions, and hardware interactions, superimposed over hardware being designed
and fabricated at the frontier of the state of the art both by In-house and
contractor groups, necessitated a strong overall coordiDatlve device. As a
consequence, the program organization at Houston was the focal point where
decisions were made and trade-offs achieved among safety, performance, and
cost by the program manager, and cost, performance and safety by the contrac-
tors. At Houst0n_ unlike Huntsville, the functional directorates did not
dominate the organizations, basically becauSe the technical experts had no
base of experience in managing programs, the state of the art was to some
degree unknown, and because of the man9 co_nunication, and hardware inputs
ali impacting and affecting the mature of the Spacecraft and Lunar Module
configuration.
: For Huntsville the major management problems involved setting up
procedures to allow the project managers to manage the stages and thereby
allow project considerations to dominate. At Houston, the major problem
was buildlng a program organization which could manage the great diversity
_ extant at Houston and which could meaningfully involve the technlcal
functional dlrectorates located at the Center, The degree of success the !
program orientation had aC Houston, to a measurable degree, is a function _
i
of a strong program _nager who had a long hlstory of assoclat_on wlth the
center personnel, and who was skilled enough to malntain program emphaso_s
while encouraglng center functional and contractor support. At Huntsville, _
_, the organizational sUcces_ of the Apollo e_fort Is ton measurable degree '_
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a function strong project managers (stage managers) backed up by a
i_" technically and organizationally conpetent program manager and center
management.
The success at each of the centers, with somewhat different project
or program organizations is strong evidence for the nature of the task,
the personnel available, the experiential base, and the prevailing know-
ledge or state of the art, all interacting to p_oduce a viable form of
organization and management. The form of tileproject or program organi-
zation was variable and stabilized only after a series of trials and
errors. Perhaps this is necessary with research and development work of
large scale and technological complexity. If so, it means that too much
organizational and management planning is not appropriate for the develop _
ment of successful projects and programs. It might be hTpothesized that _'
there must be a trial and error management and organization process
analogous to the preliminary design and a_alysis phase of the actual
research and development process which takes into account the uniqueness
of the organizational setting, the task, the personnel_ and other relevant
factors.
!%t
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E° GENEAAL ORGANIZATIONALCONSIDERATIONS
. Among the large mmbee of organizational Innovations Introduced by ,_
NASAend the Apollo project, two stand out; the creative use of ambiSuity
and c_lict, and the extensiveness and £1exlbtliCy of the feedback nec-
works fr_n lower co hisher levels of the organization.
1. Cr_eative U_eof .a_b£guiCy and conflict. The issue, here involves
the _ppsr_t p_rposeful use of conflict ae _ mechanism co £uoure coucrol
= by t_ top o_ the NA_A Apollo organization. The _nec_cuCtonalisscion o_
conflict is uccompli_hed by eltheX'9 or bot_hj o_ ewe r_l_Cacl Ceeimlques|
p_t£ti_i_ respo_ibility in such a meaner Chat tC cQnde to e_c_d the
deSree _nd e_pe o_ authority sssoc!.-ced with thQ _esponstb__licy, _n_
deleSsti_$ overin_pi_ _eponstbiliCy a_d/or ao_hority _uc_.h_hat some
_mb_,gui_y e_ieCs ss _e how problms t,hich u_£s_ &_e to b_ ro_olvtd, An
_ple of _h_ _or_,_ woul_ be _her_ the _roJect _an_s_r £e $_ven _he
• e_m_i_il_y _or b_il_in$ _ue stsSZ o_ the rocket and _k£ns Sure _C
e.o_iSu_ee _L_ _he rest: of the he_dws_e. The _cope Of his dol_qlecati
_ec_n_$ _o z_c_Z_h h_S tu_ r_ths_ Chin _xe_e_ee dsls_c_d a_ho_icy_
_re _e_ttu c_no_ b, r_0ivgd_ _h_ zre bro_ht_ t:o the at_nt_t_o_ _f h_gher
laVe_ in _ o_S_tlon for _oittCi_n, Though highi_ e_p_,ifi_d_ _.tt_
t
G
_m, (_e_he_e) _e_eom_l, and con_,_m_Co._doeTe_ntke _ta_let_e eo_* _q__ee_ !!i
s
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be quite functional for an organization i_insurlng some modlctn, of control
in highly decentralized, technologically comple_ organizations. It a_so
suggests that structured conflict can be utilized _o more personalize rela- i
tionshlps in large organizations. Lastly, it suggests that this particular
form of instltutionallzed control deals mainly with the productive aspects
00000001-TSF04
should predominate and the consequences that :flow from Lhat decision.
NASA has worked out a mechanism _hat potentially has the capacity to :_ ,
overcome this dilemma, the creation of cha1_ge control panels which were
ostensibly used as a configuring device° In general teri_,g,one can think
of an organization as comprising a series of re.latiw._]yinsulated levels
and within these levels, a series of relatively insulated sub-unitso As
problems arise that cannot be solved by the sub-units, the formal mechanism
of a single level change control panel is initiated. Discussion of the
problem among sub-units, at a single level either leads to the resolution
of the problem or brings it into clearer focus and makes more evident the
scope of the problem° If the scope is too large to be handled at any one
level_ members of the sub-units_ now representing the variety of interests
at a particular level, help initiate a change control panel, at the next
v
highest level where the potential to resolve larger scope problems exists.
The exercise l.srepeated and either resolved or a nez_t higher level pan.el _
is convened. In essence, the process is an emergent one growing out of the
nature of the problem and its scope. Whlle each particular problem resolu- '_.
_ tlon repg:esents a substantive instance of the change control panel structure _
being utilized, the structure always remains as a viable p-coblem solving
,_"
mechanism, The numbers of levels involved varies grom problem _o problem, ,,_
e.ssen_ially dete_,Ined by the seop4_ Of the problem, its Smpor_asee_ the i£_
_. amount of zesouree_ necessary to regolve it, the..clif£1_ulgy associaecd _:.;
=" with les resolution, and pro_Imlty 't,olau_¢h t.:i_e. :
_:.,. While thi, s organtz_ti_nal in_ovatioa has only been ou_,:llne4. (se,_._ :iii,
_i _' Chapter IV fez'details), it appea_s to be a wide ranging 4ev;Ice to handle i_
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feedback from lower to higher bevels of orgattJzatloT_sin a truly creative
way. The assumptlor is that most occurre_iccs a_e gouti_e in organtz:_tions
and can be handled at the sub-unlt level° Where this is not so, the forme,l
mechanism exists to actualize a decision-making apparatus _hat involves
potentially all levels of an organization. This mechavlsm assumes _hat
problem definl=ion and resolution proceeds inductively from the smaller
sub-units to h_.gher and more f.arra_glng levels of the organization, and
that members of ali necessary levels ere importantly involved in the final
problem resolution. There are some important issues that are related _o
this conception of the change control process as uti_.Ized by NASA and Apollo.
For one, iS the particular procedure only useful when you have a situatioo,
of geographically dispersed field centers and contractors and.where you are
dealing with quite complex and highly Inter-related hardware assemblies?
i._ Here the issue is the generalizeabillty of tl_eprocedt_re, Another issue is
_.,:. whether this is mainly a feedback devlce for dealing with production actlvi-
z_
_: ties or can it be modified to deal with a wide spectrum of problema associated
_ with organizations? _cther issue is the degree to which levels attdsub-
unito within a level of' an orga=Iza=ion can be decentralized and the suit-
_ ability of this device. Yet another issue has to do with tltenatare of
:ii the organlz_tlon that is most approprlate fo_ this kind of procedute o Is '
'_, it only ,ogeful for R&D o_'ganlzmtlons,dea],i=g with advanced hardware conStruc-
tion c_r can ;t b_ utiilged f_r all k_ _ds o£ organizations? The_e are
ce_talnly ot_e_ issues related _o u_ing _NIs kind of technique., but th_
i_portan_ point _.sthat herr l.sg novel feedbae_ mechanism used with sncc_ss
by NASA that should b_ ex01ozed _e_ its ge_ez'aluse_Ul.nes_ and appllcatlon, i
1
I
- 2 •
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_ The Apollo stanagementorganization also contaJr_sotho_:e].ementsq
3.
- worth noting as they potentially have relcw_nce for any complex, la_ge_
!_ scale undertakings.
_! 3. The creation sz_dmalngenance of a strong In-house technical
i with the skills necessary ta..helpdesign_ manag_ test, and success£ully
_:_i!!; complete the hardware and software tasks. It can be hypothesized that to
insure the successful completion of a large scale venture, an organization
assigned such responsibility must have technical and managerial skills
equal or surpassing those who assist the organization in the venture
(see Chapter IV).
4. As part of its management respot_sibtllty,the Apollo program
_ organization adopted procelu_es which resulted in detailed and extensive i,
surveillance of contractor actlvities. The complexity og the undertaklng,
its importance, and NASA's overall program re_ponslbillty, were major _,,
_ factors In thI_ devel.opment. Although ther_ _ere dl,fflcultleS related ,
to contractor autonomy and ae well, g_neral coordinatlon p_obl_ this L'
!.
procedure appSsred to be essential to the successful coaplet£on o£. the -,
J
:_ program (s_e Chapter V), _
..... 5. _ie "purposeful use o_ confllct" wa_ Utiliged te overcome the _;
_:. problen of me_n_ain$.ngcontrol a_ong co_petl_g aughorit_e_ i.e,, ius_l- _i
tutiOnal posltlon authO_ISy.(fleld ¢¢n_er head), technlc_l authority _:
: (dltect0z of Rg_O) _nd p_ogr_m _uthorlty Conflicts o_cU_ted Within :_
-- c_tezs, aeroos eente_s, a_ involv_ headquarters a_nd' the contractors. ,_
; _h6 us'e ef thia co_flte_ w_S suce_aafiil b_egUs_ of _h_ st_ob8 cOm£i_dnt
_o the success Of the progrsm, i_
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a) Confl|_cr wa_ resolved by lnform_3_ _eti, ng_ hard_pa_
revlews, chan_ control boards, status, review_, e_c,
b) Decl_io_l_ which resob#e_ the coa_lte_ v.¢ere mad_ known
to the partie_ and rat£onole_ provided, Appeal proced-
ures were awilable Co the part.l.cipa__t_,
It can be hy_othe_ized that one way of resolving the authority
and responsibility dil_ma in o_ganizatiorm, which is a function of
positional authority versus technical skills_ is the controlled use
o£ conflict (see Chapter III).
6. Every effort wa_ made to stendardize th_ _anage_ent and
coordinative procedures in the Apollo program. Given the fact that.
this was a research and development program, an effort _as aade to
Standardize all relatlvely routine maintenance ac_lons_ eveluative
activities, _nd repot ng procedures. The s_flda_di_ativn represented
an..attemp_ to conserve resources for the "unkno.w_" pa_ts_ of the p_ogram,
It can be hypo_hesi_ed that research sad development actlvi_y contains
both novel a_d traditional aspects a_d _hat the tradi_onai aspect_
should _e standardi_ed to optimize organizational response Co _he novel.
7. For tha Apollo program, schedule was the foremost cons_deratlon
and _zade-off$ were ef£ected which de-_phaSSZed cost a_d _pha$ized per-
£ormence and safety, _ht_e main_ainin$ strict adherence _o schedule. I._
can be hypo_h_8_ed tha_ _hi_e schedule, p_os_to_cv and cost par_ne_er_ _
f'
az_e all management constraints, e_phasiz_ any one o_ them i_ pr0bably _:
beneficial for the co_plet_0n of a p_0_r_ and h_ _pertant _pi_cation_ _
for the mauase_¢_C of the pvosr_, as _eI1. :_
?_
f_t,
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8. In t|'_c Apo_lu ,rgunlzaticrn. thr_,e,g_,neral dimens_ons had to.be
coogdlnated/ t|_e _ech_ical or scientific, the overall internal org_nizs_
fish, and the social, political, and eco_omic envirot_ment. The Apollo !
_ progrom proceeded g'elat_.velysmoothly when top NASA leadershlp consisted _i
of three Indiv].duals; one who looked .outward, one who acted as an internal
geutr_ manager, and one who looked after the technical and scientific
consld_ratlons. _eu this trl-partite division of labor _as disbanded in
1965, the problems of NASA as an aSency and ifiparticular the Apollo program,
were Inqreastd. It _an be hypotheslztd that any technical organization, but
particularly those organizations involved in R&D work, must constantly moni-
tor alI three dimensions and work out mechanisms to coordinate the various
,I
activities associated with each dimension.
9. The Apollo program utilized the technique of "projectizing" critical
tasks or probleJns which arose in the course of the project. Closely allied
to this procedure was t_e use of task forces. It can be hypothesized that
the succe_sf,,l uti!!zation of these temporary, situatlonally specific organi-
zations was directly related to the degree they ware perceived and utilized
_ as temporary and high priority operating units.
17'
_. 10o As the Apollo program reached conclusion, there was a prollfera-
i'
tion of con__rol and reporting mRcha_iSms _eso_ted to by top management,
to insure the cOo_dlna_io_ of _he diverse parts of the progza_ and to re- _:'
_stablis_ agency dcmlna_ce over _._eprogram. For the most part these '}_
.f
appended controls were Indlcetlve of _he imbalance between progro_ and ,_
\
_ _ost organization. D_e to many dlfferent factors, Apollo dominated •over ._
_gency concerns, _d v_e continued surv_a.l of the agency at Its e_i_tlng
i_.
!:
J
.i
;'" {i
2 '
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'- m..g
00000001-TSF11
CHAPTERIiI
A. MANAGERIALADVARTACESOF NASA'S PROJECTMANAGENENTSYSTENS
i_ Our investigatio_ of the NASA l_roJect approaches uncovered a number
of important advantages associated ,_ith the management of complex tasks.
'_is section di_cusses what we consider to be some of the most outstanding
•_ chazacteriBtic_ of the Apolio project management system.
As we viewed tile Apollo program, several basic variables became evident
In explaining the rationale of why a project management approach was utilized
and uhy project management was probably mandatory. The tasks undertaken in
placin8 a man on the moon were exceedingly large, complex, costly, and required
the effective coordination of thousands of individuals, millions of pieces
of hardware, and thousands of private contractors and universities. As one
observer cogently noted:
In terms of numbers of dollars or of men, NASA
has not been our largest national undertaking,
but in terms of complexity, rate of growth_ and '
technological sophistication it has been unique.
Involved have been a government headquarters and
widely dispersed set of laboratories and t_chno-
logical facilities; some 20,000 industrial con- '
tractors, sub-contractors, and supplierS; almost
400,000 non-governmental workers; and faculty
m_nbe_s and students at 200 universities. _eep-
ln$ all these parts--often working right at the
• " edge of technological knowledge and capacity--
finely tuned and in close harmony has been an
organlzatlonal achievenent of high order. I
Since the task was considered too large to be underteken by an all
!_ "in-hOuse" NASA effort, a NASA/prlvate contractor/univezslty consortium was
V
_. esteb!tshed as the primary "team." NASA assumed the role of technological
i_:
......
ii 1Duel Nolfie, "The Administration Of NASA," Sclence , November 15, 1968.
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leade_ while the supporting private contractors and universities t,yere ...
delegated the responsibility tO help design, fabricate, test, and del!ver
a significant portion Of the program's necessary software and hardware. !
To assume the role of team leader, NASA relied on its strong in_house
technlcal_and managerial capabilitles £o initiate, direct, and monitor
the work of covtractors. As we have alluded to previously, without
the high degree of in-house technical competence, NASA would not have been
able to direct the development and manufacture of the necessary hardware
undertaken internally, nor would it have been able to effectively monitor
the tasks being uLdertaken by the thousands Of contractors and sub-contractors.
The entire development of the Apollo hardware Was truly a "team effort" with
NASA and its contractoEs working JOintly on the various projectS.
In addition tO assuming the rale Of technical leader, NASA also had
to assume the role of management l__der in _anaging the cost, schedule,
and performe'.:ce Objectives of the Apoilo prOgram..
I. Problem_,. . O_i_ntatlo_.._______ ',_
The basic characterlstlc of project management is that a specific _
1
problem requires solving. Often Withln Apollo problems were unique one- _
" time undertakings where there was prior organizational experiences The ;_i
_, problems to be sol_ed in the ApOllo program nozmaliy had three ancillary _
objectives--to Solve the problem wlthin stated per_drmance obie.ctlves, _.
cost objectives; an_ .by a given S_hedu!e. oftsn these objectives determined .,iii'
how the problem oi:project woui_ be managed, Wl'_owould ran.nagswhat sub L _i
task_, what trade_Offs could be made, and how various simultaneous tasks iIi_ii_
see D. L. Nilemo'_a,"Ma_agln_ Proauct Development Systems: A Project _._,
.._, Nanagement Approach." Buslnegs & E.__ _concanicD_.m_n__ions_,,May, 1970, pp. 14-_19 ;:._
" u "_'°
..... L" " • " •
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could be sequenced to "telescope" the task's development time, :;-i
. ".!
The "probl_ni"in Apollo was to safely land a man on the moon. This '"
2} :
' was the starting point for all the other activities which had to precede _. !
the actual accomplishment of the objective. The major "problem" was then ; _'
....._ analyzed to determine what other problem must be Completed before that major -_'
obJectlve could be accompilshed. This p._rocedure,in effect, Segregated the
maJo_ problem into thousands of distinct steps necessary to reach the ,,
ultimate goal of safely placing a man on themoon.
iJ
2. Mu_tidiscipltnary Emphasis
The nature and scope Of complex problems frequently demand the inputs _
of several disCipllne-oriented specialists within and external to an organi-
: Zation for problem resolution. The problems encountered in Apollo Often "
involve more than one basic disclpllne---thusexpertise from other areas of
expertise Within the OrgNnizatlon needed to be coordinated to effectively
=- _ resolve p_oblems. In e_ssence, compleX,probiems required the systematic
: IntegratiOn of both tec_nleal and.managerial expertlse. For the most part '..
= the Apollo prOject organlzatlot_sWere designed to provide for the effective
inteSiatiOn of the problem-solvlng capabilities of varidus dlsclpllna-orlented i
specialists. In Apolio the Interdlsclplinazy efforts at probl_-soivlng toON ,_
two basic fO_; The fir_t cas___tailed discipline-orle'_tedSpeciallsts on 2
the immediate project team, Ifa p_0biem de_elOped these Seam m_gets were i
expected to apply their: _e'ttlSe to the _es01ut_on of the p,_0blem. The {
Cb
second case occurred when p_obi_s a_os¢ Where the nece_Jsaty talent _0 !i?;
• ' L-
resolve it were located in•Othe_ psrts ol the NA$_ ozga_izatlon or external
_' to it es Was the ca_e w_,th supporting contracioe".
i.
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3. Resppns.ibi,lity Ide.tifiCat! n
Project m,,_n_gement _pproaches _re designed to employ a deductive approach
in breaking a project don into manageable segments. More specifically, a
problem is broken doWn on a "systems" or "Subsystems" basis, In Apollo, for
example, the hardware necessary to accompllsh its objectlves were identified
the S-IC, S-11, S-1VB, Conmand Module, Service Module, Lunar Module, Engines,
_ and Ground Support Equipment, etc. Each of these were distinct projects
because they possessed certain integrated characterlstics. A manager was
assigned as the prlnclpal manaser (project manager) for each system with
overall responslbillty for cost, schedule, and performance obJectlves.
Management responslbillty was further assigned to each of the project'S
primary Components or subsystems. For t_he S-1C Vehicle, for example, sub- _
system managers repcrtlng dlre_tly to the S-IC project manager were 81yen "
_ responsibility for critical components. Subsystem managers, £o_ example_ ;-
::"._ eere assigned to S-IC's mechahi_i_ Structe_es-,- _he propuisldn system, the
#¢
electrical systems, the instrumentation flight csntfol systems, t-heenVlron-
• mental contzol systems_ and the necessaz'ySround support eqUlpment. Because '_
of the compleXity of the task snd the interface relatiOnshlps_ an orSa_tza-
_ tlonal matrix was established to pln-pOint inter_ a_d Int#aLorgan_aCionai
relationships. _he _evelopmen_ Of thest _tr_-0rient'_d r_spomsib]l!ty . .
_elatlonshlps p_bVed to be _ s_gnificant Inn_V_C±0_nin man_gi_ the Ap01io
..,, P_68ram.
: The p_o_ect/_tr_x orsmd_at_ _-_I azrahsement used in _pollo:no_ _nly
-:_ pin-p6in_ed_the pro]tee mansse_ and his subsystem menasers _,_ _Iso helped
00000001-TSG03
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delineate the technical supporting personnel found in NASAts various labors- _
tories; the reeldent managers at the contractor's facilltleS, and contractor
'=_ counterparts° These matrix relationships made clear who was responsible for
_vhattask and assisted it_establishing a system of accountability throughout ,_',
the N_A/_pollo Organization.
4. _S_, _Perspective-.
Closely allied I:0 the preceding discussion On the ability of project
oTganlzation_ to.identify key respon,slbilityareas, is that a project approach :
assists in giving top management an opportunlcy to view the "pro_ect" as an _:
"action system." From an organizational,perspective this ailoWS m.anagement :_i
to survey the total performance of specific projects, projeCt interreiatlon- '_
ships, and the relatiOneblps Of the pr_ects to the i_tltu_ion_l and functlonal _.
areas of the organization, On lar$_ proJects @here conSldera_le resog_ces Of _J
the organization are being e_ended, th_s becomes C_cial In terms of effec- _,}
ti_;e _eSd,,ce contzol and_the mlnim£zati_° Of c_:[ltat_S oVe_ th%se reSOu_'ces, '_
T
over priorities and ffes,durces m_ong ._
Frequently, for ex_np1_ ccn_.lict'S.a_ISe" " .............' ...
the various taSkS any organization Undert.akeS. If top manag_nent can mainta_u ;!
'._
an. overview capability of all the projects, by deval_ptns ef_eC_ive tnfo_natton _:
manag_ent SyBt;_ms, they will th_n h'avea pote_tiaily va[gabieman_nt tool :_}
to assist in allocat_; re-_outee, On a m'oie tg_t:6nal bas lS. _
 lOn,: Design:
_e develbpinent o£ p:_oJec_, mana/emen_"m_t, hOdshave 1)iOduced a- nmnber 0i i
• _
Innov_tlOns in Che way org_n1_ations have" t_i'ailrionaliy:-func-tl°ned"'Most }
orsani_stionS fo_ exampie, S_ouP their spe_tails_s,under ,'fU_ct£;;_l" at:Sea '
such a_. reseecch ai_d deVel_Nent, e_in_erl_, m.nU_actlu-rin6,etc. ,,
!
¢: ..
. - - _ ,_. .. . ._ ) -,_ ;. / ."..... .:- -
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management system assisted in de1_It:i_ many Of theee probl_aso I_
!---._:_ add£_:ion, funct£onally oriented orsanlzation structures often b_eome "power
'_+_' centres" within an orSanlzet£on. The project manegement approach attempts
-_ to del_mi_ these actual and potential p_aer centere by £ocus£ng orsanizationai
l
,: strensths on task_ to be soZved rather than on particular diecSplines.
:: .+
- ,..... ... -- . . . , . - . -_.- -:_./__o.._..+.-..+_..... . ,/: -'.
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group to capitalize on the strengths of the functional organization _h£1e
s_nultaneously overcoming many of the deficiencies inherent in NASA's
£unct_onai o_saniZat£ons. This _ather fluid approach to organizational
desisn assisted in encouragl_ peer-to-peer c_unicacion, multidisciplina_y
intesratton of._tale_t,and dynamic problem-solving c_pabilities,
j_
-
• i
i
x
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B. ROLE OF CONFLICT IN APOLLOPROJECT M_AG_NT
_" I. ItiCroduQtlO_ n
The objective of this seCtiOn is to explore the role of conflict In
Apollo project manase_ent_ examine its determinants, and analyze both the
positive _md nesattve consequences Of conflict. Conflict in the project
environemnt is defined as the behavior of an individual, a g_oUp, or an
organization which impedes or restricts (at least temporariIy) another party
grom attaini_ its desired project goals. Even though conflict may impede
_he atta£nment of project 80als, the consequences may be beneficial to the
project i£ It produces new lngoxlnatioual inputs which e_ences, the decision-
mak.tn8 process. Conflict become,s dysfuncttonal if it r_sults in poor 1
decision maktnS 8nd a dist_tegr_tion of the efgorts of a project team.
The slsnificance of Marshall Space FliSht Cencer_s (HSFC) approach to
project manag_nt i8 rela_ed to the complexity of the projects undertaken &
ai_d the degree o_ cc_ir_tion required t_ ln_egrote NASA iu-house e_pertise
_v£th the scores of s,tpport:_n_ cont-rec_:o_'s. Ehrly l_ _he Ap_llo krO_c_ a
_ecieion _as made tO u_lli_e two parallel _ubor6aniz_tion_ to eupp_t _h@
Apollo p_oJectS, i.e., Research a_-Develo_n_n_ Operatione (R_) and
2
Industrial Operat_o_ (lO). Thee declsiOn ma_e ft possible _0 proVi(t_ be_h
_cently
i_. _.-
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1
project tee_. Some of the confltcts had deep-eea_ed historical roots
• while others resu!t_a pr_narily from differences in professional viewpoints _
• and motivations. Historically, some of the conflict between the project
management groups and the R&DO groups can be traced to the initial Imple_enta-
" tton of the project manasmnen_ system within MSFC. A n_ber of the key
people in R&DO, for axample_ felt that they shoui.d direct the efforts of the
supporting industrial _.ontractors _nd that the lmpiementatiOn of a separate
project management organSze_ion probably was not really needed, As a
consequence, vary].ng degreea of m_trust and conflict have occurred between
the project _an_ement orsenization and elements of the R&DOiaboratortes.
The conflict which ensued, especially early in the progr_en, often resulted
in power struggles which delayed decision-_akinS.Contr£buting to the conflic_
" was a lack Of "organi_ational clout" by the project m_naSemeut organization.
One approach taken by' NSFCVs top admiOXstrOtors early in the progr_
•. _ _o bolster the strens_h of the proJ_c_ orgen_za_on w_s _o i_lr_ top talent
from outside NASA to men key positions in the pxoOJect orSan:tz_t_on. In _Ome
_' _nstances this practice involved hlr_n 8 e_ecu_ives fro_ pr._v_te t udu._try with
proven track-records in mane_£u_ co_plez t_sks as well es m_lita_Y l_ne
: _£f£cers wiLh _perience in _aissll:e developm_u_ and _ana_cment,
. project .ent organizati.n the/c,tractor. .hilch:a e not.:disC  ed
Dieasr_mente',. for example, ar_Lein_,_er %he _cope of a,. co_t:_,ae-_" ".t_e
e9 It) . . . e! ,_
of confllet in contract man, ge_ent sltu_t_ons,,
2_s practice _as even _o_e pr_Valen_ _t th_ H_me_ Sp_acocra-£_i Cent'_er. ii
, . - . .... . , ., •. ..... - ., ; . ..... .. .2". .. .. ,.. ._- .., ._....._ .... . ..... .... . ..,_.
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Although the R&IXIgroup'g reeponeibJ_l,_.ty w_e co provlde technical
direction for the projects, am_,,18_Ity _omeClmes developed ow_r what. wee
actually entailed in the term "technieal dlrec[lon." l_ e_ence, R_DO
personnel could advise but did f_ot have the auth_r_.ty co initiate proJec_
._ ._: engineering Changes outside the scope of the conCr_¢.t. I_ _o1_e luotm_ceo.
especially early in the program, attempc_ _yere made by s0_ R&DOperBo_ne]
to dtreet the contractors without first Clearing chair _ctlons with the
appropriate project management pereonnel. One project engineer in a
contraetor'e Organi_ation perceived th_ exletenee of conflict be_0een
the it&DOgroups and th,_' project groups in this vein:
The main confiict that occure within NASA te between the
technical aide and the project Side. They h_ve conflict_
over who the hell makes the decisions....
AS the above quote implies, confllct eo_et_es e_Isted betwee_ ttroje_t
• man_ement and R&DOover who had _he "right" co io_ue directives _o contractors.
In effect, _he lack of coordination between NASA's project 8roup_ and t.he
R_DO orgsnl_acfon would, on oecae_on, d£rectiy affect the oper_._on of the
1
¢ontraetor _e efforts.
In add£eien _o the hietortcai soureee of conflict, conflict often was -_
f_ctlitated by the divergent _otivatlons Of pereonnel in the p_oject _sn_ge_ent
organizations and in I_&DO. Pereonnel in R_DO, for e_ample, often are highly
mOtiVated to achieve high qtt_l$ty end reliab$1ity r_tng_ for che par_lc_i_r
project or eub_yetem they support. Prolect spelciftcetion_, for example. _gy
' L call for _ reilabXltty factor Of "W_o Personnel in a_O, h_evet; raCy feel
Isee _hapter V _or £.r.t.her insights or _hl_ _robl_ are_.
";,;:. ".
_,_-_':%,,";. : ' _ :'-- •
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a reliability rating of "R is better and that the necessary steps
_hould be taken to change specs and achieve a higher reliability level.
_ b project manager, on the other hand may feel that the project's speci£ica-
ttons are adequate and that accepting a higher "R" rating is not worth the
additional cost nor the impact on his schedule. One project manager explained
how he perceived the motivations of his RaDO project team members this way:
A lot of the individuals in R&DOgive you a lot of static.
They are and they should be purists. They want to do the
best Job they can and they argue with you long and loud.
A project engineer within the R&DOlabs agreed_ in principal, with
the project manager's comment and stated:
You can have a guy (in R&DO)=that has nothing but technical
responsibility. Tf he is only told that the system has to
work right and woe be unto him if anything ever happens to
it, he can afford to be absolutely stiff in his demands ....
As both statements suggest, the basic motivat:ion of the supporting R&r_
personnel is to achieve the best possible technical solution to a problem.
Unless a project manager is able to modify these mOtivatiOns the vuccess3:
2,.
_ of his project may be endangered. Agatnp a project manager is _otivated by
per£ormance but also by a more encompassing "set" of variables, such as,
" the successful completion of his total project on sch_dule within established
budget parameters.
b. Conflict Uithin theR__ ___ _&__OLab0rator, i,es.
The impression may have been given that the R&DOlaboratories always
presented a unified front in their dealing6 with the project me_uagemen_
group8 or with _he prime industrial contractors. O_ten there was es much
conflict Within R_O over the resol_tion of probl_s as between R&Do a'._d.
¥
the project managers. Differences in viewpoints, professiona] orienta-
tions, and laboratory philosophy often engendered conflict within and among
the laboratories. In cases where two or more labs within R&DO were involved
in the resolution of a particular problem, conflict often would develop
between the labs over which particular problem-solvlng approach to pursue.
Some of the conflicts which occurred within R&DO also were promoted
by "jurisdictional" problems. A large number of multi-disciplinary problems
occurred in Apollo requiring the input of several laboratories° When problems
occurred which required a technical input from R&DO, conflict might develop over
who should be primarily responsible for the total resolution of the problem--
1
who should perform the "lead" in the problem's resolution.
c. R&DO/Contractor Conflict
Col_flict also occurred between R&DO and the supporting industrial
contractors. One project manager for a large, supporting contractor, for
example, described a basic determinant of conflict between his organization
and R&DO over problem resolution this way:
I think R&DO is pretty successful at wanting to
control the prog_am...Everything that involves
the configuration and technical aspects always
has to be blessed by the labs. It's a headache
'_ but I can't say that it is bad--they're there
to s_e that we do a technical _ob properly. So
it becomes a thorn in your side primarily because
there are so many R&DO personnel who look at each _
Isee the discussion on the concept of "lead" laboratories in Chapter IV.
2See Chapter V for the broader dlmeuslons of conflict between R&DO/
Contractor Confllcts. ::
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problem. You can always find a better way to
build s mouse,rap and many o_ the case_ are just
Eha= ....We have, however, uncovered many problems
this way--so it's also been beneficial.
Conflict situations often developed over _ngineering changes which were
pe_cclved to produce only small marginal benefits in project performance.
In addition, conflict situations appeared to be fostered when a number of
people were involved in the technlcal decision-maklng process.
3. Some Prob]ems Resulting_From Confllct
if conflicts cannot be effectively resolved, a number of detrimental
consequences can occur. First, the Inabillty of a project manager to effect-
ively manage conflict may cause the project decision-making processes to be
lengthy and cumbersome. In Apollo, for example, when conflicts .could not be
resolved between the project organizations and the R&DO labs, each party had
the option of appealing to higher management levels. Such a procedure if
exercised excessively, would delay project declsion-making processes.
Second, if conflict situations can not be adequately resolved it may _,
lead to excessive documentation on the part of tea_ members to protect them-
1
selves in case of "flnger_-polntlng" which might result from project failure.
, Third, if project participants perceive that conflic_ situations are
detrimental and distasteful they may take measures to avoid confrontations
and meaningful dlalogues with other project participants over IssUes that
might place them in a conflict situation. A comment such as, "If they don_t
want us to help _emwhy should we be_t our heads against the wall_" is often
indicative of an attltude toward t_e avoidance of conflict. Project team
members need to feel that their ideas are bei_ judlc_ously evaluated and that
- = _-
IThis practi=_ _8 sometimes referred to as maintaln_ng "Pearl Barbo_ Files." _
.'- ,; :.
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they have an opportunity to "win" on some of the key proj_:ct decisions.
If supporting project partlclpan_s feel that they are not being heard and
perceive _hat they are being repeatedly and unfairly over-ruled, they may
simply "withdraw" from willing cooperative support.
Fourth, excessive conflicts among project participants may cause
"coalitions" to be formed among some of _he diverse groups supporting a
project in order that their particular viewpoints will receive the maximum
impact while minimizing the inputs of other groups. Such behavior may lead
to "compromise situations" in order to get views expressed and thus lead to
a sub-optimlzation in problem-solving. A number of project engineers in R&DO,
for example, felt that the pro3ect management personnel and the contractor's
personnel would often align themselves on key project issues and thus limit
an open exchange of alternative problem-solving approaches. If real or
perceived alignments occur among the principals of a proje,:t, they can make
the participants spend their energies preparing for "battle" rather than
engendering a mutually beneficial exchange of infotmu_tion and idea_.
4. Su_. ar_ H_potheses
By their fluid, intezdepen_ent nature projec= groups often promote
conflict situations within organizations. A number of hypotheses are suggested
from our study and prior researches that warrant further attention by any
organization utilizing a project manaSement mode. Each proposition suggests
conditions and/or situations which may either increase or decre,_se conflict
Within the project management environment.
The greater the diversity of disci_l.i_arv e_er_ise amon_
th_ pa_t:tcipants ofa _ro_ect team the greater the: Dot,_ntial
for conflict to develo ' amoS. _he m_,berm of the tea_
,_ r, .4
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One of tltekey differentiating characterlstics of Apollo was the hlgh
i_._. degree of technical expertise found within the contractors, the R&DO organiza-
tion, and the pro_ect organization. Due to the level of this expertise a
_lumber of conflicting problem-solvlng approaches would often be suggested,
Several manage.rs in NASA a_.d In the supporting industrial contractors
suggested that the utilization of this high degree of technical expertise
often varied greatly from the project management systems practiced within
the Department of Defense. The existence of high degrees of diverse
perceptions on a project team (as in the NASA context) was often related
to the high degrees of expertise_ x_d =he more varied the perceptions and
expertise the more likely conflict will develop among the project team
1
members.
Hypothesis 2
• _ " r, • --
.... The we_Xer, th_ana_ authorlt_ . reward and
punishment ower over or anlzatlonal units su ortln
...... ;lonaJ. units su orczn.
, his toact the rearer the , otential for confllct to -
develo_
It appears that the project manager's weak degrees of authority, reward,
and punishment power over supporting project participants, R&DO, facilitated an
" environment conducive to conflict° If a pzoJect manager has a high degree
iI •
i2 ' of reward power, those who support him may devote their efforts to the rewards.
ti_ey percelve he can give them rather titansupplying the project manager ::
with frank appraisals of a glveT_ _ituatlon. In a similar vein, if a project
I, 1j • ;_
_ G. March and H_ A, _' Org_izatlons, New York: John Wiley and Sons,
oi_on, ..... .
:", Inc., pp. 121-131, (1958) :_:":!
_i, a deeaile.d di_cuselon of the organizatlon_l consequences o£ using "_'i_ " i:i
: _ewards and punishments on p_'oject team members, see G. R. Ge,_ulll an_ D.L. :
il Wllemon, "The Power Spectrum in l_roject Management," =l[JanMa.._na_Revl__ :
i! Vol. 12, Fall 1970, pp. 15-25.
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manager is capable of punishing those who support him, the support
personnel may atterapt to avoid th_ punishments they feel the project
_: manager can administer by supplying h_n with the informational inputs
1
they believe he wants from them. If the Apollo projec_ managers had
possessed high degrees of reward and punishment power over the R&DO personnel,
!_ it is likely that the informational exchange between the two groups would
,i have been less effective.
i_ The less the specific objectives of a pro_ct {cost,
!-! schedule, and e erfo:nma,nce) are understood by project
=eam members the more likely conflict will - deyelopo
The more effectively a project manager is able to explicitly communlcate
the specific objectives of his project to those who support his project, the
more likely dysfunctional conflict situa=ions can be avoided. If, for example,
the objectives of a project are ambiguous, conflicts may develop since project
participants may be operating on the basis of different perceptions of the
project's objectives and their own role in fulfilling them. In the early
phases of a project's llfe cycle where project specifications may, by
necessity, be ill-deflned, there is often a greater likelihood that conflicts
will develop than when specifications are more explicitly defined (as in the
maturer llfe-cycle stages) and can thus be more specifically articulated to
project team participants.
The renter the ambi uit of roles amon
"lne rearer, tat __ .
_rricipants of a _ro_e_t team the more likely
that conflict will develop.
lln contras=, we might expect to find a low degree of conflict among the
participants of a p_oJect group where th_ project _nager ha_ a high degree
of authority over participants°
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When the roles of various pro3ect participants are ambiguous (which
they may have to be at times) there is a greater opportunity for conflict
to develop. Role ambiguity can cause frustrations among those supporting
the project and raises the question of_ who does what? When feasible, a
key responsibility of any project manager is to clear]y ar_=iculate the roles
of the various project team participants. Top management also c_n play a
key role _n establishing clear definitions of the roles project participants .
perform--whether individuals or organizations. It should again be noted
that ambiguity may develop over the goals of a project as well as over the
means to achieve the goals. Most conflizt in Apello_ however, occurred
over the means to achieve project goals°
H_hesis 5
The greater the a_reement on superordinate
goals by project team partlci ap_@_n_ts____thelow r
the potential conflict°
,, r _ i i
In Apollo, the presence of the superordinate goal, "a manned lunar
landing," appeared to be a mediating factor which lowered the potential
for detrimental intra-group conflict. The pervasiveness of this goal was
constantly actualized by the highly visible program objectives of performance
and schedule. If several diverse organizational groups support a project and
there is a high degree of identification by each group toward a common super-
ordinate goal, these groups will tend to lower their own goal identification
and increase their identification with the goals of other participating groups
in order to achieve the over-all objectives of a project. In other words,
various groups Jointly supporting a project must often mak_ _dentlficatlon
trade-offs with their own goals in order to achieve superordlnate goals.
i!
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Thus, th_ effectiveness of a superordinate goal in medlatlng conflict is
I
dependent upon the degree of identification with it. One also can posit
that the higher the degree of identification with a e_uperordlnate goal the
lower the potential for conflict over the means to achieve a goal since
alternative [,roblem-solving approaches can be delineated more effectively.
?inApollo, not only was there the very dominant single goal of
achieving a manned lunar landing, there also was a number of "situational
crises" which developed that endangered the over-riding superordlnate goal
at various times during the program. If, for example, a serious problem
emerged which could cause a potential crisis to develop_ there would often
be a concentrated focusing by all. the in_,olved parties (NASA and the contractors)
in resolving the problem. When these "crisis situations" developed, the
existence of a high degree of intra-group cohosfen was evident. One project
team member discussed how he felt abou_ a serious structural vibration
problem as follo_s : "On a 'show-stopper' we're all in the same bed toge=her."
 h _sis 6
The m_r_e t__hemembers of a functional a_ve__
__that__ the _Implementatl°n__ of.a_._ro_t_ mana&ement., .
syst_ W1,11 .adversely us_elrtraadi_tlonal
o!_gan!zat!onal roles__the g/_eatert_e potential
for confllct o
If the functional units in an organization, such as R&DO_ perceive
that the implementation of project management methods will slgnificantly
affect their tradltio_al roles and responslbillties, it is likely that
Bmmmmdmm_mN_...
]_. Sheriff, "Superordlnate Goals in the Reduction of Intergroup Conflict,"
Am_l oX Soclolo_j_L No 6_, pp,. 349-358.
........ • ._,._,_, _,_',,,_'.i:'- Y".__:",__......... b"...._..... , ....... _ _., , /._.r...... ",:_" i i :_
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conflict will develop between the functional units and the project org_niz_ -_
tlon. When a project management group usurps an important part of a
functional area's traditional raisslon_ It is likely that the _unctlonal
units will resist the efforts of the project group to perform those functions
in some way or another. One often finds this form of conflict, for example,
, occurring between the R&D departments and project mat_agement groups in the
area of new product development in private industry.
5. Ro..leof the proJ_ect Manager in Conflict Managenent
A key role of the proje_.t manager is to optimize the beneficial aspects
1
of conflict. This may mean lowering the intensity of a conflict situation
while in other ca_es it may involve inducing conflict among the project parti-
clpanLs. Conflict may be induced by promoting the flow of diverse informa-
tional inputs, by providing a facilitative environment for conflict, and by
employing the emerging organizational development (O.D.) techniques. Creating ,
a competitive atmosphere also is an important means of facilltating conflict.
When conflict situations arose in Apollo the project managers most
often attempted to resolve the conflict at the project level rather than
resorting to arbitration at higher NASA management levels. All of the project
groups we s_udied had frequent meetings which dressed their task-oriented
conflicts. These meetings tended to be straight forward and allowed the
Involved parties to "lay their cards on the table". By employing such
direct confrontation methods the project managers frequently were able to
dlspo_- of problem situations before they became detrlmental to the overall
ID. i
" Busin_6s }|orizons, Vol XI,I._Cl_land, "The Deliberate Conflict, ....... .
No. I, pp, 78-80, (1968). !
_c
_t
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1
project,
In tern_ of persona], attributes helpful in _esolving conflict, the
project manager's techaical and managerial expertise is critical. Not only
can e_pertlse assist project managers in gai_llng respect but it also can
help them in the crit:_ea] role of information gathering. The ability to
collect, analyze, and disseminate inform_t_o_skillfully is mandatory in
resolving task-orlented conflicts.
In addition to possessing adequate =echnical and managerial competence,
the effective project manager must also provide an environment for conflict
to occur. In this vein he must view conflict not as a problem to be on
2
guard against and to avoid but rather as a source of ideas and information.
For the most part, the conflict which occurred in the management of Apollo
projects appeared to be task-oriented rather than based on interpersonal
problems among project team members. In terms of the general effects of '
each form of conflict, Even suggests that conflict based on interpersonal
dislikes tends to be negatively associated with performance while task- _
oriented conflict tends to be posltively associated with project team
3
performance.
IFor an informative account of various approaches which can be used in
resolving conflict by managers performing integrative roles, such as, project
managers, See P. R. Lawrence and J. W. Lorsch, "New Management Job: The Integrator
Harv.__._ardBusiness Revlew_ November-December 1967, pp. 142-152.t
2N. Ro Maler and L. R. Hoffman, "Acceptance and Quallty of Solutions as
Related to Leader's Attitudes Toward Disagreement in Group Problem Solvlvd_,"
_av_oral Science, pp. 373-386, (1965). Also E. Po
Hollander and J. W, Julian, "Contemporary Trends in the Analysls of Leader-
ship Processes," P__lo ical Bu.lleti_=_,pp_ 38/-397_ (1969)
ii_ M. Even, "Conflict and Performance in R&D Organizat_ons," Ind str____l
3W.
Man_gt R view/, Vo . 7, pp. 37-45, (1965).
ii
,!i
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_=_ In conc]uslon, conflict is a fundamental characteristic of Apollo
_ project manag_nent. The value of the conflict produced depends theupon
J
effectiveness of the project manager In promoting beneficial conflict while
concomitantly mivlmlzing its dysfunctional aspects. A good project manager
" needs a "sixth sense" to indieate when conflict is desirable, what kind of
conflict will be useful, and how much conflict is optimal for a given
sltuatlon. In the final analysls he has the sole responsibility for his
project and how conflict will impact the success or failure of his project.
i
l
,>
..... I
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C. INTERPERSONAL DIMENSIONS IN PROJECT MANAGEMENT
The objective of this section.is to investigate some of the inter-
personal relationships existing within the Apollo project groups, More
specifically, this section discusses how project managers influence the
technical specialists in the NASA organization over whom they have no direct
1
authority, but on whom they are dependent for information and project support.
In other words, what "influence strategies" can a project manager use to
accomplish the cost, schedule, and performance objectives of his project?
In discussing the lack of authority over support personnel, one Apollo
project manager noted the followlng:
I think it makes it more difficult to get the job
done when you have to rely on support people over
whom you have no real authority.
To identify how P.M.'s get support for the projects without formal
authority we examined some of the primary influence techniques employed by
2
Apollo project managers. These influence techniques are most apparent and
most easily understood when we view the project manager's relationship with
those in the research and development laboratories and those within the
various functlonal areas of NASA.
' We found that expert opt, reward and punishment _, and referent
power are the primary influence techniques employed by project managers.
Expert power refers to the ability of the project manager to get his interfaces
to do what he wants them to do because they attribute greater knowledge to him
i
Iportlons of this section are adapted from G. R. Gemmill and D. L. Wilemon,
o__.c__t.,pp. ]5-25. Also see: G. R. Gemini11 and D. L. Wllemon, "The Power
Spectrum in Project Management," Working Paper No. 26, Syracuse/NASA Program,
,!
Feb. 1970, and D. L. Wilemon and G. R, Genni11, Interpersonal Power in Project
" Journal of Management Studies, October, 1970, pp. 315-328.Management, ...............
2See also, J. P. Cicero and D. L. Wilemon, "Project Authority--A Multidimension_
-_. View," _IEEE Transactions_ _ 09 Engineering_ Management, Vol. 17, May, 1970, pp. 52-57.
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or believe he is more "qualified" to evaluate the ¢:onsequences of certain
project actions than they are. Expert power can come from a project manager's
managerial expertise or from his technical competence or both. In the area
of managerial expertise the project manager may have abilities associated
with the management of the project which enables him to build an infiuen¢
base over others. For example, the project manager is in a critical position
that can allow him to have a systemic view of the total activities of the
project, lie knows what inputs and/or changes will affect the business side
of the project. His managem_ent abilities are frequently demonstrated by
his grasp of the complicated cost, schedule, and information systems attached
to the project organization as well as his human relations skills.
In some cases it appeared that it was difficult for the project manager
to exert influence based on technical expertise alone. However, this may be
overcome if the project manager can view the project from a mixed technical/
managerial perspective. It may also be overcome by his demonstrated abilities
and track-record in making sound project decisions.
The ability to reward and punish directly or indirectly is another means
by which project managers build an influence base. Although it appears that
the project managers within the Apollo program cannot use reward power as
freely as their counterparts in industry, in matters such as promotions and
salary increases, they can reward project participants by:
1. Giving recognltion--both formally and informally.
2. Providing organizational visibility.
3. Assignlng stlmulatln 8 work assignments.
4. Dele@atlng responsibility.
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Project manage,s can "punish" those who do not perform adequately by:
_. Isolating them from the primary action of the project.
2. Giving negative comments to the individuai's superior.
3. By formal means, i.e., documenting the Indlvldual's lack
of compliance.
4. Exposing mistakes of their interfaces to peer groups.
Referent power w_s another important source of interpersonal influence.
It is based on the degree to which the project manager's interfaces l)Identify
with and are committed to the objectives of the project; 2) identiiy with the
organizational position of the project manager; and 3) identify and value
their relatlonshlp with the project manager as an individual and as a manager.
One project manager explained the alue of referent power this way:
I think I have the confidence of my support people. I'm
able to call them and get a very quick response without
any question. I think it's mutual confldence...that i'm
able to get them to respond. I can pick up the phone and
call any fellow in the support group and tell them we've
got a problem at the Cape and you've got to catch a plane.
lie doesn't work for me, he doesn't owe me anything but
he'll do it....
It appeared that a project manager possesses a good basis for influenc-
' ing his support people if they could identify with hJ_n, or could find a
co_mo_ basis for respecting him. As one manage_ stated, "There's a phi_.osophy
here that you aren't a good project _a_ager unless you've co_e up through the
bowels of eng_n_.erlng... Another project manager agreed with his observation
and pL_t it this way:
I gues.q l_m so_t of lucky in that I came up with the
support people so they don't resent me, I have no
trouble _n getting along with them ....It's been
indicated that other ma_gers who bavez_'t-come up
thzough the ranks might _mve ha_ more dlffLeulty
than I've had°,,
00000002-TSC02
-.69 -
As indicated, friendship ties appeared to be an ixapor_-avt source of
ii_I_ influence for project managers. Those project 1_anagers who had the
opportunity and time to develop relatlonships with those who supported
them appeared to be better able to exercise referent power. To illustrate
the importance of referent power another project manager when asked how he
',_: knew who to ask for advice when he needed support replied: "Strictly
!_i personal friends that I've cultivated over the years...and they may i,e
!3:
_ anywhere within NASA."'ii What is the best "influence mix" then for a project manager to employ?
_q! I. If a project manager has too much technical expertise, it may
thwart the contributions of his supporting team members if he
over uses it. Full commitment by the team members may be
weakened because it destroys their intrinsic motivations in
problem-solving if the project manager attempts to dominate
!_ in all problem-solving situations. ..i7
j 2. If he has too little technical expertise it slows down the
declslon-maklng process of the project. The project manager
would frequently need to "check on the advice he receives from
his support people. In the process, he might lose control
over his project.
3. If the project manager has too much referent power his support
personnel may no_ want to tell him he's wrong since they may
fear it would d_age their xelatlonship with him.
4. If the project manager has too much reward power, it may weaken
the strengths inherent in NASA's skill centers. Good support
people may want to gravitate to project work rathe_ than build
expertise in a functlonal work area. It may cause an unbalanced
reward situation with the rest of the organization. Support
personnel may be afraid to indulge in independent problem-solvlng
if the project manager has too much reward and punishment power.
We conclude tha_ the most effective style for project: managers appears
to be one based on expert and referent power rather than one based on the
project manager's reward and punishment power or the use of his limited
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degrees of authority. The expert/referent style seems best to promote
independent, professionally oriented problem-solvlngo It is a model where
the participants respond to "colleague authority" rather than forn_l authority.
L,
i_i_ii'_
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D. SPECIAL PROBL-L_ISFACED BY PROJECT MANAGERS
The high degree of Intraorganlzational interfacing and coordination
i,_ required in project management and the complexity of the _echnology being
dealt with produced a number of difficult problems for project managers.
In this section we shall examine four specific problem areas which affect
the role of the project manager, gllese four areas include: l) managing
human interrelationships in the project organization; 2) maintaining a
balance between technical and managerial project functions; 3) coping with
various types of risk in the project environment; and 4) surviving
1
institutional restraints and rigidities.
i. _Httm, an Reiatlonship_
The Apollo project managers and his immediate team members required
the support and services of diverse professionals within and external to
the project organization. At MSFC, for example, project management personnel
required the support of scientific and engineering specialists within the
E&DO laboratories. As previously noted, these professionals may have
~
entirely different motivations which often conflict with the objectives
the project management group is attempting to achieve. For project personnel
to effectively cope with these d_verse motivations it often requires effective
human relations skills--especlally empathy. One project manager illustrated
this point as follows:
You have tO understand who you are dealing with.
Al_engineer in the laboratory may feel that he
shonld settle for nothi_ less th_n zero leakage
2
i_o 1
_ '[his section is largely adopted from: D. L. Wilemon ,,
c_,_ and J. P • C_cero, "The Project Ma_,_ager_ Anomalies and Amblgultles,
!_ Academy of Ma_taz_._en I, Septet_tbez_ ].970. pp. 269-282 o
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on a certain seal. He llasa certain background,
a certain psychological makeup that you have to
understand, appreciate, and not violate. You
':% can't tell a guy like that, go to hell, that he
.J doesn't understand the problem. The guy can be
' a Ph.Do and can darn well know exactly what he's
talking about. So you've got to find within
your own means the mecha_isms for communicating
with him...and then again you've got to realize
_hat he's communicating with us.
It appeared to us that the effective project manager is one who respects
_. the motivations and vlewpolnts of his interfaces but is also able to get
_-
_ them to do what he wants them to do in te1_ms of providing support.
i_!_l 2. BalancingTechnical/Managerialpro_jec__ttFunc- tion___ss
__ In managing his project, the project manager must maintain a balance
!_ between the technical and managerial requirements of his task. When the
_ project manager is directly confronted with a technical problem which may
_: disrupt the designated objectives of his project, usually the project
_ manager must make both a technical decision and a managerial decision
before the problem can be resolved. For example, if research and develop-
ment personnel inform the project manager that a crltlcal component of the
launch vehicle has only an "X" rellab%llty factor, the project manager must
weigh the technical decision of whether or not to accept the recommended
reliability quotient against the overall management considerations of budget
and schedule° Of course, when a problem occurs that has a high risk quotient,
in te_s of safety for example, the technical decision would outweigh the
importance of the "management decision." As previously alluded to, a
po_entlal problem for the project manager lles in the possibility of over-
stressing either _he technical or the management dimensions of his project.
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The resolution of this problem appears to be in the project manager's
understanding of his technical function and how he uses the project team
to achieve performance requirements. While the management considerations,
as evidenced by the MSFC/ApolIo model, are clearly the responsibility of
the project m_nager, he also has final responsibility for the technical
performance of his project. He may either become deeply involved in the
engineering problems or he may leave many of the details to other project
team experts and maintain a more distant position°
Through analysis of interview data, the most successful strategy
appears to be to display an understanding of and acute interest in the
technical aspects of the problem while usually leaving its more detailed
resolution to other technical specialists on the project team. A project
team member emphasized this point as follows:
All organizations suffer from having a man too ,
interested in understanding everything. If that's
the project manager's interest, I feel that he's
misplaced. He can do a job, but it shouldn't be
in management. He should be in a technical job,..
You sometimes can't reward a =echnlcal man...you
put him in a management box and he makes things
miserable. He's miserable and the people under
him are miserable.
Again, the implication is that to maintain the technical balance, the
project manager should be concerned with the technical details and yet
remain somewhat apart from the more routine details.
While it is generally desirable for the project manager to leave
many of the technical details to other team members, there are at least
t_;Omitigating conditions: I) the perceived technical competence of the
project manager; and 2) his ability to e_fe_ti_ely us_. his proje_it t'esm, i
/
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An important determinant in malntalnlng the technical ha tance is the
project manager's _echnlcal competen,:e as perceived by thoo_e who support
his project. The p_oJect manager coming up th:,'ough the NASA organizational
ranks often appeared to have more respect frola support parsonnel than those
coming _rom an unrelated field or coming from a position outside NASA. Thus,
a project manager's perceiged technical competence often appeared to be based
on both his prior NASA experience and his abilities as a project manager.
As sugge_sted, the project manager draws upon diverse organizational
resources and his ability to effectively use the experts on his project
team is critical for successful project performance. The effective manage-
ment of a project team was described by one Apollo project manager as follows:
A good project mallager has to surround himself with
ezperts. He doesn't need to be an expert engineer,
an expert in finance_ an expert in e;ontracting, etc.
He does, however, need a working knowledge of these
things. For example, when au englneer starts talking
to him about longltudinal oscillations, he llas to know
what the man is talking about. The prime thing that
a project manager needs is the ability to listen and
comprehend what his people are telllng him.
A fundamental quality of many Apollo project managers is theiz ability to
seek information from several diverse sources, evaluate that information,
an4 make decisions based on all the alternatlves. In terms of a projec_
managerVs ability to evaluate informa_.ion, one manager stated: "...to me,
.: this is what makes a real project manager."
_' ). Cop!log With Ri__9_ki_n__th__Knvlro_men_____t
There are at least two catagorles of rlsk that seem especially relevant
_ to project= managers: l)proJect risk; and 2) professional risk° The first
i!
=:_
:i
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form of risk, project risk, invoJ.ves JTai]ur_., to do an adequd_r.e m_anng_:_ment
j) Job which may resu]t iu proje_t't fai[ure ¢:ither iJL tel:ms of pe_[o_naance or
' Jn terms of crl£1cal budget or s¢:hedule_ objectlv¢_s. Professional risk, oI_
the other hand, centers around the possibility of profess!on;,l obsolescence
as the result of long-ge_ tonure on a project which could i:_sulg :in ti_e
-_-. project manager losing his technical competence°
:I Project risk may be identified with the-proj_ct manager's: final
il responsibility for meeting and maintaining tile performance, scheduJe, and
budgetary ob3ectives of the project. His success and the recognition of
hls ability as a manager, in part, depends upon ills achievements in these
areas. In effect, the project manag_n- is the [ocill person in a i,ighly
visible management responsibility system. For example, In the Apollo
program, the project managers i, charge of bJunci, vei_icles snd _'ng_.nes
must frequently coordinate their operai:Loz;:_with ]nlerLac, Ing pr.._j_cts.
In thls sense, the project manager not OI]ly has ze_Donslbillty t01: his ow1_
project, but shares in a real sense J:he respon_.b, lity fur the L,LI_._r preject
managers _ hardware o
Two rather different perceptions were_ found to exist _ong the Apollo
project managers in terms of project risk. The disparity in co_,ceptua]izing ..
project risk may be illustrated by the [oll.owlng two quotaL_|ons:
o If my hardware didn't work and it failed in llft-off,
it would be a eatastrophlc occurrence. I wolild completely
expect to be replaced. Pl,t It that why.
_' Ig you don't want. to accept the _.es|_ons_b_li£y you don't
have to, you just buck It up to the next manager and _f
he doesn't want to make the decision, he can go _o t|l_.
program manager.
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.Lit LIlt* |'[l_,t lll:_[_ll;_', Lht' Projt_CI. Illllll;lt._cr l_l_r('e.lVl#H hj_ leB|)UllfilbiLI.Ly
as final and complete wish tile risk of project fal.]ura resting entirely
on his shoulders. In the second case, the project ,_anager is left with
an option o£ whether 07: not to acc.ept complete responsibility in critical
areas. The first case is; relatively unambiguous, however, the second
leewes assumption of project risk up _o the indl,Jidual manager. Further
research may provide a word.able hypotheses for understanding under the
conditions that de_ermine the amount of risk a particular project manager
is willing to assume. The purpose here is to point out that project managers
perceive risk differently.
Apart from project risk, the project manager may also be confrorJted
with a form of risk in terms of professional obsolescence. Advancement of
the state of the art may bypass the project manager, for example, if he is
_mable to keep up with the rapidly changing practices in his engineering
field. This is especially relevant in a rapidly chang2ng program like
Apollo where some of the major hardware projects have life cycles of eight
to ten years. One project manager who had been in his position a number
of years stated the implications of professional risk in the following
manner: "l'm an obsolete engineer, l'm an untrained manager, and l'm too
old to go back to school."
4. Survivfng Inst!tut!ona.! R,estraints _
Al_hough project management is often defined in te_ of its flexability,
the antithesis of the traditional bureaucratic model of organlzat_on, many
Apollo team members indicated thet certain Instltutional parameters 4eveloped
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over t_me which diminished the effecLiveness of the pruj_ct managemlent
ilI'_°:i concept. It was, for example, also suggested by so_e of the managers that
ii!i ,:o
As p_oJects mature over their life cycle_, varlou_ management systems and
reportl,g mechanisms become attached to the project organization which
prod_Lce rlgldlties and encumberances. For example, over the llfe of Apollo,
various "staff offices" at the field eengez levels and at lieadquarters
placed rather stringent demands on the project organization I_:,ter,ns of dat.a
reporting systems, audits, and various types of project control requests.
Many of these systems were not considered necessary by the project groups.
7 One project manager explained how over a period of time, a project loses
its flexibility this way:
First you start out with a small organization and call
it NASA. As you expand that organization you have more
and more staff people at Headquarters and you have more
people thinking up reasons why there's a need for a
report. So, pretty soon you get hit with directiveS_
some from Headquarters, some from every level. Many of
these directives require comprehensive reporting_ we_ve
got a lot of people who thixdc it would be real nice to
huve this report or that report_ etc ....
In order for the project managers to cope wlth Inereas£ng amounts of paper-
work while maintaining peak efficiency in the management of their projects,
they had to learn how to cope with the systems and data reportlUg require-
ments placed on them.
Aslde from documenting the system, another variable which appeared
to be a restraint on some of the project managers was the Civil SerVice
rules, regulations, snd requirements. Because of their rlgldltles, these
ret_uJrements frequently became problems for the project manager in selecting
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and molding a viable project team. For e:_,_apJe, a project: massager wa._ not
_, always able to choose his own men for his project no matter how qualified
or how necessary they might be in terms of a particular task requirement.
i
i[ The man must first be "freed" from his present organizatLonal posit:.)no
One project manager _lluded to the proble_n in this way:
Ii_ Nobody gets assigned to a job around here. You have to
get permission frola the people you work for. If it's
just a lateral, transfer, and say I really need a good
,. _tr ng proJec_ engineer, even if the c nter is in trouble
and a man is around who isn't doing very much, if ;:he
person who is sup,=_vLsing his a_:em .'.."eelsstrong about him
and won't let him go, then 9ou almost can't get h.hn no
matter how badly you need hLm..oand that's kind of bad.
The problem of assigning manpower to build t!%e most effective project team
also appears in the reverse situation if a team member's performance is[ $
!
below an acceptable level, the project manager may also have problems in
"spinning-off"unneeded personnel. One project manager concerned about the
effectiveness of some members of his team made this comment"
l've got three people I could do completely without.
But, if ! asked for their _elease from this pro.jeet_
I would most likely have to give up my three best man,
so, I just sit here and don_t say anything.
The examples here only briefly touch the problems the Apollo project manager
faces in surviving the system. If the project manager is evaluated in terms
of how he meets his task responsibilities, any mechanism constraining optimum
efficiency a_d flexibility is, in a real sense, a threat to the manager's
capability of survlvlt_ the total project system.
,t
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i_ There are a number of sun_nary" hypotheses wh:tch can b_ derived from the
" preceding discussion which warrant further observation, dlsc,_:_s:Lon, and analysis.
We believe each hypothesis is signJflcant in helping understaud some of the
i:., more important behavioral problems faced by project management personnel.
i a o M@_ Human Relatlonshi_
I
i. The degree to which engineerLng and scientiflc personnel
i associated with teams are motivated to contributeproject
I," to the objectives of the project varies w_th the project
I manager's ability to satisfy their professlonal goals
within the context of the objectives of the project.
2. The greater the necessity of utilizing scientific and
specialized engineering personnel in project problem-
solving, the less effective the bureaucratic form of
organization becomes and the more likely the tenents
of bureaucracy will be violated°
3. The internal rewards in terms of motivation and ego-
involvement for those who support the project manager
are related in a positive sense to the project manager's
abil_ty to encourage autonomous problem-solving, when '_
feasible, for them.
4. The greater the diversity of problem-solving situations
available to project support personnel, the higher their
motivation levels.
b. .Balancing Technical and Han agerial Project _'unctions
i. The greater the project manager's technical expertise, the
more likely he will overly involve himself in the technical
details of his project.
2. The greater the project manager's difficulty in delega£Ing
technical task responsibilities, the more likely it is that
he will over involve himself in the technical details of his
project (depending upon his expertise to do so).
3. The greater the project manager's interest in-the technical
details of his project, the more !Jk_,ly he will defend his
role as a technical specialist
i;
%
1.' ..................... ,.....,-....... ...... ......... . . ...........
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c. Coping, With Risk in the Project Envi_onment
I. 'l'heproject manager',_ anxiety over project risk varies in
relation to his wllli.ng!_ess to accept. "final" responsibility
_,:_ for the succes_ of his project.
2. The greater the length of stay in the p_oject manager, the
greater the t_udency for project managers to cem_in in admln-
istrative or managerial positions during their careers since
technical avenues for career advancement will be limited.
3. The degree of onxlety over professional obsolescevce varies
with the length of time the project manager spends in project
.:_ management positions
:o.
,_ d. Surviving Institutional Restraints
=,.
_ i. The autonomy of a project manager decreases over the llfe of
_3 his project as institutional management and program ,management
i_ increases their desire for centralized project control.
_!i_ 2. The higher the degree of bureaucratization in terms of report-
ing systems, ruless and regulatlons, the more highly developed
the informal communication channels of the project manager
become and the more cumbersome the decision-making process.
o
i
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E. SUMM_RY REMARKS ON APOLLO PROJECT
MANAC FMENT METHODS
} ,
1. NASA's top management mlght have been more adept when establishing
program manageme=nt at the field center level. We feel that it took
too long with the result of too much conflict for project management
to be e_cablished at the major field center level.
2. Functional specialization, while facilitating in-house expertise,
has promoted many organizational c:-ordination problems within NASA.
A parochial vie_rpoint by the labs at MSFC, for example, often hindered
efficient intra--organizationa] coordination. In the future, more
emphasis should be placed on disseminating a "total agency viewpoint."
3. Those who manage and select project managers and subsystem managers
should place more effort on selecting those with pzoven depth in both
technical and managerial experience.
4. NASA should establish a formal system for training project managers. We
surge _ perhaps the establishment of the position of "assistant project -
manager" would be helpful in training future project managers.
5. Headquarters should continually monitor its informational requirements
which it requires from the field centers, the project organization,
and the contractors. As projects mature there is a feelins that too :
much information is required of the project manager which probably has _
limited value to the recipient.
6. More training should be available to _roject managers in terms of inter-
personal skills and Organizational Development (O.D.) technlques. Such ili
tralni._ could facilitate their Job of _anaglng people and coordlnatlng :::!
the_-r projects. "_
_
/ ;
,,7
_'_,,_,_i_,_:_i_ii_'_'_,:_.-._:,._; -._, .,-_:_(,_.:,_:_._.;---_..,,._.._... _-_._%:_-_._::._,_._-_........... _._............._-
,,_ _ .___.__,_,,_,___
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7. A personnel system should be established which really allow_ • r the
flexible rotation of the younger subsystem managers and project
engineers In and out of both management and technical positions.
Such a system would greatly facilitate the training of tl_eyounge_
personnel and would help reduce the problem of technical obsolescence
while increasing the appreciation and understanding of the "management"
i;
viewpoint.
8. NASA should not stifle in-house and inter-center rivalry. IC is
recommended that NASA assess the viability of establishing "Venture Te-m_',..........................
to promote innovative ideas as currently employed by many industrial
i
corporations •
9. NASA top management should examine whether the management structure
at both field centers is excessive. For example, can PM and PD at
MSFC be coordinated more effectively?
i0. A concentrated effort should be made for the infusion and cross-
fertilization of engineering and scientific personnel between NASA and
the unive_:sitieso Such a program could facilitate the infusion of fresh
ideas and technologies to both NASA and the universities and potentially
eliminate some of the problems fostered by t-_epersonnel policies forced
on NASA°
Iio _ system should be investigated which provides a faster, more effective
turnover of personnel in key project management positions while still
alle.wlng for the _mportant variable of continu.%ty....e_peclall_ for
pro_ects that are of l_ng-t+._rmduration.
isee D. |,,Wi].emon_ "Program Innovation in a Comple_ P_-ogram_" Syracuse/NASA
i:_ Program, Worklng Paper 6223-hr_-9._July, 1971,
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_ CHAPTER IV
UTILIZATION OF IN-HOUSE TECI[NICAL COMPETENCE IN
APOLLO P_OJECTS
by
Bernard Do Wood
i..... A, The Significance of In-Rouse Technical Competence
_, B, Comparison of Centers
_:_ C. Center Organization and Apollo Program Support at MSFC
i "= D, Center Organization and Apollo Program Support at:MSCE_ Center Organization and Apollo Progzam St_pport at KSC
F, Change Boards in the Apollo Program
G, Conclusions
'-,,
i
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sent of the goals in the time spec_!.f.led and with tlte mo,ey available. It
ia our c¢,ntention tha_ the maintenance of a strong in-house engineering
capability was one major enabling factor In NASA's success in the Apollo
program. It is difficult to imagine the aahievement t,f the goals without
it. Amy other government agency that manages programs in which actions
necessarily depend on professional decisions should consider emulating
NASA in this respect, k_ether the professional _ield is related to the
physical sciences (as in energy utilization) or the social sciences (as
in public welfare), the parent agency must maintain its own professionally
_t
trained staff° This in-house capability cannot be rented. While there is
a place for consultants from universities and other institutions, these can
only supplement and cannot replace the agency's own competence.i i,
Of course the size, _echnlcal complexity, and boldness of the Apollo
pro_r_, were all staggering. While these forced NASA to adopt management i
practices that were in many respects new, the lessons of Apollo management
should not be dismissed as unique and inapplicable elsewhere. One very
slgnlfleant lesson is found in the skillful blending of outside contract-
Ing with In--house expertise. The effective management of the program,
including the management of che In-house talen£_ assured the successes
achieved
.k
/
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The utilization of the private sector ohrough prhne and _ub-co.tract::-_
to accomplish the Apollo program is dealt with separately in Chapter V. It
has been _uggested that NASA c.ould have contracted ou_ -'I thor mo_:a or lc_,_
o£ _he responsibility, in the extreme making this either ,:,nt:ir_.!yan In_
• house effor_ or_ on the other hand, e.ntire.lya contractor effort with little
NASA input or supervision. It was more than a political or _;ocial expedienL
_ to have private industry in various parts of the country cmplt_y |he .bulk of
the manpower particularly in the final design and the fabrication ph_Jse_ of
the program. It allowed NASA to utilize the technical competvnce of :indus_]
without actually removing large numbers of scientists and engineers from _he
private seetor._ and it provided access to large manufact_ring facilities with-
out direct government ownership of and responsibility for the plants. For
political and economic reasons, NASA could not have put on government service
payrolls the number of people eventually involved in the whole Apollo program.
Why then would NASA not have been wise to move towards the posit_on of the
Department of Defense, for instance, in giving to the contractor much morei
" responsibility?
The technical complexity, the use of astronauts, and the involve_ent ,
of national urestige in the manned space programs plus a growing in-house
competence in which there was JuStifled pride probably saved NASA from
what, in our opinion, would have been a grave error: the assignment of
too much unsupervised responsibility to contractors. Intensive super-
: vision, though desirable_ was not uniformly NASA's practice even within
"_. r iff:_cu]tle= arisingthe Apollo program° _,,e.e were instances of serlous d ' ,=-
from the practice cf some admlnistrators a_ certain ti_m_ to trus[ the
r_
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contractor in reliability and quality a,_utancc a:_ wcit at_ (n t|¢._i_ig, judg -_
. M.d,L._. mentso In thft;, blSC wao more guilty tha_t e,,
hA,_A :'In general there was no c.t-of_ poli_t toz the l-t,:,polv_li, l Sily _)f _" t_
teehn.tcai experts. For some iodlvidua! piece.s ,;[ hardware wn_! b;t)!dt' ._;O[IL_
• ware., NASA's laboratorLes and research and developme_t off'iee_ t::_n.q_.it,d with
_ Its ll_llted mantffacturing capabiilty performed the whole task t rol, coitcept,
?,
i
_.." through design, to manufacture and test. But this wa_ unusttal, in most
4:
t.
_i, tnst_nce_, the original concept and at least some prelimLaary dc:-:_gn were
_: NASA's. This meant that people e_ployed directly by NASA knew a._well as
anyone the objectives, the requirements, and the difficulties in the system
or sub-system. When a contract was let for final desJ.gn and fabrication,
NASA had experts who could constructively criticize proposals as well as
pzoduct. This was essential because ultimately NASA. and not the contractor
had to take the final responsibility for reliability and performance.
The existence of the professional competence within the agency was
necessary but not sufficient to expl_in the success of the program. Im-
.i properly utilized, _hat group of dedicated enthusiastic engineers and
scientists could have been disastrously frustrated, l_%e question immedi-
' ately arises then as to how thls potential intellectual energy could best
be harnessed. To answer that, we have carefully stud'_ed two of _he major
NASA centers responsible for Apollo, We h_ve found two rather different[
management systems operating, From the poi_ of view of this study, that
is fortunate since project managemen_ in Apollo cau fx'ui_fuily he approached
through a co_p_-_rlsonof the utilization of Ino-house sclentlst and ettglneer_
a_ the M_rshall Space Fl.ight Center (MSFC) an4 the Manned Spacecraft Center
?
! -°
t
_ 8"] _
(_tSC). The fact _hat tho-.,re we're di, f£erence_ thua:rt:_ the tendency [or men
_} in any organ!zation to accept the _truct,Jre a_ perhap_ the only way to
operate.
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B. COMPARISON OF CENTERS
Both MSC and MSFC utilized some form of project manage_tont bur wlth
certain differences. Particu]arly noticeable dlfferences were the ]ocatlon
of sub-system managers and the ass;Igned responsibilities of the Apollo
program managers at the two centers. There are two important questions to
be answered in this comparison: (I) Which system provided the better access
to the research and development or other functional directorates for more
effectlve utilization of the in-house technical capability in the program?
(2) kqlich system provided the program and project managers with a better
view of the achievements and weaknesses of the program as it progressed?
It is difficult to separate tlteconsequences attributable to an
organizational system from those attrlbutablc to the individuals involved.
A center is a product of its history, the key men, and their capabilities,
as discussed in Chapter II. It. is also difficult to isolate effects on the
program of th_ experience and competence of the various contractors and the
state of the art for the tasks to be done. Nevertheless, as far as these
can be separated, it is our view that: (I) the system at MSC (Houston)
provided better penetration of the fun_tJ.onal technical directorates with,
incidentally, less resultant resentment and anlmosity at the worklng
engineer level, and (2) the MSFC (!tuntsvtllc) orgattizatton provided better
tracking of the program and lts.sub-components,_ ?['he seasons and the effects
will be discussed :In this Chapter.
A careful _atudy o£ M:$C, MgFG, and K[._C convinced us _.ha¢, ASPO at M$C,
While being in a strong m_m_gcottmt p_mit, ion_ depended he_lV],ly on the runt-
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i,:szman e of rea_ work. At MSFC, the mona_e-tlozlal dJree_or_c_s for the peT.._ ° c
merit responslbillty for the Ap,)llo prob,,ramwas p,rposely dlifuscd to involve
the llne organi_.'itlono£ the Cen_er more d:IrectJy. At:KSC, tlt_APO was
eseentlally a lialson office to br:tng HSFC, HSC, aztdHeadq,ta_t_r_ il_to
decb31on_, as necessary, while responslbillcy for l:lte major task at theft
center was delegated to LauzJch Operations which was a funrtlooal directorate
of the Center.
Although we had independently reached these con-.luslon._:,we found them
substantiated by a recent NASA report in which management was only one
consideration. A very concise statement o£ the management systems in the
Apollo program is to be found In the Repor_ of the Apollo ! 3 Reylee Board,
submitted to the Administrator of NASA by the board's chairman on June 15,
1970. Appendix E of that long document iS the "Report of Project blane.ge-
ment Panel." NASA's adoption of the matrlx approach to project management
for the Apollo program is very succinctly presented. In e_plalning the '.
responsibilities of ApOllo managers at the three major centers, that report
uses subtly different language for the three situations. To this reader,
that language reflected the real differences found by our own investigations
of the three centers, as summarized in the preceding paragraph.
The following three quotations are from that report. The emphasis is
added by this writer:
MSC
Responsibili_.y for man_.ging all aspects of the Apollo
Program aselgned to the Center iS vested in _e Manager
of the Apollo Spacecraft Program Off lee (ASPO)....
Virtually all of the Apollo tasks done In-house at MSC
00000002-TSD11
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• . . _re_erformcd _o2_line organ_zations
- _lol_a ! Direct orates_ unde r the overall direc-
tion_ arid= coordination of '_he ASPO Manager.
MSFC
AIChough the Saturn Pror_ Office _epresents the
: A_pollo Launch ye_?_Pro r_ for purposes
of full-time management, the ....Director: of Pro._:ram
Hanae_has been designated the Apollo Launch
Vehicle Program Manager. He manages ann directs
all aspects pf the Apollo Program aslsi_ned to MSFC,
drawln_ on technlcal support from the Science and
EnglneerinR Directorates.
KSC
Overall responsibilit% for managing all aspects of
the preparation_ checkout, and launch of the Apollo
space vehicles is assigned to the Manager of the
Apollo Pro_/am Off,.re (APO). All functional organi-
zations at the Center participate in those activities o
under the o_erall direction of the APO manager.
Direct responsibilit.: .y for launcL and. checkout is
delegated t9 the_Director of LaUnch Operations.
J
in the management of the Apollo program, the responsibilities of the
three Cen_r Directors must not be overlooked. In assigning responsibility
for the launch vehicle to MSFC, the spacecraft to MSC, and launch operations
to KSC, the Associate A_inistrator for Manned Space Flight made the director
of each center specifically responsible for Apollo Program functions at his
own center. In actuallty, however, the involvement of the Center Director
and his staff was not the same at each Center and varied with time at the
The implications of these organizational differences will be discussed
further after e detailed look at the utilization of the _n-house technical
- *_1 _
resources at MSFC and MSC and a brief description of the operations at
KSC.
Perhaps the most effective manag_m_ent tool developed in the Apollo
program was the use of Change Boards. These operated at levels that
exactly paralleled the management levels in the program, Their purpose
was to deai with changes in hardware and software proposed or requested
after design completion. In so doing, the Boards formed a formal channel
of communication across each Center at various levels and across Centers.
Because their structure was similar at the three Centers, Change Boards
will be discussed in a separate section of this chapter.
,
.I ,...... • . .... _........ .. • _. ..... _ _. ,,_,,
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C. CENTER ORGANIZATION AND APOLLO PROGRAM SUPPORT AT THE
_RSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER (HUNTSVIIJ,I.)
J,
__!_ This nection and the two to £ollow den]. witS_ the organization of ,
the Centers as they existed at the end of .1.968. That date represents
the end of the period of greatest NASA concentration on Apollo, Shortly
thereafter, all the manned space flight centers experienced some reorgani-
zation, initiated at least in pare by _.he necessity to provide flexibility
for the introduction of other manned prograi, s. It will, of course, be
interesting to take note of the later changes, for instance those at
MSFC in February, 1969. This will be done briefly at the end of this
section,
The official organization of the Marshall Space Flight Center, as of
October, 1968, is shown in Figure I° It is important to note that the
relationships dealt with here were found to remain essentially unchanged
\
when "Industrial Operations" became "Program Management" and the "Research
and Development Operations" directorate was reorganized into "Science and
Engineering" and "Program Development" in 1969.
!
:: In Figure I, only a few boxes have been filled in and they will be
i dealt with in particular. It Is immediately obvious that below the level
' of the staff function offices of the Center, the whole organization was _
dlvlded into only two dl_ectorates. What is not obvious from the chert
is that most of the Center's budget flawed through the hands of the I,O.
directorate, indeed thzough one program which was the Saturn V office.
Also, most of the Center's personnel worked under the R&DO directorate. '_
• While four programs in I.O. are represented by the boxes_ these were by _
f
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po means equal in scope nor were, they all. p):ogr_n_ in the u_ual fCe[l'_._e.
A project _tanager IlltideApollo p_'ogl:amlhas respon:_:[bilities to his
superiors in _he lin_ organization of the Center and he L.erta_nly has
responsibilities to the !_rogram itseltf. The apparent conflict of loyalties,
to the Center and to the Program, ts partly resolved when we r_.-:callthat
the DJ.rector of the Marshal.1 Space Flight Center had been given the respon-
sibility "for the deveJopment, fabrication, assembly, and testing of the
large launch veh:[cles req,..iredIlL the Apollo program," Also, the Director
of Industrial Operations at MSFC was responsible "for conducting ._ndmanaging
Launcl; Vehicle Sy._tem Projects" and he "_cts as the Apollo Program Manager
at this Center." Both of these me__ oversaw other projects as well, but
i
they had specific places in the Apollo program organization.
A generalization frequently encountered in discussions about the two °
directorates at MSFC was that Industrial Operations was essentially task :,
oziented, primarily concerned with performance, schedule_ and cost, while
Research and Development Operations was discipline oriented, conce.rned only _
with performance. This is a gross over-simpllfication. We have found
many examples of cost consciousness originating with R&DO personnel_ and
_ certalnly we have found an understandable concern with schedule, deadlines ,_
in addition to a prlde in perfo_ance in that same side of the house.
U
NeVertheless, it is true that the final responsibility for. cost and schedu].e
b
rested with the program and p_oJect _anagers, and it Was i_evlt_le that _
some of the.more bltter co_mfilctS between the .two directorates stez_med from ,i
that formal responsiblllty which sometimes forced the managers _o make a _ii
decision cont,rary to the advice of their own In-house e.zp_.rtswho were In _
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R&DO. The e_i_tence anJ iade_,d the u,_eof conf[i_t in the management of
Z_
Apollo Js dealt wlth In Chapter III.
q
_'_ Perhaps the best ,_ay to appreciate tllecomplexity of relatio_iships
between the two dlrecgorates ac MSFC Is to examine: those directorates
down co thelr smallest work!ng elemenLs, the sub-system _,_anagerin I.O.
=i and the laboratory section In R&DO. For this purpose, Figure 2 i!lus-
_Iiii! trates an arbitrarily selected example of a sub-system manager in the
_ngineerlng function of the S-If stage (project) of the Saturn V program,
who may wish to co_nunicate with a quite arbitrarily selected specialist
in the Environmental Control section of the Mechanical Systems branch of
the Propulsion division of the Propulsion and Vehicle Engineering labora-
tory° To trace formal relationships, it has been necessary to identify
also the Project Support Office within the Systems Engineering Office,
a staff office in the R&DO directorate. Further, one must note that
there was a Systems Engineering/Project office wlthin the P.& V.E. : '
laboratory. Although ve did not find it referred co as such_ thls is
an example of a functional office being "co-located" in another organiza- •
tion, reportlng.both to the director of that organization (the P.& V.E.
laboratory in this case) an4 _o the parent office (Projec_ Support in
Systems Snglneering),
Again to e_aphasize the complexity of the Whole organlzatlon, we should
note the folloWing:
I. Saturn V was one of four program offices then in the l°O,
Directorate. The others we._e."
Saturn I/IB
Saturn/Apollo App1_eatlons
Ermines __
J
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2. The S-Ill project manager was oT,eof five project (or stage)
managers in the Saturn V program. The others were:
S-IC
S-IVB
ij Instrument Unit (IU)
Vehicle Ground Support Equipment (GSE)
3. Engineering was one of seven stage functions of $-IIo 1_e
others were:
Program Control
Test
Keliability and Quality Assurance (R&QA)
:" Manufacturing ..
,: Configuration Management
: \
_ Logistics
' 4. Three sub-sys=em engineers are shown on the chart.° but in this
./. ,
_:: partieu!ar office there was also a chief engineering manager
: (not shown). Other offices had either move Or fewer sub-system
::_r_ ' : managezs 0
:?! .-
;:: 5. Iu Rb.DO there were eight laboratories:
:t
-,,,_i Aero-As trodyn_ias
! As trlonlcs
/' C_putation
': : Manu f aa. tur £n8 .Engineer i_8
' g_, !:Propulsion aged Vehicle En neertlt_ _
:"- Quality and P.eI..tabI,ll_y Assurance i
-:.... Space _cle_ces
_::_-- Test
• ,}.,,
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'= 6 In _hc P&VE Laboratory th(;,rc _crc fou_ d]vi_;J,)ll;_;:
_,., Propul_ lot_
N: Struuture_
H
i_=1!_). Propul,aIon_ia te r I _a.[_;
: 7. The d'__vtsion o£ P&VI_ Ll_bozatory had five braa,,lles:
EnR£nc and Power
Fl u [d-Thcrmat Syst;:_.m,_
Mechanical Systems
Appll cd Research
Propulsion Systems
8. Not ahow_ on the chart is the Projects Office for the Propulsion
division which had three engine project engineers (F-._, J-2, It-l)
': as we!l as project er,g£neers for Saturn V, Saturn IB, S-IC and =
, S-IB, S-lls S-IVB, and AAY. These were liaison men fox- the
cozrespondlng program and project offices In I.O.
, 9. The Hechanlcal Systems branch had four sect£onS: ,:.
' Advanced Design ::
_ Electro-Mechanical Systems _
<!
: Envlro_mentai Control
)i;
:: Fluld Controi _
_ Fluid F_ed :,
• r_
)! i0. Sectlons, branches, an_ di'vlslons h_d Chlefs; iaboratorlea had _,_
t' ,i)
_: dlrectors; progr.am_, projects and steges had managers; and all '_• . _,_
:" these, men had d_put_s_ and assistants, ':,
!' ji',
"7"_
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• !1I. 7,! ose were all in _ddttion to all the _taff support _nd functions
offices that were shown :in Figure I and that were quite complex
In themso!ves.
The obvlous overlay of program reqairements, managed from within Io0.,
on _he ex£stlng strong llne-and-staff organization of the Center's R&D
,: laboratories presents a cias_ic ex_m_ple of matrix management. Tile concept
o£ management matrices was not unique Co the Saturn V office, but the
i:
development of such comple._ matrices, the insistenc_ on their being up to
date ,...and the heavy reliance on them in day.-to-day operation constitute a
manasemenc innovation peculiar to the Saturn V program and represent a
real contribution to the technique e,fma.aglng complex technological
programs.
The contacts between I.O. and R&DO necessary in tlleoperation of the
Apollo program followed both formal a_d informal channels. For instance,
f
no formal agreement for the R&DO ]aboratorles to provide time or _acilities
to a project (which, after all, would require an allocation of.funds) could
be made without the knowledge and agreement of the Projects Support Office
: of Systems Engineering/Project Office located in that laboratory. The
Change Boards represented another formal communication channel at various
levels. But since formal agreement for time and facilities allocations
could be made only after it had been determined what the requirements were
likely to be_ there had to be Inform_l ss well as formal contacts between
the two dlrectorateS and between these two and the contractors at all stages
of the p_ogram.
00000002-TSE09
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The very large number ot individuals In l.O. uho had to communicate
_ with varlous indivtduat_ t. R&IX)r_q.l.red Lhe .on.true, ties of formal _natrix
. charts to delineate poluts o[ contact. For tile Saturn V program aJone,
._: the R_DO polnt_ of com..It=motet= ([,croons ,Jho could officially commit the
laboratories for _erviccs), tire d_,,,:_:tg_._tc,:l technical person:; (who could
not)_ the contract.or ¢ounte, vpart:,_ arid _esldent managers, the I.O. program,
project, and sub-sy:_tom _,anagors, all were noted .on 23 separate matrices
which stated who was offiela,lly to _,n_eract with whom.
The telephone uas au tndD_pen_able instrument in the wl_ole management
scheme. The frequency of telephone contact between individuals in 1.0.
and in R&DO-(as well as between these men and thelz counterparts at the
contractor_' sites and at.the other ce_ters) was unbelJevabJy high. And
more often titannot, these phone calls were by-passi1_,off:telalchannels.
Nx i.
The routes of formal con_aunication,, so carefully lay_d out to ensure main-
tenance of technical and financlal rt_sponslbility,w_re _oo complex and
time consuming _or a tlme-critlcal program such as Ap,:i_Jo.Knot/ledge
_esldes wi_h people despite their off_ce loeatlon_. Technlcal assistance
and the _lllingness to expedite a solution with or ei.thoutofflclM_ direc-
tion often depended on _utual trust and respect a_d on personal commitment,
_, dedlca_ion, and enthusiasm for the prog_:am. Neve_tlteless,fot_el documenee-
_"
'_T ties necessarily _ollowed all agt'eementS or stro_,,_disagreemen_s,
Thus, _h_ Project Support off lee of Systems _.ngineerlngin R&iR}cam-. .....
muvicated informally with the Saturn Y program office, avd serVed a_ a i:_/
channel for the SatUrn V progrms to get _::o0pe_'atlons_4ahagementand _:_
F_peri_ents_ eh_ch were two othe_ staff _f£1ce_ in R&DO, Similarly, _
!i
'," f
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.laboratory depended l)rtmarlIy (,, tile individual cllo._en to lead the
Investigation, and on. his particular affiliaLion r_,Lher than follow-
lng from t l.: selection of a logical laboratory, Lllough the two con-
shleration:_ are hard to separate. The lead laboratory then put to-
.. gether a _eam, primarily from R&DO, and the other laboratories involved
_ became supporting laboratorieS. An engineering manager was designated by
the lead lab dlr_ctor and each supporting lab designated a project engineer
for the p;_rticular problem. This practice of drawing a working group from
all eoncerm,d laboratories provided the flexibility in R&DO necessary to ............................
manage) tl_esolution of unexpected problems.
The cllanges made at MSFC in February, 1969_ which have already been
tel.erred to, were quite significant. They primarily were instituted to
provide more flexibility in the Center for adaptability to new programs,
no,e of which coutd be allowed to dominate the Center as Apollo, of "
necessity, had done in the past. Provision Was made also for the
encouragement of ghe generation of new programs. _
The lndustrlal Operations Directorate was renamed "Program Management."
Thls was certainly a more descriptive tens for the situation at that time,
although it is unde_standab!e that "Industrial Operations" had been a
logical name whun tlie Center's great concern was Its ..relationships wltii
Industry ¢braugh contracts that were larger than any government peace-
time eontr:_cts had ever been° However, the program offices remained un-
changed in tha_, reorganization.
The more significant change in February, i969, was the renamlng of the
Resea_-ch a_d Development Operatlons DlrectoraCe as "Science and Engineering"
a_
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along with the creation of a new directorate called "Program Development,"
The latter essentially took over directiou of those functlons which would
lead directly to the conception and development of new programs while
leaving SclexLce and Engineering in a predominantly supportive role for
both Program Development and Program Management. Looking ahead to the
next decade, Program Development (P.D.) provided a much :seeded home base
for embryo programs not yet sufficiently developed or funded to be moved
over to Program Management (P.M.). As a proposed program became a reality,
its management could be taken over by P.M. It remains to be seen how smooth
this transition of each program from P.D. to P.M. will be.
A fourth Dire_rotate, Administrative and Technical Services, was
created at the same time. It brought together a large number of Center
staff offices and put them organizationally under a director who would
be on a.par with the three other directors° This took much of the day-
to-day management of the Center off the shoulders of the Deputy Director :. ,
for Management to free him for consideration of pollcy matters. It is _ ,
not surprising that, in a year which foresaw declln£ng NASA budgets and a
general maturing of the whole space program, a Cost Reduction Office was
created in A. & T.S. Of similar significance was the creation of a new
Center staff office called Procurement Policy and Review. That fum=tlon,
carried oat until then by Center and Program management needed a more
formal locus of responsibility at the Center level as more progr_s could
be foreseen competing for limited funds and making competitive dema=ds on
contractors, i'
%
i
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_ D. CENTER ORGANIZATION AND APOLLO PROGRAMSUPPORT AT TIlE
I_ED SPACECRAFT CENTER (HOUSTON)
The Center orga_izatlon at the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC)
was described in some detail in the previous section. Therefore here,
iI the description of the o_'ganization at the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC)
can be briefer with concentration on differences between the two. Again,
" the charts shown represent the situation as of the end of 1968, and again,
very little change in working relationships was found after that date.
The orgnnization of MSC is shown in Figure 3. In contrast to
Figure i which represented MSFC, this shows five Center directorates.
Three programs are shown, but they are not in a "Program Management" or
"Industrial Operations" directorate as at Huntsville° Officially they
reported directly to the Center Director. !
There were sub_tantlal differences between the ApOllo Spacecraft
Program Office (ASP0) at MSC and its counterpart, the Saturn V Office, ,i "
at MSFC. These are evident in Figure 4 in which the organizations of i_ "'
ASPO and of one of the functional dlrectorateS, Engineering and Develop _
ment, are depicted tO illustrate program support at that Center.
While there were under the Saturn V office at MSFC five projects
or "stages" each with a project manager in charge, the office of the
ASPO manager at MSC actually contained t|_eLunar MOdule (LM) manager
and the Command and Service Module (CSM) manaser. The implAcation is
that these two men functioned as assistants to the ASPO managez with
-., responsibility for their.reapectlve projects. TechniCal mana_e_ent of
ii: those two projects was accomplished with the aid of the CSM and theLM
: i
.L
° --Y
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Project Engineeritlg Divisions aided by the Systems i_nBineering Div_slon
and the Test I}lvjsiOn. Pars.l](,,1 Io thes(, four dlv[slon_ w:l._; tim Program
p. -
- Control Division which played a key role l.u contract management for ASPO.
Program Control essentially pcrformt,d a staff function for ASPO.
., Each branch chief in Program Control., for instance the I2d Cotttraet Branch
" Chlef, acted as a "project Officer" for the designated contracts. He had
sign-off authority on directions to contractors for particu]ar sub-systems,
but did ,_otmake decisions on the technical aspects of change orders. This
functlon was necessary because the sub-system managers at NSC, unlike their
counterparts at MSFC Who were in the px'oject management offices, were t:obe
found in one or another-division of the functional directorates such as
Engineering and DeVelopmeut,, ConseqUently, tlteProgrmn Control branch
chief who was a project officer and the sub-systeu nimmger I_ say E&D.
formed a team to direct the contractor on a partlcular sub-system. '_
Similarly Within ASPO, the individual Vehicle managers in Ia_and CSM
Project Engineering had "complete authority" for their particular w_hicl.es
except for official contract control which reaided eith the project officer
(branch chief) in Program Control.
A _,ery useful function performed by Program Control was the develop-
me.hi of cost estimates in parallel with the contractor's cost estltnate for
any change, If P.C.'s and the coutractor'_ figures were vezy different,
there was a s_rong _Jdidatton that one or the othet_ misinterpreted the Job
to be done. This gave an _arly warnt.ng of m,.tmlnderst.an41ug which, _f not
rectified, could cost the program i_ toxins of bot_ money a_td time.
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To pursue the l!luatration f;f progr_m _upport a_ HSC, I,'tgur_ 4 shows
ai.so the organ!rat.tonal struct:ure of LlJc Engineering and Developlaent (E&D)
Directorate sitice this was the prime source of support for hardwnre develop-
ment. Wi_,hin this directorate there was a strong Line organizational struc-
ture under two of the three assistant directors. This dttt_ers from the
organization of the "laboratories '_ in R&DO at Harshall in that the E&D
:. Direct:or at M_C is one of five reporting directly to the Center Director,
while all laboratories at Harshal! were under the RbDO directorate.
!
The Crew Systems Dlvi_lon of the Chemical and Mechanical s_ of E&D
was chosen to illustrate that a division chief here had several branch
chlefs under hlm and that each br_nch might have several sectlons or
: offlce.s. Crew Systems was unusual in having an Apollo Branch; only one
other divlsion of E&D had such a branch. It was In the various branches
_ o£ the eight divisions of E&D that typical sub-system managers _#ere to be '
found. Timy had respon_Ibi!ity-for technical and administrative aspects
of the management of their own sub-systems, and they generally had their
,_ own projact engineers. Ito_ever, their authority did net .extend to sign-
off authority in the direction of a contractor; that was reserved to the
branch chiefs of Program Control in ASPO. ':
il A few sub-ey_te_s in the Apollo program at MSC did not fall spectgt.-
cally £ntv the LM or the CSH projects. Tire managers Of these sub-systems _s
therefore reported directly to the AgPO manager agd were _entlally }_
,j
project manager_ Wlth full responslbillty for f_helr systems. Ho_eve,r, "_"
: they were organizatlo_ally located In the ffunctional dlrcc_orates (a_ ii_
w_re all sub-system march, re) and stand as an anowsly _a pro_ee_ ma_ge_ i}
merit ochemes, :i_
/?,
"_ "" s_o ,
• :.._ _
:ii_,i
f
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While located :ina directorate such as E&D, the sub-system manager
at MSC had a prime responsibility to ASPO. lie was assigned with the
!
co,lcurrence of_ the directorate and ASPO, and could not be removed [rom
that responsibility by clleunilateral action of either one. Project
'i
,:! managers to whom he reported could certainly recommend his adva_cement
in GoVernment $el.'vice rating but his promotlon depended on action by his
own superiors in the llne organization of the directorate. He,was thus
tied tO the functional organization which was his "home," and consequently
his presence there was not likely to be resented.
Although sub-system managers were far down the organizational struc-
ture, their location at MSFC and at MSC respectively is a Rey to the
difference in the management of the Apollo program _t the t_o Centers.
. _: At Marshall, sub-system managers were completely outside the supporting
laboratories while at the Manned Spacecraft Center, they were nominally
and actually a part of the technical support group. Both systems bare
i. a
their merits and both have dlsadvant_ges tO be _us_arl_ed l_ter. ,
, !
: _.
' 2
'I
_c
$
s, t,
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" F. CHANCE BOARDS IN TilE APOLLO PROGRAM
Throughout the Apollo prograal, at Headquarters, MSFC, MSC, and KSC,
Change Control Boards and Configuration Control Boards were set up in
paraliel tO the whole management structure of the program. These provided
for formal contact across Centers, from centers to contractors, and within
centers a_ _II levels. Their empioy_ent by the Offlce of Manned Space
Flight helped to make the Apollo program a successful undertaking, bring-
ing together all the resources which otherwise might often have workedat
cross-purposes. In the Same way that the in-house competence of NASA
_rovlded one of the strongest factors in Apollo, the form and use of the
control boards constituted one of the boldest and most significant manage-
ment tools in the Apollo program.
The point is made in Chapter V that the job of the project manager
is most active during the period of actiVltyof the major contractS, after
p
the basic goals of the program and its components have been set. The pro- .
gram and project managers' jobs would be much less complex if the whole
prograU, could be conceived at once and no deviations or changes allowed. i
This obviously cannot be achieved in a research and development program,
So that the major responsibility of management through the contract period
of the program is to consider, assess, refuse or approve, and track all
change r_quests and proposals, in Apollo, this was done by meansof the
i
Chan_e COntrol and Configuration Control Boards at the management.JLevels.
shown:
I
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_= Level 0 Board_ NASA Administrator
Manned Space Flight Office
MSF Management Counci]
Science and Technology Advisory Co_nittee
MSF Experiments Board
Apollo Executive Group
Level I Boards Apollo Program Officer lleadquarters
Level II Boards Manned Spacecraft Center Director
Marshall Space Flight Center Director
Kennedy Space Center Director
Program Managers
Functional Directorates
Level III Boards Project Managers -.
Functional Directorates \
Level IV Boards Sub-System Managers
J
Contractor Resident Managers .....,
Technical Personnel from Center
Level V Boards At Contractor's Plant
Additional Level At Sub-Contractor's Plant
While the contract is active there can be many requests for changes
in detail within the scope of the contract. Occasionally there may be
requests to go beyond the scope. Both types may be quite reasonable in
an extremely innovative program continuously pushing to the limits of the
state of technology. The need or desire for a change may come from the
00000003
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contractor, in which case he submtts an EngineerLng Cllange Proposal (ECP).
It may come from within the.functional directorates of one of the centers, ......
in which camp an Engineering Change Request is drawn up. These proposals
or requests naturally follow lengthy informal discussions in the critical
_ team made up of the sub-system manager, the functional directorate's
designated technical person in the case of MSFC, the project officer from
Program Control in the case of MSC, and the contractor's engineer who is
the counterpart to the particular sub-system manager. There is continuous
interplay within the team with any one of the members taking the initiative_
usually by means of a telephone call.
Configuration Control Board directives to implement a change will
come from the C. C. Board at the appropriate level, established by what
other elements are affected (impacted) by the change. But these direr- \
tires follow the decisions of the Change Boards after all arguments from
J
management_ laboratoriesp and contractors have been heard.
Naturally, there will be differences of opinion concerning almost
all changes_ and it is not always possible to reach compromises satis-
", factory to every party. It is fundamental to project management that
the appropriate manager in the program or project office (for levels IV
and III) or at Headquarters (for Levels II, Ip and O) must assess the
merits of each argument and make the final decisions. Where a man in a
functional directorate disagrees at a particular level, the problem can
be forced to a higher level for decision if the llne management within
that directorate is wi11ing to push it. In other words, whether a
technical person can pursue his mlnority reportj taking it to a higher
O0000003-TSBO3
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level, apparently depends on his ability to convince his own superior
within the line organization of the d/.ue_c_tnratein which he worka, and
whether a center pursues an argument up to or beyond level II may depend
on someone's ability to convince a program manager, the head of a direc-
torate, or a center director.
The resolution of conflicts by means of change hoard reviews pro-
vided for an active exchange of views among all concerned parties. Appeal
to a higher level was necessary only where compromises or agreement were
impossible. To draw an analogy with counter-flow towers in chemical process
industries: change requests and proposals bubbled up through the organiza-
tion in such a way that resolvable conflicts were filtered out at each level;
management decisions cascaded down through the same organization only after
a thorough evaluation at the highest necessary level; consequently directives \
and requests were never too far from an equilibrium state.
J
It is an extremely important function of Configuration Control, at Head-
quarters and at the Centers, to be certain that each change is properly docu-
mented, that no affected element in the whole program has been disregarded,
and that all affected parties are properly notified. In the dynamic situa-
tion that characterized Apollo, the strength of the Configuration Control
offices has at times been weak. The importance of Configuration Control
in the program has been emphasized with each mishap, but its imperative
position in the program has at times been overlooked.
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G. CONCLUSIONS
The following conclusions are a summary of our more important
observations of the project management systems in Apollo with regard
to the effective use of in-house technical competence.
1. Maintenance of a strong In-house technlcal competence is
essential in a large, complex, technological program even when the vast
majority of the budget goes to outside contractors. The great strength
of project management in the Apcllo program came from the fact that each
project manager, in dealing with contractors, was backed up by an in-
house technical competence the equal of which probably no industry or
government manager had ever enjoyed. Beyond that, NASA's own people
had conceived and refined a large percentage of the systems involved
and could not be misled by others.
2. The establishment and use of change control and reyiew boards
at every management lev_l were extremely important in maintaining a
coordinated management overview of the whole broad program. Through
these boards all differences could be aired, all changes scrutinized,
and all concerned parties apprised of progress on difficulties. In
addition, "management by exception" was possible since differences
I
already resolved at one level did not have to be dealt with at a higher
level.
3. center_personnel outside the Apollo program as well as thoseJl,,iJ
officially working in it were equaliy dedicated to the superordlnate
$oalS of the program. This made a very difficult management Job easier.
i
i
:!
E
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i,_ In fast, it ,nay have made an impossible job feasible. It certainly made
the whole system somewhat tolerant of minor flaws in the management
scheme.
4. The whol e Saturn V program offic e at MSFC ach,ieved a better ,
management overview of the operations for which it was responsible than
did ASPO at MSC. This was partly a result of keeping the sub-system
managers in the project management offlces. It also followed from the
deployment of technical expertise in depth in the solution of any problem.
It may have followed from MSFC's inherent distrust of contractors.
5. The Apollo SpacecraftProgr@m Office at MSC drew more effec-
tively on the total resource s of the Englneerlng and Design directorate
without feeding resentments at the level of the working engineers thail
did PM at MSFC. Leaving technical specialists in E&D when they became \
sub-system managers enhanced this relationship without weakening the
functional organization. At the same time it must be noted that the
project managers in ASPO at times regretted their iack of direct control
of sub-system managers.
6. The delegation of responsibility was more important than the
delegatlon.,of authqrlt._y in establishing a project manager's effectiveness
within and beyond his own center. In the complex management schemes at
the three Centers, MSFC, MSC, and KSC, a true project manager could only
be identified by studying his job rather than his title or his place in
the organization.
7. Mat!ixmanag_ment was 9_e_ with great d#!,iberationandeffec =
tlyeneS_ both throughout the centers and into the contractors' organlza-
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tlona in the Apollo program. To superimpose this tremendous program
on tile solidly built line organizations of tile centers' functional
directorates and of the contractors required tileconception and imple-
montatlon of an extremely complex matrlx system. Only through thi_
identification of points of responsibility and po_;Its of contact could
the project manager's Job be accomplished.
8. The necessary informal communications must 6_.__cbacked up by more
formal agreements in all significant decisions. With the necessity tow,,
bring intelligent judgment very rapidly to bear in innumerable changing
circumstances, it was necessary in the program to depend on informal
telephone and direct person-to-person communication. It was necessary
to deploy manpower before formal authority could be obtained. This was
acceptable, and in most instances proved satisfactory. In a relatively
few but significant number of problems, the formal follow-up was not
_ sufficiently well documented to prevent later difficulties. Despite
frequent complaints from technical support personnel that the paperWork ..,.,,.
was overburdensome, it was largely indispensable.
9. It is a project manager's responsibility to ensure a balanced
flow of information to himself for the purpose of decision making. It
• ,L .... - ....
must be his responsibility to make a final decision (or pass it to a
higher level). Only he can weigh one factor against ancther and perhaps
make trade-oils with the overview of his whole project. However, he must
have the best advice possible from his sub-system managers, the functional
directorates, and the contractor, and if that is not forthcoming, he must
force the flow by regular review meetings or any other device.
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THE PROJECT MANAGER-CONTRACTORINTERFACE
by
Eugene E. Drucker
A. Introduction
B. The Nature of the NASA/Contractor Interface
C. Contract Negotiation
D. Contractor's Organizations
E. Support and Integration Contractors
F. Resident NASA Organizations
G. Some Specific Contractor Grievances
H. Some Points of Comparison: NASA and _
Contractor ProJect Management
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A. INTRODUCTION
Quite early in the manned spaceflight program NASA decided that the
major hardware components required in the program would be procured in the
traditional way, namely by government contract with private J ndustry. There
is reason tc believe that, permitted to do so, MSFC could have built all of
the boosters and spacecraft to be utilized in Mercury, Gemini and Apollo.
Of course, this would have required a tremendous increase in manpower and
facilities. However, with the in-house expertise and cumulative experience
at Marshall, there is no reason to believe that the three manned flight
programs would have been any less successful than they were.
It has been Federal government policy for many, many years to utilize
private industry as the main source of procurement, not only for off-the-
shelf products, but for the bulk of Its research and development needs.
_= was more or less to be expected therefore, that NASA would utilize the
aeronautics (consequently becoming "aerospac,_") i,='.......yfor the major ,,,,,
portion of the development and production work associated with the massive
manned spaceflight program.
\
In many respects, then, the procurement of Apollo hardware was similar
to government procurement of other advanced technological products, _,_tably i_
weapons systems by the Department of Defense. In fact, the DOD system was
the procurement model utilized by the rapidly expanding NASA organlzation_
not only because of the early Army affillation of the Huntsville booster
group Which made up a large portion of the new NASA space core, but because
in its quest for manpower, NASA reached out to the DOD for people with
O0000003-TSB09
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management experience in large projects or programs.
i_ Unlike the DOD, however, the NASA field centers contained large
-!
numbers of technical personnel--engineers and scientists from many
dlsclpllnes. At HSFC, these eomprlsed the Army Balllstic Missile
team under yon Braun, _nd st MSC a large group was assembled around
a core of NASA's Langley Field people, such as Gilruth, Faget, and
Klelnknecht. With..zhe. technical expertise and curiosity of experienced
_ scientists and engineers such as these, it was inevitable that the nature
t of the NASA/contractor interface would evolve into _omething quite
different from the DOD/contractor relationships from which they had
r
sprung. If one could loosely characterize the latter as a buyer/seller
relationship, then the NASA/contractor relationship was moze of a coopera-
tive, _eam involvement. This is not to say that relations were never
strained. The team atmosphere was one which only developed after feelings \
of caution and suspicion gave way to mutual feelings of trust and respect.
J
It was certainly true in many cases that both organizations were learning
and one could hardly identify which of the two possessed the "expertise."
Whether the Apollo program would have succeeded as it did, meeting
the performance, schedule and cost objectives set up for it at a very
early stage in the progranwithout the degree of NASA involvement in
contractors' affairs which took place is somewhat dubious. The well
known performance failures and cost overruns in many DOD programs, however,
probably is a reflection of the lesser degree of involvement of government
agencies in the management of industrially contracted programs.
O0000003-TSIBq 0
;5;
- 124 -
It has been amply states that the NASA project manager has working
I_ relationships, or "Interfaces" with several groups of people. In the
previous Chapter, the internal relationships at the Field Centers have
been oxamlnad in detail.
The assessment of the relative importance of these interfaces is
a difficult one to make. Therefore, it is best to avoid the argument
of whether the contractor interface is more important to the NASA prtJjt, ct
manager than his other interfaces. Clearly, thought in terms of actually
deslgn[ng, fabricat:tng and testing hardware systems and Individual items,
the success of the project is directly related to the performance of tILE
contractors. In no small part, the performance of the contractor in turn
is strongly infl.enced by the NASA project manager; that is, by his sug-
gestionsj reviews, and his abillty to modify contract _-_peclficatlonsand
to change the amount of resources made available to the _ontractor. The
key nature of the interface is "change." Indeed, if the conduct of a
NASA contract were very routine the function of the N_SA project manager
would be little more than clerical monitoring. And under these circum-
stances, there is no reason to believe that NASA could continue to enjoy
the affiliation of technical and managerlal personnel of clearly superior
competence to that of most other governmental agencies. The nature of
development prnJects, which by and l_rge most Apollo p_'ogram contracts
were, is such that constant communication between contractor and contractee
is necessary if a reasonable compromise between performance, schedule and
_ost is to result° Otherwise, almost any specified performance may be
obtained given sufficient time and money.
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The handling of changes requires a certain formality to satisfy
contractual requirements and to provide the very basis of a workable
configuration control system. In the case of a completely in-house
NASA or industrial company project, tile formal requirements are mini-
mized. But wSth the _xpenditure of large amounts of public funds and
the renponnlbil£ty for f£1gltt safety, the formal nece_itie_ are con-
_ldorable, and corronp_ndlng]y time eonnumlng. Were the Apollo changes
to rely solely on formal channels however, there is no doubt that the
Program would have extended over many more years than have actually
elapsed. Nevertheless, despite the heavy consumption o£ t_me and
effort, the complaints of industrial contractors, the comte portrayal
of the paperwork overweighing and overshadowing the hardware, pain-
staking documentation of changes to hardware and software is the only o
known method to insure control of a complex engineering system.
In the end, a NASA/contzaetor interface consists not of a series
of co_unications, encounters, and disagreements between two organiza-
tions, but of a myriad of people, pairs or triads who engage in various
oral and _rcitten communications or information exchanges. So, although
contractually there were only a small number of designated personnel
who could issue orders or "sign-off" on official, legal documents, the
actual NASA/contractor interface consisted unofficially of a large
number of people it, both organizations who had hourly, daily or weekly
contact with each other.
O0000003-TSB13
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B. THE NATURE OF THE NASA/CONTRACTOR INTERFACE
The basis for the NASA/Contractor interface is a contract, whlch
defines in a legal way the mutual commitments and obligations of the
two parties, such as the hardware, software or services to be produced
and deiiv_red by the contractor, and the resources (funds, tools, build-
ings, plants, etc.) to be provided by the government. By "interface"
is meant the entire set of contacts made by various members of the two
organizations. Of course, it Is true that substantial discourse may be
had between the two parties prior to the execution of a contract, i.e.
during its negot£atlon. However, it is the contract period which is of
primary interest, as far as the role of the project manager is concerned.
The relations between the NASA project manager and his prime contractor
undergo distinct changes with time for two reasons. One is purely a
humanistic proposition; there is a learning curve necessary for people
to learn about each other and each other's organization and method of
operation. Naturally, relations are more reserved and formal in the
beginning. With time, however, in most cases, a more informal relation-
ship develops which is more of a partnership than a vendor-customer nature
because of the phenomenal appeal of Apollo to ali concerned. With most
other government procurement operations, though_ the latter format is
retained throughout.
Secondly, there are different requirements and emphases as the work
progresses through the different phases of concept definition, design,
manufacturing and testing. For example, schedule establlshment and co_t
e_timatlon is very dlfflcult in the early phases, becoming less of a
ooobooo3-Tscol
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probiem___t the end of the contract cycle when sche_alntenance and
_%j cost control problems predominate. The fact that different contracts
,.o
may be in effect for Phases A, B, C, and D is of minor consequence,
since the same contractor usually is engaged for all of the phases.
The nature of problems and subject matter discussed and acted upon are
quite different in the concept phase than in the manufacturing phase,•
for example. In the former case there is significant communication in
terms of predominantly technical matters, that is, of matters based on
engineering or scientific information which affects the working or per-
formance of a piece of hardwarej a computer program, a flight plan_ and
so forth. In manufacturing, on the other hand, major concern shifts
toward industrial matters: delivery schedules, minor engineering changes, .
quality assurance and check-out procedures. Not only does the subject
matter of the NASA/contractor interface change with time, but different
people, in both organizations become the centers of action. This is true
despite the fact that the NASA and the contractor project managers always
have the nominal responslbility for all facets of the conduct of the
contract.
NASA/contractor interface activity generally takes the form of
action items requiring NASAdecislons, on the part of the NASA project
manager. It is very convenient and indeed quite common to think that
his responsibility and therefore his decisions can be neatly divided into
technical, schedule and cost categories.
"Technical" decision implies a decision based on engineering or
scientific information which affects the design or operation of a piece
\,
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of hardware, computer program, or flight plan, There is no doubt that
the three elements, performance, schedule and cost exist and are identi-
fiable in most actions. But they are rarely, if ever, indep___Bdentof
one another, A "techr_cal" decision can never be made without consider-
.ing its influence on cost or schedule. It may have no influence, but
certainly the project manager must think about it and make a judgement
in the matter. Similarly, a change in schedule can seldom be made with-
out any impact on cost and often performance.
Rather than trying to identify a decision as "technical", "schedule"
or "cost" according to the major subjective content of the problem, it
is perhaps more rational to indicate the type of problem and decision by
its origin. The need for a decision arises when a problem materializes
and one of several alternative solutions must be chosen. The problem
will commonly be of the nature of an indicated failure to meet perfor--
mance specs, a schedule slippage or a potential cost overrun. These
are clearly identifiable by source, but the solution to each (or decision
making) will surely involve all three classical elements. Decision making
is nothlngmore than the selection of one of alternative solutions. The
'!
function of the project manager is to examine and evaluate the alternatives i
and make the most rational choice. The manager has staff personnel who
gather and prepare basic information concerning performance (systems
engineer, sub-system manager, or R&D liaison person), schedule (program
control) and cost (contracts and prlclng). This does not imply that
program control is concerned only with scheduling; it performs several !
other important functions as well.
'i
i -
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Managers have various degrees of fa-niliarity with the technical
details of their project, depending upot the nature of the individual
and to some degree upon the historical philosophical tradition of the
particular center. For the larger projects and systems, it is literally
a physical impossibility for a project manager to be intimately familiar
with every detail of every sub-system in the project. He must there-
fore_r_ely upon his sub-system managers, resident office managers and
contractor representatives for processed rather than raw information.
There is, thus, no systematic way for the project manager and his
contractor counterpart to avoid wrong decisions, as in the case of the
Apollo 13 oxygen tank failure, when incomplete or erroneous information
is provided to them.
In matters of t ,ical origin, the MSFC project manager relied -
very heavily on the in-house R&D people for engineering evaluation.
His activity has been characterized aptly as a "lateral management,"
as a Chairman of the Board, as a mediator of the technical laboratory _
representatives and perhaps more of a coordinator than an independent
decision maker. Contractors consider this style to be a consequence of
the strong laboratory orientation of Huntsville, in turn a historical
institutional development, by no means devoid of personality factors.
i:
AS far as the contractor is concerned, this managerial style makes for
a lengthy decision making process, but also a carefully considered one.
This is so because the style is dependent upon the concurrence of many
people.
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The strong project management style, in a rather general sense,
is characteristic of MSC project management. Inherent in this general-
i
iZatlon is the danger that the style attributed to the Center is in fact
a reflection only of one or two individuals at MSC. Regardless of the
underlying causative factor, however, the e,'plrical observation of
contractors and researchers alike is that the MSC manager sits astride
a pyramidal organization, takes more of the decislon-maklng responslbillty
upon himself. This may require, or it may follow from a greater partici-
pation of the manager in the technical details of the problem and its
solutlon.
A point of similarity between both Centers and the contractors is
the technique of the CCB's (Configuration Control Boards). All organiza-
tions have parallel CCB's at different program levels. Engineering change
proposals (ECP's) are processed more rapidly at Houston than at Huntsville A
because of the greater degree of centralized project management at the
former center. _'
Given the dependence of the project managers (both NASA and the
contractors) upon the subsystem managers, the effectiveness and thorough-
hess of the latter are obviously of the greatest importance to the success
of the project. A large degree of responslbillty and authority assigned
to the sub-system manager tends to sharpen his motivation. The rigidity
of the Apolio time schedule tended to foster strong centralized control
and decision makln8_ in some cases with an adverse effect on the morale
of the subsystem manager with laboratory orientation. Permitted a some-
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what more flexlble timc schedule, a slower but more deliberate handling
of ECP's , on the Huntsville style, is more satisfactory in general ._
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C. CONTP_ACT NEGOTIATION
It is the NASA project manager and his contractor counterpart who
have the responsibility for making program decisions, but only the
contracts or procurement office has the legal authority to translate
these decisions into contractual documents, or changes thereto. In
their a_.xlety to get the Job done, verbal authorizations have been
given to contractors by NASA project personnel in many cases. Although
most of these work modifications or additions were honored by subsequent
written authorizations by appropriate contracting offices, there were
some cases early in the program in which contractors could not recover
their costs because of the inslstance of some NASA contract officers
on prior NASA Written authorization for the contract change. -
It ha_ been a frequent complaint that the NASA legal procedure for \
contract change is time consuming and therefore tends to restrict tech-
nical improvements and innovation. However, the formal procedure assures
several important consequences:
l) that the indicated change enters the configuration control
system
2) that the change is made known to many other persons who can
view it in terms of impact on other systems,
3) that suggested changes not in consonance with the established
budget or financial resources are avoided,
: 4) that since the indicated change is scrutinized by others, its
' Justification by the originator must be well thought out and
strong.
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Therefore, despite the frustrations and impatience of dedicated
engineers, quick verbal requests for changes or addltlonsby sub-
L
system managers, engineering laboratory personnel, resident engineers,
astronauts, etc. should not be honored by contractors. Since, in the
technical world of NASA_ decisions and negotiations are of a highly
sophisticated nature, and s_nce contracting personnel are generally
not engineers by background, there tends to be a natural communication
and understanding barrier between project manager and contract admlnls-
trator. This is not to say that the barrier is insurmountable; it is
simply inherently there.
At MSFC, the Contracts Office is not a subdivision of the Apollo
Program Offlce, but is an independent staff or functional group of the
conventional procurement type. The manager-contract administrator rela-
tlonshlp therefore tends to be somewhat formal and somewhat far apart,
and the process of translating program needs into legal documents tends
to be lengthy and needful of better coordination.
At MSC, the contracting and technical people have a less formal
and more closely allied relationship, and as one contractor respondent
aptly put it "are closely in bed with each other." The NASA contract
people partlc_.pate in technical negotiations between NASA and Contractor
managers, a practice not followed at MSFC. As a result of the close
llalson there generally is quicker contract action. Organlzatlonally,
this takes place through the Contract Engineering Offices_ which are
jointly responslble to the Program Office (via Program Control) and to
the Director of Program Control and Contracts on the staff side of the
J
w
i
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house. This is a practice which is innovative and very much appreciated
by contractors. This feeling is illustrated by the statement of a
Contractor Executive who had had experience with both Centers: "I have
never yet had a verbal commitment out of Housto_.._ s_.tting in this office
wlth the contracting people and the technical people that wasn't lived
up to by the contracting people." By implication, there were experiences
with Huntsville in which, at the very least, there were difficulties with
NASA contract follow-up of prior technical agreements.
From the point of view of NASA, it was pointed out by an MSC co-
located person: "We think we benefit by our direct association with
the program office. There's no question as to where your primary
functinnal interface is located and we feel that we occupy a more prestige
position in dealing with the contractor .... But in dealing with defense \
contractors they always tend to focus in on where the power lies... •
J
And in a development program, R&D, the power should lie in the program
office."
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D. CONTRACTORSt ORGANIZATIONS
The contractors are for the most part organized around lines similar
to the MSC and MSFC "matrix" organization. Virtually every contractor has
indicated that NASA has had some influence in bringing this about, although
!_ to many, this organizational form was not new. NASA liked to see a strong
il program office utilizing fully Lhe functional resources of the company.
Some contractors resisted but all seemed to have evolved a strong program
office. Ironically, these contractor program offices appear to be considerably
stronger than those in NASA itself, the very stimulant to the emergence of
the aggressive, action-oriented management format. There undoubtedly also
has been some influence on the NASA organization by contractors, but this
is much more difficult to assess.
The notion that the NASA and the Contractors' program offices have
corresponding or counterpart positions is widespread in NASA. However, it
L
was found that the Contractor's program manager in general does not have a
single counterpart in the Space Agency, in spite of efforts to bring this
about. The desirabillty of counterpart personnel throughout the affected
., organizations is clear, in that it makes obvious points of contac_ and
promotes ease of communication and pinpointing of responslbillty. It was
found, though, that there is an overlap, rather than a clear cut matching
of responslbilltles. Correspondingly, it was indicated that partlcular
contractor managers had several alternative polntsof contact In NASA, at
different authority levels. This is partlcularly conspicuous at MSC, whet&
despite the official designation of only one program manager for Apollo,
I
I
i).•
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there are assistant and subordinate persons whose responsibilities although
not titles, correspond closely to those of _ project manager.
There appears to be no really important reason, other than symmetry
of the org_nlzatlons, why the objectives Indleated above could not be met
without one to one correspondence of po_ition_. The problems faced by a
NASA program office and a contractor's program office are by no means the
same (as will be discussed later) and therefore Lhere is no compelling
reason for the organlzation_ to be the same.
It is understandaole that each NASA project and sub-system manager
desires to see his Contractor's manager occupy a position of great authority
within his Company. This insures the assignment of a generous share of the
Company's resources to the project involved and a high standing on the
Company's priority llst of in-house work. However, the strength of the
Program Manager within his Company depends on the relative value of the
Contract to the Company, measured not exclusively in dollars but in terms
as well of the future potential of the product concerned or the technical
capabilltles acquired. Some of the Co=tracts were so large and important
that the Program organization qulckly assumed the actual_ but generally
"I
not titular, status of a separate division of the Company, physically not
contlnguous to the Company and having most of the staff support usually
associated with a parent company. A good example of this arrangement is
the SII qtage Program, conducted by the Space Division of North American-
Rockwell Corp. at its separate fac_llty in Huntington Beach.
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On the other end of the spectrum, where there are several projects
!_ _ of relatively small and equal size, the company resources are economleally
distributed to the project in the recently designated "matri_ form." That
is, the several projects draw on functional services of Company Departments,
and p_rsonnel have Joint responsibility and loyalty to both programmatic
and functional _rgavtzotions. In contractor parlance, this process is
known as "proJectizatlon." Thi_ format is particularly well adapted to
handle tlle early s_ages and the phasing out of projects. S_nce functional
support can be provided in continuous increments (such as .25 or .75 of a
man), it can be provided according to need and it can change relatively
rapidly. If a project grows to the size of a _ or SII, then it in essence
becomes a "compuny within a company" and the advantages of proJectization
are not as obvious as they are with smaller projects.
Industrial project organizations go through a life cycle, as depicted
on Figure 1, starting with a small research group developing a technical
concept. If the concept survives and is funded, a project team is assembled
in a matrix format. If the project continues on and grows, it may become
the dominant project office in the matrix and ultimately achieve a Division
status, such as Atomics international_ Rocketdyne and Autonetics in the
North American-Rockwell Corporation.
The growth of a project may be arrested and even reversed at any of
the stages described above. Typically, many of the projects existing at
the matrix stage, with more or less equal magnitude and importance, will
not grow beyond that level aud wiil phase out sooner or later, b similar
i
fate will befall most dominant programs, either directly or going back
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through the matrix level. Faced with the _ractical necessity to econemize,
uaning projects or Divlslona_mre__cnnsolidated. Inevitably, th_ specialiZa-
tion and expertise assembled in the growing project or Division is quickly
dissipated during phase-out. Eecognition of the stages of project metaphorsosis
should be an important feature of NASA decision making with respect to
industrial contractors.
i.
The history of a "project" d_es not, thereforu, appear to be always
describable as the simple combination of a creation, a work, and a phase-out
process. The project has a llfe cycle, starting from and often ending in
stages which are organlzationally quite different from the "adult" phase of
the project. By this is meant the matrix stage, in which most of the unique
f_eatur_ nf project organization are manifested. At stages before and after
this one, the difference between project organization and ordinary organization
are rather indistinct. ,
J
Y_;
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E. SUPPOKYAND INTEGRATION CONTRACTORS
°i_ In addition to the development and production contractors who were
engaged in Apollo hardware and software, a number of other Contractors were
enBaged by NASA to provide a variety of support services to the Field Centers
and particularly to the ASPO in Washington. In most cases, these contractors
were extensions of NASA itself, performing technical consulting services and
management information services such as the maintenance of the Apollo Action
Center in Washington.
The Boeing Technical Integration and Evaluation (TIE) contract was
concerned with the control of technical interfaces and configuration manage-
ment. Because of resentment towards and suspicion of an outside organization
by field center and prime contractor personnel, however, the contract was
largely ineffective. In addition it was difficult for a new organization
coming into the middle of the program to assimilate all of the background
of the extremely complex Apollo enterprise.
While supportive, staff-type work by industrial contractors appears
to be useful to and harmonious with NASA personnel, the assignment of a
supervisory role, whether actual or apparent, to a private company has
little chance of success in the NASA environment.
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F. RESIDENT NASA O_GANIZATIONS
Intermediate between NASA Field Ce, ter Program office and prime
i
contractor is the resident NASA office. The resident manager is intended
to be an extension of the NASA program or project manager at the contractor's
site. His role is to maintain close contact with the contractor, and to
expedite the progress of the contract by making certain classes of decisions
on the spot in behalf of Field Center managers.
_4 a natural consequence of the differences in project management
organization and authority at the two NASA field centers, the resident NASA
personnel at the Contractor sites also exercised correspondingly different
degrees of authority_ although in terms of the charters of the resident
managers, the differences were not large.
The MSC RASPO (Resident Apollo Spacecraft Program Office) is directly
responsible to the Apollo Program Manager in Houstonj _lthough the LM and
CSM managers possess some functional authority over the resident.
In the case of MSFC, resident management offices (RMO) were attached "
to both the Saturn and the Engine Program Offices, received their principal
: authority from individual project managers rather than the program manager_
but were in the sensitive position of also having to represent the MSFC
00000003-TSD04
- 142 -
I
Laboratory Directors. Despite the explicit instructions in tLe RMO
_r charter, however, the dual responsibility of the Resident Manager to the i
I0 and R&DO sides of the house was often ambiguous or incompatible. This ,_
l accounts for the greater difficulty that the RMO's had in operating than
the RASPO's and as a consequence _he greater effectiveness of the latter
over the former on site.
The role of the resident office is an unusual one in an organizational
sense. Obvlously, the office's primary role is to act as a representative
of the center at the contractor's site, but in addition the resident office
must, in order to be effective, become the contractor's ally and confidant.
This is indeed a difficult role, and not surprlsingly leads to many of the
resident manager's dilemmas.
The resident office also acts as the communications link between the
center and the contractor. It is through the resident office that all
l"These (RM) offices are an extensiOn of MSFC program management,
established to assist in the execution of the MSFC mission by providing
on-site representation. In this role, the Resident Manager projects the
on-site MSFC/NASA image and is the official on-site spokesman for the.
Center. His office is the official channel of communication between
MSFC and the contractor. Every effort must be made to strengthen the
Resident Office by working through the office and in particular through
the Resident Manager.
The Resident Manager is responsible to MSFC through both line and
functional management channels and must represent and satisfy a11MSFC
interests. His princlpal responsibility is to the Program and Project
Managers. He must, however, also assure the effective execution of ali
other on-sire functions and, consequently, must satisfy all MSFC functional
managers. In each functlonal dlscipline, business and technical, he must
ass_ _e accomplishment, communications and executio_ of functlonal policies.
It is the responsibility of each MSFC manager; i.e., Program Manager,
Project Manager, Lab Director, Contract Office Chief, etc., to clearly
define his resident requirements and communicate them to the Resident
Manager."
MSFC Management Policy Statement #3 (Revised), August 29, 1966.
ex_
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official correspondence flows. This means that the resident office becomes
actively involved in any contractual changes; a very important role.
Two other roles played by the resident office which are less tangible
than the others, but which are nonetheless significant to the NASA-contractor
relationship are: i) the development of mutual respect between NASA as a
whole and the contractor; and 2) the role of keeping the contractor alert.
Of course, the former may backfire if the contractoz-resident manager inter-
face becomes abrasive, and a mutual disdain may result instead.
Without doubt, i_ is this wide divergence of roles which makes the
resident manager's job sensitive, difficult and at times frustrating.
The establishment of large resident offices early in the program
understandably aroused the suspicions of the contractors, despite their
previous experience with on site government personnel via DOD contracts.
\
In prior instances, though, concern for the most part was for quality control,
J
inspection and product acceptance purposes.
With the Apollo contracts, where the contractor's work was of a highly
developmental nature and schedule maintenance and extreme safety consciousness
was especially important, the NASA resident perronnel played a more intimate
role in the contractors' affairs than ever before. It is not surprising that
the contractors felt that they were living in a closely monitored, transparent
environment, entirely alien to the normal concepts of company-customer
relations.
The feelings of amlmoslty created in some instances by the two organiza-
tions being thrust together could be and were dissolved to various degrees by
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efforts primarily on the part of the resident manager, since in a sense it
was he who could be considered the alien member of the association. A sense
of mutual trust is reached in tlmewhen there is professional respect and
complete open-handedness between the resident manager and the contractor
manager, and when the latter becomes convinced that the resident office
z:i
: can be helpful to him in accomplishing the objectives of the contract. One
!!
contractor manager Intervlewed said:
At first our Company was dismayed and alarmed at the
amount of on-site customer particlpation...the most
significant aspect of that thing which is mutual
trust and the realization that it was absolutely
pointless to try to play any set of cards close to
the vest.
Eas//y detectable here is the feeling of early alarm but subsequent and
not altogether unhappy resignation to the situation as it exists.
In what way is the resident manager useful to the contractor? The
resident manager is in almost constant communication with the contractor,
and is, therefore, aware of problems immediately aS they arise. He is
capable of bringing these problems to the attention of the center project _
manager, not for punitive purposes, but to seek technical or financial aid
or authoritative support as necessary. The resident manager can often
expedite certain center decisions which the coutractnr is waiting for. The
resident staff can also identify problems which can be corrected at early
stages.
In its attempt to keep informed of contractor progress and to input
guidance and technical direction to the contractor's work, resident NASA
personnel of the RMO or RASPO staff, or more usually, laboratory representa-
tives can easily overstep the bounds of their contractual authority, and
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_ overpenetrate_ the contractor's organization. There is little chance for
ii_ a congenial relationship to exist under these conditions.
The problems discussed here are really part of the overall task of
establishing a viable working environment between the resident office and
the contractor. They are the most important problems that face the resident
manager in deallng with the contractor. Without solutions to them, the
usefulness of the resident office to NASA would be very questionable.
Equally essential to the vlability of the resident offices is the
maintenance of proper relations wlth the Centers. The main problem which
must be avoided is the undermining or ignoring of the resident manager's
authority by Center personnel, who may by-pass the resident office and
deal directly with the Contractor, thereby placing the Contractor in an
uncOmfortable position as well. Resident office charter notwithstanding,
'l
Center project or functional managers may simply refuse to delegate certain
authority. This was concisely put by a contractor representative: -
I would say that the problem that had been most severe _
would be the amount of authority that we could construe
that has been placed in the office. Now NASA and we have
exchanged contractual documents which said he has the
authority to do this and this and this and this. But
", there is one thing, to look at the printed word and then
say now let's get into a specific thing.
The only way for the resident manager to combat this tendency is to
vigorously assert the authority which has been delegated to him by the
Center Director, with the full backing of the Director being virtually
assured.
T_,e Inabllity or lack of desire of the RMO organization to obtain the
necessary delegation of authority is one of the reasons why the RMO organiza-
tion appears not as effective as the RASPO organization. Reading betWeen
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the ]lnes of Managm.ent Folicy Statement #3 and ;i contemporary agreemen_
between I0 and R&DO directors, it is clear that early in the program the
Huntsville program/project managers generally did not delegate suff_cient
authority to their resident managers and never insisted that all official
communications go through the resident office.
Ironically, close cooperation with his contractor may alienate the
resident manager from his Center, appearing as it might that the resident
had "sold out" or was assimilated into the contractor's organization. Given
compatible personalities and lengthy on-site service, it is quite posslble
for a strong alliance to develop. For example, a contractor representative
said:
There have been many instances where they have done
things for us that I am sure have enhanced our ability
to get certain decisions made because, let's face it
they are closer to us than they are to their own
people.
He also felt that Center management preferred to deal directly with the
Contractor because of the lack of trust in the resident office. _,
The view expressed by the above interviewee was by no means a
unanimous one. Some contractor people felt they could manage nicely without
%t
resident offices at a11.
Interface problems are discussed in greater detail in a NASA/SU working
paper by Barry L. Kelmachter, "The NASA-Apollo Contractor Interface: The
Resident Management Operation," Working Paper #24, Syracuse University,
February 1970.
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The clear consensus of the NASA interviewees is that troublesome as
relations have been with Contractor_ and wlth Center_ alike, the resident
offices have performed a significantly u_eful function in the Apollo Program.
And despite many specific complaints, the contractors, freely or grudgingly_
have by and large acknowledged this assessment. Because the RASPO's operated
i from a center with less internal conflict between programmatic and functlonal
organizationS, they could and did represent their Center with greater
effectiveness than the RMO's. They obvlous[y enjoyed more authority, made
more on-site decisions, and consequently had a closer relationship with the
contractor. Those contractors who have had experience with both Centers
indicated preference for working with the RASPO's rather than the RMO's.
This is surprising to some degree because RASPO is considered to be more
demanding in their monitoring functions than is RMO, but at the same time
it verifies the importance of good resident-contractor relations in maintain-
ing an effective resident office.
The most important period of the development and production cycle for
the resident office is that which takes place between the completion of
concept and preliminary design work, and the last production runs. This
\ was especially true in the Apollo Program where schedule pressures were
very great. It is the period where efficient communication between Center
and Contractor is absolutely necessary to make schedule mileposts. -'
Given smaller projects with less demanding schedule restraints, then
the necessity and utility of resident offices beyond QC and acceptance
duties may become marginal.
00000003-TSD10
7- 14_ -
G. SOME SPECIFIC CONTRACTOR GRIEVANCES
It is inevitable that the forced intimacy of a public agency an_ a
private corporation will produce certain tensions, points of frlct_on and
irritation. After all, there are substantial differences in mctl-atlon,
tradition and style between the two olganlzatlons, as dlscuss_d in the next
article.
'riLeconcluslon of the previous article is well worth emphasizing here;
namely, that the general nature of the NASA-Contractor relationship is not
only satisfactory, but has helped more than hindered the achievement o_
program objectives while fully protecting the public interest. The com_lalnts
made by the contractors should be viewed against this background, and perhaps
considered as suggested areas of potential improvement in the NASA-Contractor
mode of operation.
i. There is excessive monitoring on the part of NASA, and undue
penetration into the internal affairs of the Company° This is partly due
to a well meaning, paternalistic attitude on the part of NASA toward its
contractors, partly to the extreme schedule pressures in Apollo, partly
" on the desire of NASA engineers to head off problems and to see their own
ideas and expert knowledge incorporated into contracted hardware and software.
Nevertheless, it creates in the contractor organization a "_oldflsh bowl complex."
Monitoring activities have, of course, decreased as projects near completion.
2. There is a general feellng that NASA is overmanned at the resident
office level. Because the contractors are producing hardware and software,
they tend to think of themselves as the "doers" and NASA as the monitors
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and odmintstrators to a large extent. The necessity of phasing out
contractor peraonnel toward the end of the program, but not resident
! -/:_ personnel contributes to the feeling oi surplus NASA manpower.
3. There are excessive requests by NASA for information, briefings,
proposals, etc. as a renult of the excess of NASA manpower over needs.
The tendency to have meetings increases in Inverse proportion to the amount
of work that people have to do. At the same time that pre-nsureo on NASA
personnel _re relaxed, the work load on contractor personnel tend_ to
increase in view of the phasing down of manpower toward the end of the
contract period. This accentuates the time demands placed on contractor
personnel by NASA in the final project phases.
4. There is some ambiguity in NASA management, compared to a company's
clear lines of authority. Whom to go to to get particular decisions? Who
is authorized to require the contractor to make changes? There is a whole
spectrum of changesj from those lightly suggested by intermediate level
NASA people to those demanded_ authorized and contracted for by top level
NASA managers and contract officers. On the surface_ this ambiguity does
not appearj because in a legal sense there is a formal, well defined
", procedure for bringing about not only hardware changes, but schedule, cost,
contractor personn_1 and other changes as well. However, one cannot ignore
the intangible effects on contractors of suggestions and requests specifically
voiced or implied by NASA representatives from various organizations. For
example_ although many contracts are funded and monitored by Centers_ much
of the authority for approving the contracts, changing them, renewing them, etc.
[
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lies in Wasldngton. Therefore, the contractors find it difficult to
I_ resist their natural tendency to satisfy various members of the Headquarters
P_
establishment. Directions thus indicated sometimes caused conflict with
Center or project managers.
i 5. Contractors sometimes were caught in the middle of an inter or
intra-center dispute, very much like the resident managers. In particular
certain NASA internal personality conflicts, which have been difficult to
keep concealed, have had adverse effects on some contractors.
6. Ordinarily, hardware in production at a contractor plant is
subjected to quality control checks by both plant personnel and NASA
resident QC personnel. In some cases, however, other federal agency QC
personnel are utilized in a plant at which other than NASA projects are
also in progress. These might be Army, Navy or Air Force civilian QC
personnel, who are responsible directly to their own agency supervisors,
although they are representing NASA in their relations with the Contractor.
In effect, then, there are three parties involved in QC affairs in the plant,
and since many of the QC judgments which must be made on the floor are
subjective in nature, a good deal of friction can easily be generated.
7. NASA does not designate a chief engineer in their own management
organization, as industry invariably does on a project or program. It is
true that the NASA project manager was himself in many cases the chief
engineer, in effect. During the life of the project different people at
different times performed the functions of chief engineer. In i,ldustry,
the necessity for separating the functions of program manager and chief
engineer are clear. The manager has many areas of concern other than the
strictly engineering one, and cannot deal in _he fine details o2 the project.
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The NASA manager, on the other hand, has fewer business aud personnel
problems, and can deal in greater depth in _ngineering, Then again, the
amount of engineering work done is much less in the NASA project group
than in the much larger contractor group.
These considerations are further amplified in the next article and
lead to a partial mis-match of the roles of the NASA and the Contractor
project manaEers,
The designation of a single chief engineer i- a large NASA project
organization appears to be a deslrable modification of NASA practice_
because it frees the project manager to deal with broad project matters
and presents an unambiguous technical liaison point for the contractor.
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H. SOME POINTS OF COMPARISON'. NASA & CONTRACTOR PROJECT MANACEMENT
There are a number of similarities between NASA and Contractor project
management, but more importantly for their _ipact on the NASA/Contractor
interface, there are salient differences. Some simply require recognition,
but others form the roots of problems or at least of contractor grievances
as described in the previous article.
1. The contractor's fundamental motive is profit, whether it be direct
or the acquisition of an expertise and experience base from which other
enterprises may be launched. This is not to deprecate industry; on the
contrary_ the indirect motive is the very vehicle by which NASA-funded
technological developments are most effectively transferred Lo the
industrial community.
m..
Obviously, NASAVs function is not to earn money but to insure the
meeting of performance and schedule goals set in the early stages of each
project. While project managers operate under money constraints, they are
generally less concerned with effecting economies than they are with obtain-
ing the greatest performance and reliability of their hardware in a given time.
While there is no conflict between NASA and contractor by virt,,e of
basic motives_ these do influence the general philosophies of the two groups.
2. The contractor's major problem areas are detailed design in the
early phases; manufacturi1_, labor, union mid associated difficulties in
the latter project phases. In the early stages of most project developments,
the NASA manager often participates in technical evaluation and critique,
but as the project matures, his concerns shift to scheduling, supplementary
funding and controlling changes. Thus, the roles of the NASA and contractor
° ..
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managers are not the same and they diverge to some extent with time. The
managers are therefore not "counterpart" in thesense o£ performing similar
L
_ or parallel tasks, but are complementary to each other and act more as
members of the same rather than competing teams.
3. The contractors' program organizations are strong and highly
pyramidal in shape, at least in the case of major prime contractors. NASA's
influence in this direction has been large, but by the nature of private
enterprise, supervisors have more authority over subordinates than in public
service (with the exception of military and police types of functions).
The NASA program organization appears to be weaker in terms of line authority,
having the nature more of a coordinating, monitoring and advising group.
However, there are exceptions; there have been particular project managers
who were highly authoritarian, even bordering on dictatorial.
4. Contractor project organizations of any size have designated chief
\
engineers (generally called Project Engineer). The project manager relies
heavily on his chief engineer for detailed engineering work and technical
judgements concerning himself with overall decision making involving not only
engineering but schedule, cost_ contract and change negotiations, production,
quallty, and customer relatlons.
The NASA project manager in effect has many engineers, but no chief
engineer. Some indlvidual may, by virtue of his personality or stature,
take on the responslbilltles of a chief engineer, but there is no formal
structure of this kind, nor does the "acting chief engineer" remain the
same person for the life of the project.
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5. Contractor program managers tend to delegate more authority to
their staffs than do the NASA managers, The reasons are to be found in
the traditional patterns of industrial management compared to the more
academic atmosphere of NASA. Industrial management holds delegation of
._ authority to be an important characteristic of good management.
ii
" 6. It could be predicted from observations 4 and 5 that NASA managers
i
tend to engage in greater amounts of technical detail than do the contractor
managers. Indeed, this has been found to be the case, aS was pointed out in
earlier references, particularly with regard to the MSC management style.
Contractor managers, it was shown, depend heavily upon their chief engineers
for technical detail, because there is a formal staff structure and because
the managers themSelVes have decision making responsibilityin many different
areas.
7. The prime contractor is a middle man with respect to sub-contractors;
that is, he is both contractor and contractee. This position can create
certain problems which the NASA managers do not encounter with their single
outside interface. Of course, it is also true that NASA managers do assume
active relationships with many sub-contractors. But these relationships.are
different from those of the prime contractors, because NASA does not have
the authority to Issue directions to a subcontractor. Informally_ though,
NASA resident and center personnel do interact directly.
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APPENDIX A
_ LIST OF INTERVIEWEES
NASA HEADQUARTERS j WASHINGTON _ D. C.
Alibrando, Alfred - Public Affairs Officer
Office of Manned Space Fllght
Barber, Godfrey E. - Chief, Research and Development Branch
: Resources and Analysis DiVision
Behun, Michael - Spacecraft Test, Apollo Test
Bingman, Charles - Special Assistant to Associate Administratorof Office of Organization and Management
Bogart, Lt. Gen. Frank A. - Deputy Associate Administrator (Management)
USAF (Ret.) Office of Manned Space Flight
Carulli, Len - Office of Management Development
Chapmanj Richard - National Academy of Public Administration
Cohen, Nat - Management Development Section
Constantino, Jim - O.M.S.F.
Cramer, Jack V. - Legislative Liaison Officer "
Office of Legislative Affairs
Diller, Dick $. - Checkout, Apollo Test
Duggan, Jack - PMIS
Emmej Eugene - NASA Historical Office
Flint, Walter - Apollo Action Center
Foster, Willis
Francis, Lebert
Gay, Clarence C. - Spacecraft Test, Apollo Program Office
Gessow, Alfred - Ass't. Dir. Physics & Math., Research Division
Greenglass, Bert - Acting Management Systems Division Director
Office of Technology Utilization
Hage, George H. - Deputy to Apollo Program M_,ager (Gen. PhillipS)
Holmes, Jay - Technlcal Staff, OMSF
Kinney, Col. Arch - OMSF, Apollo Advanced Planning Group
Krulwlch, Lewis J. -Deputy Chief, Resources Control
Apollo Program Controls
Kubat, Jerry - Program Control, OMSF
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NASA HEADQUARTERS ' WASHINGTON . D. C. (Cg_t'_'_)
Liebermann, Carl R. - Program Planning, Apollo Program Control
Acting Chief
Lilly, William E. - Assistant Administrator
Office of Administration
Low, Dr. George - Acting Administrator, NASA
Newman, Charles T. - Resource Analysis Division, Deputy Director
Nolan, Jim - Office of Management Development
Poore, Ernest W. - Research and Development Branch
Research Analysis Division
Preacher, Bert - Director, Cost Reduction Program
Roth, Gilbert Lee - Apollo Configuration Management
Seaton, Donald E. - Chief, Program Integration and Reports
Skaggs, James B. - Program Control Office
Smolensky, Stanley M. - Office of Assoc. Administrator for Policy
Stephens, Richard - University Affairs
Sullivan, Edward - Apollo Data Management
Webb, James E. - Former Administrator
Natlonal Aeronautics and Space Administration
Fulton, James G. - The Honorable, of Pennsylvania
Subcommittee on Manned Space Flight Committee
on Science and Astronautics U.S. House of Re,.
Miller, George P. - The Honorable, of California, Chairman,
Committee on Sci_nce and Astronautics,
U. S. House of Representatives
Teague, 01in E. - The Honorable, of Texas
Chairman, Subcommittee on Manned Space Flight
and NASA Oversight Subcommittee_ Committee on
Science and Astronautics, U. S. House of Rep.
MANNED SPACEFLiGHT CENTER , HOUSTON , TEXAS
Battey, R.V. - Assistant Chief, LMEngineerlng
Bolender, Brig. Gen. C_ H. -Manager, LM
Bradford, W.C. - Chief, Checkout System Branch
Engineering an_ Development Directorate
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MANNED SpACEFLIGH _ CENTER , HOUSTON, TE_S (Con,'d0)
Carson, Maurlce - Chief, Portable Life Support System
_i_ Cohen, A. - Chief, CSM Project Engineering Division
Asst. Chief CSM and Integration Engineering
Faget, Maxime A. - Director, Engineering & Development
Farmer, N.B. - Subsystem Manager
CM and LM, R&D Instrumentation
Freitag, Robert F. - Director, Manned Space Flight Field Center
Development
Gardiner, Robert A. - Assistant Director for Electronics Systems
Directorate of Engineering and D_velopment
Cilruth, Robert R. - Center Director
Hood, Robert C. - Chief, CSM Contract Engineering Branch
Kleinknecht, Kenneth S. - Manager, CSM
McBarron, J.W. - Apollo Space Suits
McClintock, J.C. - Chief, Program Control
McDivett, James A. - Manager, ASPO
Morris, Owen G. - LM Project Engineering DiviSion
Nebrig, Dan - Project Engineer, CSM 108
Presne11, John - LM Project Engineer (Vehicle Manager)
Shannon, James J. - LM Contract Engineering Branch
Slay,on, Donald K. - Director, Flight Crew Operations
\
Smallj John W. - Manager, Lunar Surface Project Office
Directorate of Science and Applications
Weiss, S.P. \ - Subsystem Manager - LMReentry and Descent
\ Structure Subsystem
Young, Wayne '_ - Program Control
MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER, HUNTSVILLE, ALABAMA
\
Abraham, Ron - Subsystem Manager - S-_C Instrumentation
Aden, Robert - R-ASTR-ES
Andressen, Christian - Planning & Resources Office
Blevins, Calvin B. - Chief, Engineering Branch, S-Ic Stage
Bostwick, Leonard C. - Deputy Manager, F-I Engine Project
Bucher, G. - Deputy Associate Director for Science
=
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MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CBNTER,_ HUNTSVILLE, ALABA_ (Cont 'd')
_ Bramlet, James B. - Deputy Managers Saturn V Program Office
Bridwell, Gene P. - S-If Subsystem Manager, Propulsion, and
Acting Chief, Engineering Group
_ BirdWell, Porter - I-V-S-II (Propulsion Subsystem Manager)
Brown, R. - Chief, Program Control, Engine Program
Burks, Alfred - I-E-MGR
Clark, Adrian - Project Engineer, S-1C-R&DO
Cook, Richard - Deputy Director of R&DO
Crossman, Robert L. - Chief, Contracts Management Branch,
Contracts Office
DeNeed, Carl - I-PL-MGR
Dodd - Test Laboratory
Drummond, Floyd M. - Manager, Airlock Module, AAP
Duerr, Frledrlck -Manager IU Stage
Dunlap, Porter - Manager_ Group Support Equipment -AAP
Parish, P.T. - Manager, Systems Safety
Ferrell, Toon - I-E-J
Foster, Jay - Executive Staff
Fritz, Carl - Program Development
Fuhrmann, Herbert W. - Branch Chief, Mechanlcal Systems Branch
Propulsion Division, P&VE Laboratory
Godfrey, Roy - S-IV-B Project Manager
Grlner, Robert F. - S-IV-B Project Engineer, Systems Engineering/
Project Office, P&VE Laboratory
Haenish, Hilmar - Apollo Applications Program Office
Hagen, William A. - Executive Staff
Hallisey, Harold W. - Chief, Project Control Branch, S-1C Stage
Hughes, Ned - Project Engineer S-II, R&DO (P&VE)
Ise, Rein - Manager, Apollo Telescope Mount, AAP
James, L.B. - Director_ Program Management
Jean, Otha C. - Deputy Director, Aero-Astrodynamlcs Lab R&DO
LeBerte, Peter - I-S-IV-B Subsystem Manager
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__R_SHALL SPACE _IGHT CENTER, HUNTSVILLE, ALABAMA (Cont'd.)
Lutes, W.R. - Deputy Center Director
Marshall, Larry - GSE
Mathews, Charles - Deputy Associate Administrator
McCool, A.A. - Chief, Systems Eng/ProJect Office
McCulloch, James - Saturn-IV-B Stage Manager
Mclnnls - 0WS
Messer, D. - Chief, Projects Support Office
Murphy, J.T. - Director, Program Development
Naumcheff - Huntsville Operations Support Center
Pace, Robert E. - Program Engineering and Integration, AAP
Paetz, Robert - Deputy Manager, S-1C Stage
Reed, Joe - Member of Executive Staff
Rees, E. F.M. - Center Director
Reinartz, S.R. - Deputy Manager, Skylab Program
Rlchettl, Gary - Assistant to Head of Manpower Office
Rodgers, Richard - R-P&VE-PAX
Rudolph, Arthur - Saturn V Program, Former Manager
Simmons, William K. - Mmnagerj Orbiting Workshop - AAP
Smith, Gent - R-ASTR-PE
Smith, Robert A. - Executive Staff
Smith, T.P. - Manager, J-2 Engine Project
Sneed, B.H. - Director Program Planning
Stewart, F.M. - Project Manager F-I Engine
Stewart, Rodney D. - Manager, LM/A - AAP
Stone, John F. - S-If Stage, Deputy Manager
Sweat, S.J. - IBM Resident Office
Tanner, Roy - S-IV-B Project Engineer
Astrlonlcs Project Office
Thomason, Herman E. - Research and Development
Thompson, Arthur W. - Former Manager, S-I/IB Stage
Urlaub, Matthew W. - Project Manager S-1C Stage
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Walte, Jack H. - Manager, AAP Experiments
Webb, Horton - Saturn V Program Control
Westrope, Dewltt - R-P&VE-PAX
Wheeler, L. - Sub-systemManager F-l Engine Project Office
Willlam_ - Manufacturing Engineering Lab RbDO
Wood, Charles L. - Deputy Manager, Airlock Module, AAP
KENNEDY SPACECRAFT CENTER
Beddlngfleld, S.T. - Apollo Spacecraft Office
Clark, William - Stage Manager IU
Clearman, Bill - Systems Engineering
(Deputy to Director J. C. Wooton)
Hecker, Ed - Stage Manager SIC
Hock, Robert C. - Deputy Manager AAP
Mathews, Ed - Deputy Director, Apollo Program Office
Noyd_ J.W. - Staff of Apollo Program Manager
Popovlch, Ed - Stage Manager S-2
Rock, Willlam - Rellability & Quallty Assurance Office
Sohnoor, Richard - Management Systems Office
Scrivener, James - Resources & Financial Management Office
Spencer, Dwight - Opezations & Support Office
Sweida, Ernest - Executive Staff
' Wi11iams, Grady F. - Deputy Director, Design Engineering
GODDARD SPACE FLIGHT CENTER
Mackey, J. O'Neil, Jr. - Chief of Procurement
CONTRACTORS
GRUMMAN AEROSPACE CORPORATION
Barzelay, Arthur - Special Corporate Management Team
Fisher, Lewis - Asst. RASPO Manager for Engineering
Gavin, Joseph G. - Vice President, Space Affairs
O0000003-TS F11
- 161 -
GRUMMANAEROSPACE CORPORATION (CP_t'd')+ +
Hoboken, Andrew - RASPO Manager
Kelly, Thomas J. - Assistant LM Program Director for Engineering
Leahy, Jack - Business Development
Markarlan, Donald J. - Deputy Director, LM Program
Miller, Seward E. -Former Spacecraft Director, LM 4
_ Trlpp, Dr. R. - Director, LEM Program
i
Wright, Howard T. - Deputy D_rector, LEM Program
LTVC0m'0m T ON,p  AS,__TTES
Fuller, Robert - Program Manager of Reliability Assurance
& Environmental Test
MCDONNELL-DOUGLAS ASTRONAUTICS COMPANY|
Bauer, H.E. - Director and Assistant General Manager
Saturn/Apollo and Apollo Applications
Programs
Button, M.C. - Director - Systems Development
Saturn/Apollo and Apollo Appllcatlons
Programs
Hanson, G.F. - Director - Productions
Saturn/Apollo and Apollo Appllcations
Programs
Pakiz, J.J. - Deputy Director Program Control
Saturn/Apollo and Apollo Appllcatlons
Programs
Prentice, R.W. - Deputy Director, Systems Development
Saturn/Apollo and Apollo Appllcatlons
Programs
Roblns, N, B. - Deputy Director - Systems Safety and
Product Rellability, Saturn/Apollo and
Apollo Applications Program
Tyson, O.S. - Resident Manager, Resident Management
Office
Yarchin, S, - Program Director, Saturn V Workshop
NORT]{ AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPOFATION,. DOWNEY
Briggs, Glenn W. - Deputy Resident Manager, Resident Apollo
Spacecraft Program Office
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NORTHA R CAN ROCK LLC0R ORATIpNDO E! (Cont'd.)
Carroll, R.E. - Vice President, Contracts and Pricing
Fagan, G.R. - CSM Program, Planning and Control,
Apollo CSM
Gray, L.B. - CSM Program, Manager, CSM Reliability
Kehlet, A.B. - CSM Program, Space Shuttle
Lindeman, R. - Chief, Configuration Management
Resident Apollo Spacecraft Program Office
McDermott, T.C. - Vice President, Quality and Reliability
Assurance
McNamara, J.P. - Executive Vice President, Space Division
Power System Division
Crossland, W.D. - Division Director, Facilities and Industrial
Engineering
Rocketdyne Division
Aldrich, D.E. - F-I Program Manager
Armstrong, Jack L. - Vice President and General Manager
Small Engine Division
Ek, Matthew C. - Chief Engineer, Design and Development
Engineering
Girard, D.M. - Manager, Management Technology
Greenfield, S. - Program Manager in IR&D and Technology
Utilization
Hargiss, W.C. - Director, Quality Control
Johnson, N.D. - H-I Program Manager
Mulliken, F.R. - Project Engineer, F-I Development
Revel, Norman C. - Assistant General Manager
Liquid Rocket Division
Stratton, Harold S. - Assistant J-2 Program Manager
Yogi, P.R. - Engineer and Test Vice President
Space Divislon
Beat, R.H. - Manager, Contracts and Pricing
Brennan, R.C. - Electrlcal/Electronlc Design Engineering
Saturn S-II Program
Cutler, H.H. - Deputy Manager, Saturn Derivatives Office
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Space Division (Cont'd.)
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Dean, W, E, - Manager, Business Operations
Drucker, M.I. - Director, Contracts and Pricing CSM
Programs
Eaglen, R.L. - Saturn S-If Quality & Reliability
Assurauce Manager
Ezell, W.F. - S-II _'rogram, Chief Engineer
Goldsby, W. - S-ll Resident Contracting Officer
Long, W.M. - Manager, Structural Systems
Matteson, E.L. - Manager, Project Engineering
Merrick, G.B. - Chief Program Engineer, Apollo CSM Program
Mihelick, J.F. - Manager, Apollo CSM Material Management
Miller, Ford - Chief, Project Engineering, Resident Apollo
Spacecraft Program Office
Myers, Dale D. - Vice President and General Manager, CSM
Programs
Olsen, R.E. - Deputy Manager, Business Operations
Olsen, M.R. - S-ll Program Manager, Test Operations
Osluud, J. - Supervisor, Stage Mechanical Design
Parsch, D.R. - Material Manager, Saturn S-Ii Program
Raiklen, H. - Vice President and S-ll Program Manager -
Rubadeau, J.A. - Manager, S-II Manufacturing, Engineering
and Controls
Schwartz, R. , - Manager, Mechanical Systems
Tondre, G.J. - S-II Program Manager, Engineering Operations
Twight, F.F. - Manager, CSM Test Operations
RCA (Camden and Moorestown_ New Jersey)
Botkln, Charles C. - Manager Equipment Programs, Missile &
Suzface Radar Division
Goldman, Max - Manager Program Management, Defense
Communications Systems Division
Holt, S.B. - Manager Aerospace Programs, Defen=e
Communications Systems Division
Piro, Phi11ip A. - Di_islon Vice President & General Manager
Missile & Surface Radar Division
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RCA (Camden and Moorestown I New Jersey) Cont'd.
Schnapf, Abraham - Manager TIROS & TOS, Astro-Electronics Div.
Waddington, Willian - Manager Program Planning and Control,
Missile & Surface Radar Division
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APPENDIX B
i_ PUBLICATIONS LIST
W_orklng Papers Role of jthe Project Manager
6223-WP-I "The Role of the Project Man_ger and
Management Systems in the Man,ge_nent
of the Apollo Program," Richa:cd J.
: Hopeman and David L. Wilemon, December,
l I 1968. 10 p.
6223-WP-2 "Systems Analysls and Management,"
Richard J. Hopeman, December,1968. 49 p.
6223-WP-3 "The Spectrum of Project Management,"
John P. Cicero, December,1968. 13 p.
6223-WP-4 "The Apollo Project Manager-Contractor
Interface," Eugene E. Drucker, October
1969. 17 p.
6223-WP-5 "Project Management Authority: Some
Preliminary Insights," David L. Wilemon,
December, 1968. 29 p.
6223-WP-6 "A Concept of Project Authorityi" John
P. Cicero, March, 1969. 24 p.
6223-WP-7 "A Concept of Project Authority: The NASA/
Apollo Progranmlatic Environment," John P.
Cicero and David L. Wilemon, Juue, 1969.
42 p.
6223-WP-8 "NASA and the Apollo Program," William
- Pooler and Alphonse Sallett, July, 1969.
24 p.
6223-WP-9 "Project Management: A New Dimension in
Complex Task Management," David L. Wilemon,
July, 1969. 43 p.
6223-WP-I0 "The NASA Scheduling, System: Scheduling in
the Apollo Program_. (Part 1 of 6), R. J.
Hopeman, July, 1969. 34 p.
6223-WP-II "The NASA Scheduling System: Scheduling in
Project Management," (Part 2 of 6), R. J.
Hopeman, August, 1969. 28 p.
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_W,orking Papers Role of the Project Manager
I_ 6223-WP-12 "The NASA Scheduling System: The
Techniques of Scheduling in the
Apollo Program," R. J. Hopeman,
May, 1970. 21 p.
6223-WP-16 "Project Management at Houston,"
Henry J. Anna, August, 1969. 18 p.
6223-WP-17 "Project Authority: A Multidimensional
View," John P. Cicero and David L.
Wllemon, December, 1969. 18 p.
6223-WP-18 "The Apollo Project Manager: Anomalies
and Ambiguities," David L. Wilemon and
John P. Cicero, December, 1969. 21 p.
6223-WP-19 "Relationships Between Research and
Development Operations and Industrial
Operation at MSFC," Bernard D. Wood,
April, 1969. 27 p.
6223-WP-20 "Project Management and the Organization, "
Part I," Henry J. Anna and H. George
Frederickson, August, 1969. 66 p.
6223-WP-21 "Project Management as a Transferable .
Management System," David L. Wilemon,
September, 1969. 24 p.
6223-WP-22 "Project Management and the Organization,
Part II," Henry J. Anna and H. George
Frederickson, October, 1969. 51 p.
6223-WP-23 'iOn the Application and Dissemination of
Space Age Management Technology," D. L.
Wilemon, January, 1970. 21 p.
6223-WP-24 "The NASA-Apollo Contractor Interface:
The Resident Management Operation,"
B. Kelmachter, February, 1970. 16 p.
6223-WP-25 "NASA Priorities in Orbit: The Waxing
and Waning of Moon Mania," H. G. Frederickson
and R. Loverd, February, 1970. Ii p.
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Working Papers Role of th e Project TManager
6223-WP-26 "The Power Spectrum in Project Management,"
G. R. Gemmill and D. L. Wilemon, February_
1970. 17 p.
6223-WP-27 "Transferring Space-Age Management
" D. L Wilemon, July, 1970,Technology,
17 p.
6223-WP-28 "Dimensions of Interpersonal Power in
Project Managements" David L. Wilemon
and Gary R. Gemmill, November, 1970,
25 p.
6223-WP-29 "Program Innovation in a Complex Organi-
zation (MSFC's Program Development Operation) ,"
David L. Wilemonj July, 1971. 29 p.
6223-WP-30 "Project Management: A View from Apollo,"
David L. Wilemon, October, 1971. 24 p.
Occasional Papers
6223-0P-I "The College of Business Administration--
Circa 1995," Richard J. Hopeman, October,
1968. 17 p.
6223-0P-2 "Reflections on Interdisciplinary Research," "
Richard J. Hopeman and David L. Wilemon,
June, 1969. 20 p.
6223-OP-3 "Interdisciplinary Research in a University,"
Bernard D. Wood, April, 1969. 12 p,
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6223-OP-4 "Managing Product Development Systems: A
Project Management Approach," David L. Wilemon,
Rev. October, 1969. 18 p.
6223-OP-5 "Bureaucracy and the Urban Poor," H. George
Frederickson and Henry J. Anna, August, 1969.
20 p.
6223-OP-6 "Interdisciplinary Effort: Research or
Problem Solving?", Eugene E. Drucker,
September, 1969. 10 p.
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Occaslonal Pape,rs
_ 6223-R-1 "Project Management in the Apollo
(Interim Report) Program," E. E. Drucker, W. Pooler,
D. L. Wilemon, B. D. Wood, April,
1970. 34 p.
6223-TD-I "Impact of Budget Execution on Manage-
ment Behavior: A Study of Managerial
: Perception, Interim Report #i," Harry J°
Lasher, December, 1968. 117 p.
6223-TD-2 "Impact of Budget Execution on Management
Behavior: A Study of Managerial Perception,
Interim Report #2," Harry J. Lasher,
December, 1968. Ii p.
6223-TD-3 "The Professional and Technical Qualifica-
tions of Apollo Project Managers," John P.
Cicero, August, 1969. 151 p. (Master's
Thesis).
!-_ 6223-TD-4 "The Career Development of NASA-Apollo
Project Managers and Their Industrial
" Barry L. Kelmachter,Counterparts, "
April, 1971. 133 p. (Master's Thesis).
6223-TD-5 "Non-Hierarchlcal Public Management: A
Study in Science and Technology," Henry
John Anna, August, 1971. 268 p. (Doctoral
Thesis).
6223-TD-6 "The Relation of Five Personality Traits
to Participant Attitudes Toward Simulated
Project and Tradltlonal Management Procedures
" John PWithin a University Environment,
Cicero, October, 1971o 124 p. (Doctoral
Thesis).
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Articles Published by Team Members
a) "The Project Manager: Anomalies and Ambiguities," D. L. Wilemon
and J. P. Cicero. Academy of Management Journal, September, 1970.
This article was reviewed in the JanT-Feb i97-i,_ "Innovation/Search
supplement to Innovation. The article also has been accepted for
publication in the book entlt_ed, Reg_dlngsi_n BusJ.n_esspg_!.icy, by
Bonge and Coleman to be published by the Macmillan Co. in late 1971.
b) "Transferring Space-Age Management: Are There Potentials for
- "" D. L. Wileaon. ConferenceEnvironmental Problem Solving_ ,
Bo_ard Record, October, 1970. An abstract of this article appears
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